EUROPEAN UNION’S QUEST FOR STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND BIDEN’S FOREIGN POLICY

Over the last decade the EU has faced challenges on numerous fronts: economic crisis and slow recovery, refugee crisis, terrorism, Brexit, lack of effectiveness of its foreign and security policy. In recent years, the EU has put new effort to define its purpose and standing in international relations, and it seeks to become strategically autonomous actor. That means an actor with the ability to set priorities and make decisions. As the role of the United States is still pre-eminent in the security of Europe, the EU-US relations have a special bearing on that EU’s ambition. In this paper we provide an overview of the relations between these two actors with the focus on the first year of Joseph Biden presidency, and we argue that through a complex interaction the EU will seek to define its policies independently of the United States, wishing to expand its space for maneuver and action.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGES IN THE US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE WESTERN BALKANS DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF BIDEN’S PRESIDENCY: THIRD OBAMA’S OR SECOND TRUMP’S TERM?

Many analysts expected a radical change in President Joseph Biden’s foreign policy compared to the foreign policy of previous President Donald Trump. A year after his electoral victory, opinions about how much Biden actually changed in the US foreign policy vary from those who see it as a revolutionary change to those who perceive it as a difference only in tone and continuity in the majority of crucial policy aspects. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by addressing the issues of continuity and changes in the new administration foreign policy towards the Western Balkans. Although many expected that Biden’s policy to the region would be much more similar to President Barrack Obama’s or even President Bill Clinton’s approach, this paper claims that the new administration has a lot in common with the course of the previous President Donald Trump. There are also some changes and modifications, but they seem to be less crucial than the elements of continuity that exist between Biden’s and Trump’s administrations’ foreign policy towards this region. The paper also addresses the causes of this continuity and claims that the main reason for that are structural factors on the level of the international system. However, some reasons for the continuity are also on the state (internal) and individual levels of analysis.

CHALLENGES TO THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE ACTIONS OF PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN AND PRIME MINISTER BORIS JOHNSON

The United States and the United Kingdom have special political, economic, military and cultural relations. The new American administration is restoring priority to multilateralism and old alliances, and the British authorities have announced an expansion of international engagement. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the fight against climate change, the growth of China’s influence, and threats to cybersecurity are the biggest international challenges in the view of both states. The US and the UK urge other states to jointly take responsibility and work out solutions to the world’s most crucial problems. The United Kingdom left the European Union in January 2020 and, in line with the rhetoric of the government, it regained a sovereign foreign policy. US-UK relations could deepen but new troubles appeared, for example the need to negotiate a new trade deal. However, the differences between Joe Biden and Boris Johnson are less important in the face of common interests, as evidenced by the signing of a new Atlantic Charter by both leaders in June 2021 or increasing joint engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.

UNITED STATES AND WAR ON TERROR: COSTS OF THE PYRRHIC VICTORY

The withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan during August 2021 puts an end to the longest war that America has ever fought and the first phase of the Global War on Terrorism. In this regard, two important questions arise, which we will try to answer in this paper. First, what are the main external and internal consequences that the United States has faced due to engaging in the “War on Terror”? Second, did the U.S. achieve its goals in that war? The external effects we have identified are the crisis of global leadership, the weakening of relations with the allies, the growth of China in the lee, and the rise of populism. Among the internal ones, we included the strengthening of the presidential function, the increase of state power, more profound social polarization, an increase in budget expenditures, and a growing deficit, as well as human casualties. In the end, we contributed to the debate on the nature of the U.S. “victory”. We are providing the argumentation in the direction that the final output of War on Terror should be named Pyrrhic victory.

THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION AND ARMS CONTROL

Did the Biden administration pick up at least some of the pieces of the broken liberal international order caused in some part by his predecessor Trump? Has he been acting according to his and his party’s promises during the presidential-elections campaign or has he stood by his predecessor’s decisions? And especially how much was done or “repaired” in the realm of arms control? These are the questions authors will try to answer in this paper. They will draw their conclusion by analyzing theoretical assumptions that lie behind the Trump’s and Biden’s approach toward the international institutions, including arms control, historical analysis of Trump’s legacy regarding international institutions, content analysis of Biden’s and Democratic Party’s promises and their comparison with the Republican attitudes. In assessing how much was done in the first year of Biden’s mandate in the realm of arms control, authors conclude that the results are mixed – in some cases Biden followed Trump’s decisions and in some other he completely changed the approach.

WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN: EXIT STRATEGIES

After twenty long and frustrating years, America has finally withdrawn completely from Afghanistan. This paper gives an overview of American actions in Afghanistan, starting with the George W. Bush administration and the invasion of American troops, assassination of Osama bin Laden and suppression of Al-Qaeda’s activities, through the Obama administration, during which the ISAF mission ended and throughout which the withdrawal of American troops was announced. After that, an overview of the activities during the mandate of Donald Trump is given, during which definite conditions for the withdrawal of troops were created, by signing the agreement in Doha between the United States of America and the Taliban, which was meant to bring the peace to the Afghanistan. At the end of the paper, an overview of the activities and the situation on the ground during the administration of Joe Biden is given, during which the complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan was finally completed, which the Taliban used it to reoccupy the country and declare the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

BIDEN’S APPROACH TOWARDS RUSSIA: A “RESET LIGHT”?

The topic of this paper is foreign policy course towards Russia employed by the incumbent United States president, Joseph Biden, during his first year in office. Motivated by the recent Biden-Putin bilateral summit and Biden’s remark on the U.S. and Russia as “two great powers”, the author presents a research question whether this event could be observed as the beginning of a “reset light” approach in Washington’s Russia policy. Unlike the previous “reset” of U.S.-Russian relations this time the goal would not be rapprochement, but structured confrontation between the two countries (such as the one which prevented escalation during the Cold War), with cooperation in areas where it is possible. Having considered Obama/Trump legacy, put Biden’s rhetoric and actions in current international and domestic context, and analyzed different issues over which Russia and the U.S. are in conflict/can cooperate, the author concludes that Biden’s approach can be considered a “reset light”, but that its success in the longer run is uncertain.

BIDEN ADMINISTRATION’S TRANSATLANTIC CHALLENGE

Joseph Biden’s electoral win in November 2020 was widely anticipated as American return to the global stage. In many academic and policy circles, the removal of “isolationist” Donald Trump and important triumph of liberal internationalist Biden was expected to bring about a new chapter in US relations with allies worldwide, leaving behind the awkwardness of previous administration’s reckless political style. However, once the global affairs started unfolding in 2021, Biden Administration’s key international slogan “America is back” also proved to be much more a thing of political style than well-developed substance. This article aims to examine the ways in which the Biden administration’s strategic posture during the first year of the presidency affected transatlantic relations. To that effect, key foreign policy speeches and documents have been analyzed and major international developments tracked. The key finding is that, despite the permissive context shaped by the Trump administration’s disparagement of European allies, the new administration has failed to move forward in terms of strengthening transatlantic ties. This goes to indicate that many of the issues have all along been more structural and had predated Trump’s policies, which means that they will be all the more difficult to overcome.

THE US-RUSSIA RAPPROCHEMENT: THE (IM)POSSIBLE DIRECTION FOR A US FOREIGN POLICY

The authors of this paper examine the possible change of course in the United States foreign policy and strategic adjustment towards Russia in international relations. Although the United States were the sole superpower in the world after the end of the Cold War, the contemporary international system is marked by growing multipolarity. This change in the international arena is caused by the rise of two revisionist great powers – China and Russia. Although China represents the US’ main geopolitical rival, Russia does not lack the ambition to influence current world affairs. Possible relative gain in Sino-American rivalry for the United States could be achieved through closer cooperation with Russia. Although this hypothetical appeasement could be beneficial for the US, the authors of this paper take the stance that rapprochement between the two countries is currently unlikely. Using neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework, the paper examines the possible US-Russian strategic cooperation, including both external and internal factors that influence state foreign policy and strategic adjustment. The paper also examines the US opening to China during the Cold War under the administration of President Richard Nixon and compares it to the contemporary state of world affairs.

NAČELA EKONOMSKE BEZBEDNOSTI

Politika ekonomske bezbednosti se oblikuje pod dejstvom različitih faktora, zato se u procesu ostvarenja tih ciljeva bezbednosti moraju primeniti određena rukovodna načela. Primena načela ekonomske bezbednosti treba da omoguće da država u celini ali i njen sistem bezbednosti budu stabilni, što podrazumeva da isti ne unose poremećaje u njenim privrednim procesima. Načela o ekonomskoj bezbednosti ne treba da budu postavljena apstraktno, izvan datog društvenog, ekonomskog, političkog, bezbednosnog, pravnog i socijalnog ambijenta. Njihovu sadržinu bezbednosna teorija uobličava uzimajući u obzir prilike koje vladaju u datom društvu. Politiku nacionalne bezbednosti treba koncipirati tako da se celina postavljenih zahteva u načelima ekonomske bezbednosti što potpunije ostvari, ali se mora imati u vidu da do određenih odstupanja mora doći. Osnovni problem pri tome je jedinstvena, stalna i ujednačena, ničim sputavana primena ovih načela istovremeno.