The imf Conditionality in the Age of Post-National Governance

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Vojtěch Belling ◽  
Lukáš Kollert ◽  
Martin Vojta
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Program Design ◽  
Currency Union ◽  
Currency Unions ◽  
Monetary Unions ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Member States ◽  
Board Decision ◽  
Supranational Institutions ◽  
The Imf

Abstract The paper focuses on conditionality in imf programs for member states of monetary unions in light of the decision of the imf’s Executive Board on Program Design in Currency Unions (2018). Despite the growing importance of supranational institutions, the imf lacked until 2018 any explicit framework for imposing conditions on currency union bodies in cases where a member state of such a union requested an imf program. The aim of this paper is to assess the newly adopted imf approach to conditionality for currency union institutions based on the concept of “policy assurances” and to answer the question of whether the imf had authority to impose conditions on supranational institutions prior to the 2018 Board decision and whether the imf should in principle have such authority.

scholarly journals The European Commission’s Shifting Climate Leadership

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Birger Skjærseth
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Member State ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Member States ◽  
International Context ◽  
Climate Targets ◽  
Climate Policies ◽  
Supranational Institutions ◽  
State Preferences

The European Commission has played a crucial role in promoting ambitious EU climate targets and policies that boost the credibility of EU leadership-by-example efforts internationally. The approach has gradually shifted from leadership toward more strategic behavior that reflects the preferences of the member states. Reduced uncertainty concerning member-state preferences and solutions accounts for much of the change in leadership. Uncertainty has decreased as climate policies have become more mature and member states have gained experience from implementing them. Asymmetries in member-state preferences, decision-making procedures, and impatience caused by the international context are all important conditions for the European Commission’s leadership. These observations lend support to apparently contradictory theories that have seen EU climate policy as propelled either by autonomous supranational institutions or by increasingly ambitious member states.

Lessons and Conclusions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Program Design ◽  
Control Agency ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Imf

The concluding chapter draws on the seven program cases to answer questions that were posed at the outset of the study. It explains in particular the choice of the institutional mix for countries’ financial rescues: Euro-area member states wished to involve the IMF because their preferences diverged from those of the European Commission. Regime complexity is thus the consequence of states’ strategies to control agency drift. The choice of the institutions also inhered in the diversity of preferences among member states and in unanimous decision-making within the euro area. This argument, unlike other explanations, helps to explain why Germany adhered to the IMF despite sharp substantive conflicts on particular points of program design and why heated conflicts among the institutions did not lead to the demise of the troika. The chapter also recommends institutional reforms to prepare for the next crisis and proposes an agenda for future research on regime complexity.

Implementation Plan in Response to the Executive Board-Endorsed Recommendations for the IEO Evaluation Report—The IMF and the Crises in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal

Policy Papers ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Good Governance ◽  
Currency Union ◽  
Access To Information ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Implementation Plan ◽  
Work Program ◽  
Independent Evaluation ◽  
The Imf

This paper sets out Management’s response to the Independent Evaluation Office’s (IEO) report The IMF and the Crises in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal as part of the Management and staff follow-up to an IEO evaluation. The implementation plan proposes specific actions to address the recommendations endorsed by the Executive Board in its July 19, 2016 discussion. The implementation plan notes the Board’s endorsement of the principles that the IMF’s technical analysis should remain independent, that existing policies should be followed and should not be changed without careful deliberation, and that the Executive Board and Management should reaffirm their commitment to accountability and transparency, as well as the role of independent evaluation in fostering good governance. As to the IEO’s specific recommendations supported by the Board, the implementation plan proposes actions to address the need for the Fund to clarify how guidelines on program design apply to currency union members, the need for the Fund to establish a policy on cooperation with regional financing arrangements, and the need to further strengthen Fund cooperation with the IEO, including on modalities of interactions between the IEO and Fund staff and the IEO’s access to information. The implementation of some of the proposed actions is already underway and some actions have been included in the Fall 2016 Work Program. The paper also explains how implementation will be monitored by the Executive Board.

The Chairman’s Summing Up - The IMF and the Crises in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal - An Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office - Executive Board Meeting 16/69 - July 19, 2016

Policy Papers ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (44) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Vital Role ◽  
Learning Culture ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Currency Unions ◽  
Board Meeting ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Independent Evaluation ◽  
General Thrust ◽  
The Imf

Executive Directors welcomed the report by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) on the IMF and the Crises in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, and appreciated the accompanying statement by the Managing Director. They agreed that the report’s findings provide valuable insights and lessons for handling crises in members of currency unions. Directors underscored that the work of the IEO continues to play a vital role in enhancing the learning culture within the Fund, strengthening the Fund’s external credibility, and supporting the Executive Board’s oversight responsibilities. Directors broadly shared the general thrust of the IEO’s main findings and broadly endorsed its recommendations, with some caveats.

