Emotional Intelligence and Risk Leadership on the Effectiveness of ISO 31000 Implementation in Organisation

ISO 31000 indicates that risk management is a science in which competencies are embedded in the individuals. It also emphasises the importance of having proper leadership while demonstrating the commitment towards the risk management implementation. Humans are emotional creatures—we could sometimes be influenced by the force of feelings, rather than rational discussion. This paper describes the dynamics of emotional intelligence and risk leadership in implementing risk management. The research used a qualitative-descriptive design with the verification strategy of case study. It used a non-probability sampling to individuals in the top management position. The findings suggest that without a proper level of emotional intelligence, it is difficult for leaders to cultivate an effective risk culture. These findings may equip decision makers on the interrelationships between emotional intelligence, risk culture, and organisation’s risk management maturity.

Estrategia para la verificación de declaraciones PAC a partir de imágenes Sentinel-2 en Navarra

<p>In June 2018, the European Commission approved a modification of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that, among other measures, proposed the use of Copernicus data for the verification process of farmers’ declarations. In recent years, several research efforts have been conducted to develop operational tools to accomplish this aim, among this the Interreg-POCTEFA PyrenEOS project. This article describes the methodological strategy proposed in the PyrenEOS project, which is based on the identification of the most probable crop using the Random Forests algorithm. Originally, the strategy builds a training sample from the CAP declarations file based on their NDVI time series. In addition, a series of rules are proposed to establish the level of uncertainty in the classification, and the criteria used to represent each parcel in the verification map with a simple colour coding (traffic light), where green represents correctly declared parcels, red indicates that the declaration is dubious, and orange corresponds to parcels with a high classification uncertainty. This verification strategy has been applied to two Agricultural Regions of Navarre, during an agricultural campaign where valuable field inspections were available, with a sampling intensity of 7% of the declared parcels. The results obtained, report overall accuracies close to 80% when the most probable crop was considered, and 90% when the two most probable crops were considered. This proves it is possible to identify correctly declared parcels (green parcels) with an error below 1%. Orange and red parcels should be considered for further analysis and inspection by technicians from the paying agencies, though they represent a small percentage of declarations (~6% of parcels), and include most of the wrong declarations.</p>

Coordination of verification activities with incentives: a two-firm model

In systems engineering, verification activities evaluate the extent to which a system under development satisfies its requirements. In large systems engineering projects, multiple firms are involved in the system development, and hence verification activities must be coordinated. Self-interest impedes the implementation of verification strategies that are beneficial for all firms while encouraging each firm to choose a verification strategy beneficial to itself. Incentives for verification activities can motivate a single firm to adopt verification strategies beneficial to all firms in the project, but these incentives must be offered judiciously to minimize unnecessary expenditures and prevent the abuse of goodwill. In this paper, we use game theory to model a contractor-subcontractor scenario, in which the subcontractor provides a component to the contractor, who further integrates it into their system. Our model uses belief distributions to capture each firm’s epistemic uncertainty in their component’s state prior to verification, and we use multiscale decision theory to model interdependencies between the contractor and subcontractor’s design. We propose an incentive mechanism that aligns the verification strategies of the two firms and using our game-theoretic model, we identify those scenarios where the contractor benefits from incentivizing the subcontractor’s verification activities.

Study on Trusted Computing and Measurement Certification Technology of On-Board Operating System

Based on the complexity of space environment and the limitation of space resources, a dynamic metric authentication method for spaceborne operating system with the trusted chip support is proposed, and the configurable key metric object identification scheme and verification strategy are given. In this method, Key measurement objects and measurement strategies can be set according to the key level of on-board application. The critical application processes in operation can be measured and verified periodically, then a system security protection verification mechanism for on-board software is obtained. The experimental results show that the dynamic measurement method improves the reliability of the system, and the performance meets the requirements of on-board applications, which has great practical value.

Is Verifying Frequently an Optimal Strategy? A Belief-Based Model of Verification

Verification activities increase an engineering team’s confidence in its system design meeting system requirements, which in turn are derived from stakeholder needs. Conventional wisdom suggests that the system design should be verified frequently to minimize the cost of rework as the system design matures. However, this strategy is based more on experience of engineers than on a theoretical foundation. In this paper, we develop a belief-based model of verification of system design, using a single system requirement as an abstraction, to determine the conditions under which it is cost effective for an organization to verify frequently. We study the model for a broad set of growth rates in verification setup and rework costs. Our results show that verifying a system design frequently is not always an optimal verification strategy. Instead, it is only an optimal strategy when the costs of reworking a faulty design increase at a certain rate as the design matures.