Wavefronts and modal structure of long surface and internal ring waves on a parallel shear current

We study long surface and internal ring waves propagating in a stratified fluid over a parallel shear current. The far-field modal and amplitude equations for the ring waves are presented in dimensional form. We re-derive the modal equations from the formulation for plane waves tangent to the ring wave, which opens a way to obtaining important characteristics of the ring waves (group speed, wave action conservation law) and to constructing more general ‘hybrid solutions’ consisting of a part of a ring wave and two tangent plane waves. The modal equations constitute a new spectral problem, and are analysed for a number of examples of surface ring waves in a homogeneous fluid and internal ring waves in a stratified fluid. Detailed analysis is developed for the case of a two-layered fluid with a linear shear current where we study their wavefronts and two-dimensional modal structure. Comparisons are made between the modal functions (i.e. eigenfunctions of the relevant spectral problems) for the surface waves in homogeneous and two-layered fluids, as well as the interfacial waves described exactly and in the rigid-lid approximation. We also analyse the wavefronts of surface and interfacial waves for a large family of power-law upper-layer currents, which can be used to model wind generated currents, river inflows and exchange flows in straits. Global and local measures of the deformation of wavefronts are introduced and evaluated.

Modeling the Theory-Form: Beyond the Elements of Observational Postulation

We formalize a theory of the subject by sketching a pragmatic functional hierarchy of sapient cognition. Our expanded framework attempts to articulate a normative understanding of discursive cognition by demarcating its functional propriety within a naturalist rejoinder, seeing in the functional development of cognition from pre-discursive to discursive abilities an increase and refinement in representational competence found in non-intentional systems. We therein explain how sapient cognitive systems not only engage in patterns of material and formal inference to map intensional relations between phenomena in nature through theoretical and practical reasonings, but also engage in practices of theoretical construction and systematic integration through techniques of formalization that make the unity of nature and thought progressively intelligible. We trace the development of mind in its representational function from barren discriminatory capacities, shared with inanimate objects, to complex theory-forming systematizing conceptual abilities enabling agents to theoretically map and intervene upon the world of which they are part, and to embed the informational indexes they register from the environment that makes globally explicit the objective modal structure of the world.

Pengaruh Struktur Modal dan Bi Rate Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan Pada PT Bank Mega TBK

This study was aimed to reveal whether or not the effect of modal structure and BI Rate of company’s value in PT Bank Mega Tbk. The type study is associative research. The population was the financial data report of PT Bank Mega Tbk which accessed by www.idx.co.id in financial balance report from 2101 to 2019. This research used purposive sampling method. The technique of analysis data used multiple regression analysis couple with the classic assumption testing of normalities, multicolinearity tests, heterosticity tests, autocoreeclation tests, and regression model equations. Based on the result of this research shows that there is no significant effect of modal structure and negative to company’s value while BI Rate also is no significant and the result is positive to company’s value of PT Bank Mega Tbk

Nominalism

This chapter is a critical discussion of nominalist accounts of the ontology of the basic properties and relations present in our experience. Predicate nominalism, concept nominalism, class nominalism, resemblance nominalism, and trope theory are discussed. Several novel objections to forms of nominalism and trope theory, in other words to accounts of properties that deny they are universals, are developed. These include a series of objections that such accounts are not able to plausibly account for the essential features of specific basic properties that appear in our experience, such as colors, in other words that they misrepresent the modal structure of those properties.

Space, Time, and Location

This chapter is an account of the particularity of spatial and temporal regions as they appear within our experience. It argues that the spatial and temporal relations of these regions are sufficient to individuate them, despite standard objections. This involves a kind of moderate substantivalism about space. The chapter also explores some of the complex modal structure of the spatial relations in question, relevant for instance to geometric truth and the way in which things seem to reverse in mirrors. The eternalist view of time presumed by this account is defended against alternative conceptions of time such as presentism and the moving spotlight theory.

Modal Structuralism and Color

It is like something to have sensory experiences, and differences in this what-it’s-like, in this phenomenal consciousness, are called differences in “qualia.” Exploration of the modal structure of the superworld in earlier chapters is necessary groundwork for a plausible and novel account of how our neurophysiology is sufficient to account for the kinds of nonveridical qualia involved in our sensory experience, a physicalist account of at least the basic features of the naïve experience explored in this book. That is the focus of this chapter. Its core idea is that the apparent modal structure of such qualia as those involved in our experience is due to the actual modal structure of the neurophysiology that constitutes that experience. This chapter develops an initial sketch of this idea by treating the case of color. The robustly metaphysical modal structure apparently present in our experience of color is in fact a reflection of the much more mundane difference between activated and merely potentiated features of our neurophysiology.

Haecceities

This chapter is an account of the particularity of ordinary concrete objects like balls and bikes that appear within our experience. It argues that certain sorts of haecceities, which is to say irreducible individualities or bare particularities, are required to account for the particularity of such things. These haecceities involve modal structure of a distinctive sort. Various accounts are explored. But the central model developed involves haecceities of minimal spatial and temporal material bits, which help in turn to constitute the present time slice of a perceived object. This time slice could occur at different times or in different possible worlds, and instantiates a substantial form that constrains, in a perdurantist manner, available forms of identity over time rooted in concrete relations.

Introduction

This is an introductory chapter. It sketches the project of the book, which is to understand the ontology of a central class of particulars, and of their most basic and central properties and relations. This central class encompasses the commonsense entities that our experience seems naïvely to reveal. First of all, there are ordinary visible objects like balls and cars. The book investigates the kind of particularity they present in experience. Second, there are locations in space and time that such ordinary things occupy, and which have a somewhat different sort of particularity. Third, there are the material bits that make up the balls and cars. The proper understanding of both the particularity and the concrete properties and relations of ordinary concrete objects like these demands certain metaphysical novelties. It requires a return to the ancient conception that there is a difference between different ways of being, specifically between the existence of actual tables and chairs with their evident colors and shapes on one hand, and what might be called “the subsistence” of certain merely possible beings on the other. But it also requires the recognition of various sorts of unity relations less than strict identity, which for instance relate determinable and relevantly determinate properties. All these novelties involve distinctive forms of modal structure.