Compensating for limitations in domestic output performance? Member state delegation of policy competencies to regional international organizations

2020 ◽  
pp. 004711782097032
Author(s):  
Diana Panke
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Policy Area ◽  
Member States ◽  
Domestic Output ◽  
Window Dressing ◽  
Output Performance ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Energy States

Cooperation in regional international organizations (RIOs) can help member states to work toward and perhaps achieve policy goals that would not be feasible unilaterally. Thus, RIOs might be used as a means of states to compensate for domestic shortcomings in output performance. Do states equip RIOs with policy competencies in order to compensate corresponding domestic performance shortcomings? The analysis of a novel database on policy competencies of 76 RIOs between 1945 and 2015 reveals that usually RIOs are not usually used as window-dressing devices by which states disguise limited domestic output performance. Instead, governments tend to equip RIOs with policy competencies in order to further strengthen their already good output performance in most policy areas. However, in the policy area, ‘energy’ states tend to confer more competencies to their respective RIOs, the worse they perform domestically, indicating that output-related compensation dynamics might be at play in this field.

scholarly journals Dealing fairly with trade imbalances in monetary unions

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-66
Author(s):  
Marco Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
Trade Deficit ◽  
Current Situation ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Monetary Unions ◽  
Member States ◽  
Trade Imbalances ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
The Impact

Politicians around the globe wrangle about how to deal with trade imbalances. In the Eurozone, members running a trade deficit accuse members running a surplus of forcing them into deficit. Yet political philosophers have largely overlooked issues of justice related to trade imbalances. I address three such issues. First, what, if anything, is wrong with trade imbalances? I argue that in monetary unions, trade imbalances can lead to domination between member states. Second, who should bear the burden of rebalancing trade? I argue that surplus and deficit countries should share that burden. The current situation placing the burden squarely on deficit countries is unjust. Third, which institutional arrangements should monetary unions adopt to regulate trade balances? Monetary unions can either reduce trade imbalances within the monetary union, neutralise the impact of trade imbalances on the economic sovereignty of member states, or delegate economic policy affecting trade balances to a legitimate supranational institution. The Eurozone must adopt one of these options to prevent member states from domination. Which option protects members best against domination depends on what makes interference between members arbitrary, an unresolved question in republican theories of justice.

Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Responsibility of Member states of an International Organization

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Odette Murray
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Member State ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Member States ◽  
Draft Article ◽  
Legal Limit ◽  
Primary Rule

AbstractThis paper applies two manifestations of the principle of good faith – pacta sunt servanda and the doctrine of abuse of rights – to the complex relationship between member states and international organizations. The paper argues that these existing doctrines operate as a legal limit on the conduct of states when creating, controlling and functioning within international organizations. The paper begins by exploring an innovative provision in the International Law Commission's recently finalised Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations – Draft Article 61 – according to which a member state will bear international responsibility for the act of an international organization where the member state uses the organization to circumvent its own international obligations. Examining the development of Draft Article 61 and the jurisprudence upon which it is based, this paper argues that the principle which the Commission in fact seeks to articulate in Draft Article 61 is that of good faith in the performance of treaties. As such, being based on a primary rule of international law, this paper queries whether Draft Article 61 belongs in a set of secondary rules. The paper then considers the role of states in the decision-making organs of international organizations and argues that the widely held presumption against member state responsibility for participation in decision-making organs can and should be displaced in certain cases, in recognition of the various voting mechanisms in international organizations and the varied power which certain states may wield. The paper argues that the doctrine of abuse of rights operates as a fundamental legal limit on the exercise of a member state's voting discretion, and thereby forms a complementary primary obligation placed on states in the context of their participation in international organizations.

Situation-Oriented Designation of the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction by Non-Member States

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Mohammad Hadi Zakerhossein
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Specific Situation ◽  
State Party ◽  
Member States ◽  
Rules Of Procedure ◽  
Article 5

Abstract Rule 44 of the icc Rules of Procedure and Evidence stipulates that non-state parties to the Rome Statute may accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in Article 5 of relevance to the situation by lodging a declaration under Article 12(3) of the Statute. The ending phrase of this provision gives rise to the speculation that a non-member state has a power to accept the Court’s jurisdiction in a partial way, namely over a specific situation. To examine this feasibility, the present article will: (i) explain the functions of the Article 12(3) mechanism; (ii) discuss the possibility of making a situational acceptance; and (iii) contemplate the meaning of the concept of situation. This article suggests that a non-state party can exclusively accept the Court’s jurisdiction over a specific situation, and that is a concrete crisis within a territory.

Enhanced Cooperation and European Tax Law

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Heber
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Entire Group ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Member States ◽  
State Laws ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
The Law

The enhanced cooperation mechanism allows at least nine Member States to introduce secondary EU law which is only binding among these Member States. From an internal market perspective, enhanced cooperation laws are unique as they lie somewhere between unilateral Member State laws and uniform EU law. The law creates harmonisation and coordination between the participating Member States, but it may introduce trade obstacles in relation to non-participating Member States. This book reveals that the enhanced cooperation mechanism allows Member States to protect their harmonised values and coordination endeavours against market efficiency. Values which may not be able to justify single Member State’s trade obstacles may outweigh pure internal market needs if an entire group of Member States finds these value worthy of protection. However, protection of the harmonised values can never go as far as shielding participating Member States from the negative effects of enhanced cooperation laws. The hybrid nature of enhanced cooperation laws—their nexus between the law of a single Member State and secondary EU law—also demands that these laws comply with state aid law. This book shows how the European state aid law provisions should be applied to enhanced cooperation laws. Furthermore, the book also develops a sophisticated approach to the limits non-participating Member States face in ensuring that their actions do not impede the implementation of enhanced cooperation between the participating Member States.

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