Consider your companions carefully: How voters perceive (coalition) governments’ poor valence images?

Numerous studies of comparative political behavior examine how voters perceive parties’ ideological positions on various policy issues, either in a standard uni-dimensional space or on single issues. These studies assume these ideological positions to be representative of the entire governing coalition, classifying the government as a single unitary. While a common assumption when assessing coalition governments’ ideological positions, it is unclear whether this logic of shared accountability holds for voters’ perceptions of valence. To fill this gap, I use a conjoint experiment to assess the perceptual influence of valence issues on coalitional accountability. Overall, my results show that unlike standard left-right ideological positions, voters project the prime minister’s and (junior) cabinet members’ low valence bidirectionally onto each other. This research has implications for the prime minister’s selection process for (junior) cabinet members and junior parties’ own calculus of whether to participate in a coalition or not.

Individual- and party-level determinants of far-right support among women in Western Europe

Support for Western Europe’s far-right is majority-male. However, given the sweeping success of the party family, literature on this ‘gender gap’ belies support given to the radical right by millions of women. We examine differences between men and women’s support for far-right parties, focusing on workplace experience, positions on economic and cultural issues, and features of far-right parties themselves. We find that the received scholarship on blue-collar support for far-right populists is a largely male phenomenon, and women in routine nonmanual (i.e. service, sales, and clerical) work are more likely than those in blue-collar work to support the far-right. Moreover, while men who support the far-right tend to be conservative on other moral issues, certain liberal positions predict far-right support among women, at both the voter and party level. Our analysis suggests that gender differences may obscure the socio-structural and attitudinal bases of support for far-right parties and have broader implications for comparative political behavior and gender and politics.

Islamist Organizations and the Provision of Social Services

For decades, Islamist groups’ provision of social services, such as schooling, medical care, welfare provision, and childrearing, has been a key feature of life and politics in the Islamic world. But despite their ubiquity, this phenomenon largely eluded sustained investigation and theorizing. This has recently changed as a variety of scholars have made increasingly detailed interventions into the question of nonstate social service provision by Islamist actors. This chapter reviews this literature and uses cases from across the Islamic world to conceptualize Islamist social service provision, theorize its causes, and isolate its effects. In the process, it highlights how research into Islamist social service provision can contribute to broader research agendas, including the political economy of authoritarian regimes and the role of religion in comparative political behavior.

Populism as a Problem of Social Integration

We argue that support for parties of the radical right and left can usefully be understood as a problem of social integration—an approach that brings together economic and cultural explanations for populism. With comparative survey data, we assess whether support for parties of the radical right and left is associated with feelings of social marginalization. We find that people who feel more socially marginal—because they lack strong attachment to the normative order, social engagement, or a sense of social respect—are more likely to be alienated from mainstream politics and to support radical parties. We also find an association between indicators for recent economic and cultural developments often said to affect social status and feelings of social marginalization, especially among people with low incomes or educational attainment. We conclude that problems of social integration and subjective social status deserve more attention from scholars of comparative political behavior.

Multilevel Analyses of Comparative Data: A Comment

The articles in this special issue all use multilevel methods to study comparative political behavior. This is obviously a good thing, for both methodology and comparative politics. Clearly comparative politics means comparing things and not just studying nations other than the United States. This is equally true of micropolitical studies. These articles all do a very nice job of showing how one can do comparative micropolitics (and tie together micro and macro variables).

Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior

The field of comparative political behavior has experienced an ironic course of development. Over the past generation, the field has generated a dramatic increase in the knowledge about how people think about politics, become politically engaged, and make their political decisions. Empirical data on citizen attitudes are now available on a near global scale. However, this increase in knowledge has occurred as the processes and structures of contemporary politics are transforming citizen politics. Thus, although more is known about contemporary electorates, the behavior of the public has become more complex and individualistic, which limits the ability to explain the behavior with the most common models. This article documents the expansion of this knowledge in several areas—political culture, political cognition, voting behavior, and political participation—and discusses the current research challenges facing the field.

Japan's Habitual Voters

Party identification has been shown to be comparatively weak and volatile in Japan. A search for alternative elements of continuity in partisan behavior indicates that many Japanese vote regularly for the same party, and for roughly one-fifth of the electorate this is done in the absence of a stable party identification. Following earlier work by Ivor Crewe, these nonidentifiers who still vote regularly for the same party are termed habitual voters. Habitual voters are less involved in issues, have fewer party images and have fewer ties to external groups that support their party than stable party identifiers. What makes the habitual voters stand out most is their absence of emotional commitments to the party they vote for regularly in elections and lack of negative feelings toward the parties they do not support. Habitual voting thus reflects one of the dominant traits of Japan's political culture, which is a strong tendency toward affective neutrality. Habitual voters are a new type of nonaffective partisan not anticipated in traditional political behavior theories, and as such their presence in Japan should be of interest to students of comparative political behavior.