PARADIGMA HUKUM ISLAM TEOANTROPOSENTRIS: TELAAH PARADIGMATIS PEMIKIRAN FAZLUR RAHMAN DAN ABDULLAH SAEED

Penelitian ini ingin melihat bagaimana paradigma dan teori penafsiran hukum Fazlur Rahman dan Abdullah Saeed. Teori penafsiran Rahman (double movement) dan Saeed (teori kontekstual), penulis hipotesakan mempunyai sandaran paradigmatis yang mapan. Dalam konteks inilah, tulisan ini juga ingin menelisik bagaimana relasi paradigma dan teori penafsiran hukum mereka berdua. Hal ini penting karena telah terjadi krisis paradigmatis dalam studi hukum Islam, yakni terpisahnya wacana teologi sebagai basis paradigmatis hukum dengan wacana hukum Islam itu sendiri. Tulisan ini berbentuk kajian pustaka terhadap pemikiran Rahman dan Saeed. Sebagai alat analisis, penulis memakai teori paradigma sebagaimana digagas oleh Thomas Kuhn dan yang dikembangkan oleh pemikir lain semisal Kuntowijoyo dan Hans Kung. Tulisan ini menyimpulkan, pertama, paradigma Rahman dan Saeed berporos pada visi teologis yang telah bergeser dari teosentris atau antroposentris ke teoantroposentris. Pergeseran visi teologis tersebut adalah dari keimanan tauhidi yang abstrak ke yang fungsional, dari keadilan formal ke keadilan yang substantif, dari peran akal sebagai the logic of justivication and repetition ke the logic of discovery, dari keterbelengguan manusia (fatalisme) ke kebebasan (freedom). Kedua, konsisten dengan paradigma di atas, Rahman dan Saeed merumuskan teori double movement (gerakan ganda) dan teori kontekstual. Teori kontekstual Saeed adalah pengembangan lebih lanjut dari teori gerakan ganda Rahman. Saeed memperjelas bentuk teori gerakan ganda dan merumuskan hirarki nilai. karena itu penulis mensintesakan teori keduanya sebagai penalaran reflektif hukum berbasis nilai maqa>s}id. This study wants to see how the paradigm and the theory of law interpretation of Fazlur Rahman and Abdullah Saeed. The theory of Rahman (double movement) and Saeed's interpretation (contextual theory), the hypothesis writer has an established paradigmatic backrest. In this context, this paper also wants to explore how the relations of paradigms and the theory of legal interpretation both of them. This is important because there has been a paradigmatic crisis in the study of Islamic law, namely the separation of theological discourse as a paradigmatic basis of law with the discourse of Islamic law it self. This paper takes the form of a literature study of the thoughts of Rahman and Saeed. As an analysis tool, the author uses paradigm theory as initiated by Thomas Kuhn and developed by other thinkers such as Kuntowijoyo and Hans Kung. This paper concludes, first, that the paradigm of Rahman and Saeed pivots on the theological vision that has shifted from theocentric or anthropocentric to theoanthropocentric. The theological vision shift is from the tauhidi faith which is abstract to the functional, from formal justice to substantive justice, from the role of reason as the logic of justification and repetition to the logic of discovery, from human reluctance (fatalism) to freedom. Second, consistent with the paradigm above, Rahman and Saeed formulated the theory of double movement and contextual theory. Saeed's contextual theory is a further development of Rahman's double movement theory. Saeed clarified the form of double movement theory and formulated a value hierarchy. Therefore the author synthesizes the second theory as a value-based legal reflective reasoning.

Hanson, Norwood Russell (1924–67)

Hanson was a philosopher of science who introduced novel ways of relating logical, historical and linguistic analyses. His best-known book, Patterns of Discovery, stressed the theory-ladeness of observational reports and argued that causality is a feature of inference systems, rather than of nature as such. He pioneered in combining historical and analytic analyses of significant breakthroughs in science. Though he clarified patterns of discovery he never succeeded in the project of developing a logic of discovery, or an account of the inferences leading from problematic situations to novel explanatory hypotheses. A man of many talents, he also made contributions to the history of science, aerodynamics and epistemology.

Discovery, logic of

Bacon, Descartes, Newton and other makers of the Scientific Revolution claimed to have found and even used powerful logics or methods of discovery, step-by-step procedures for systematically generating new truths in mathematics and the natural sciences. Method of discovery was also the prime method of justification: generation by correct method was something akin to logical derivation and thus the strongest justification a claim could have. The ’logic’ of these methods was deductive, inductive or both. By the mid-nineteenth century, logic of discovery was yielding to the more flexible and theory-tolerant method of hypothesis as the ’official’ method of science. In the twentieth century, Karl Popper and most logical positivists completed the methodological reversal from generativism to consequentialism by setting their hypothetico-deductive method against logic of discovery. What is epistemologically important, they said, is not how new claims are generated but how they fare in empirical tests of their predictive consequences. They demoted discovery to the status of historical anecdote and psychological process. Since the late 1950s, however, there has been a revival of interest in methodology of discovery on two fronts – logical and historical. An earlier explosion of work in symbolic logic had led to automata theory, computers, and then artificial intelligence. Meanwhile, a maturing history of science was furnishing information on science as a process, on how historical actors and communities actually discovered or constructed their claims and practices. Now, in the 1980s and 1990s, liberal epistemologists once again admit discovery as a legitimate topic for philosophy of science. Yet attempts to both naturalize and to socialize inquiry pose new challenges to the possibility of logics of discovery. Its strong associations with ’the’ method of science makes logic of discovery a target of postmodernist attack, but a more flexible construal is defensible.