Why did President Obama Not Recognize the Armenian Genocide? Hints from the Obama Administration Memoirs – and Other Sources

Ad Americam ◽

10.12797/adamericam.22.2021.22.07 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 22 ◽

pp. 101-124

Author(s):

Julien Zarifian

Keyword(s):

Vice President ◽

The United States ◽

Barack Obama ◽

Armenian Genocide ◽

Hillary Clinton ◽

Personal Choice ◽

President Obama ◽

Obama Administration ◽

White House

Why did President Obama Not Recognize the Armenian Genocide? Hints from the Obama Administration Memoirs – and Other Sources This paper discusses the reasons and processes that led the Obama administration to notrecognize the Armenian Genocide. Although Barack Obama had promised he would doso during his presidential campaign of 2008, he never did once in office, despite many of his administration members, including Vice-President Joe Biden and Secretaries of State Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, having strong records in support of such a recognition. To investigate this hitherto poorly explored question, this paper uses primarily — although not exclusively — memoirs written by Barack Obama and members his administration, some of them addressing the issue directly, others dealing with it indirectly. This study focuses on President Obama’s personal choice, and therefore responsibility, to not recognize the genocide, but also expands on the geopolitical determinants of this non-recognition (related mostly to the geostrategic importance of Turkey) as well as on its diplomatic aspects (involving particularly the argument that US recognition would hamper a hypothetical Turkey-Armenia rapprochement). Two episodes of possible presidential recognition of the genocide will be particularly discussed; one in April 2009 (three months after Obama became president of the United States and coinciding with April 24, the anniversary of the genocide), and the other in 2015 (corresponding to its centenary). Finally, stress will be placed on the positions and role of the president’s entourage at the White House, and on his State and Defense Secretaries.

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Introduction

10.1093/oso/9780190901264.003.0001 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Caron E. Gentry

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

The United States ◽

Imago Dei ◽

Power Structures ◽

President Obama ◽

Reinhold Niebuhr ◽

Christian Realism ◽

Feminist Thought

This introduction contrasts the election of President Obama with the election of President Trump, introducing the concept of anxiety politics and the role of emotions in discourse. It argues that while Christian realism, as articulated by Reinhold Niebuhr, continues to be relevant, its discussion of power structures and anxiety needs to be reevaluated in light of feminist thought. It does so by intersecting Niebuhr with other theologies on the imago dei and creativity. In this way it can better account for the racial and misogynist structures that the United States is founded upon and that continue to haunt and effect US politics.

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Trump Reverses Certain Steps Toward Normalizing Relations with Cuba

The American Journal of International Law ◽

10.1017/ajil.2017.93 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 111 (4) ◽

pp. 1027-1035

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

The United States ◽

Military Regime ◽

Military Government ◽

Donald Trump ◽

Obama Administration ◽

White House ◽

Senior Official ◽

Roll Back ◽

Trump Administration

In June 2017, President Donald Trump announced a plan to roll back various steps taken by his predecessor toward normalizing relations between the United States and Cuba. A senior official for the administration announced the plan in a White House press briefing:The President vowed to reverse the Obama administration policies toward Cuba that have enriched the Cuban military regime and increased the repression on the island. It is a promise that President Trump made, and it's a promise that President Trump is keeping.With this is a readjustment of the United States policy towards Cuba. And you will see that, going forward, the new policy under the Trump administration, will empower the Cuban people. To reiterate, the new policy going forward does not target the Cuban people, but it does target the repressive members of the Cuban military government.

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George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Post-Conflict Northern Ireland

The Long Peace Process ◽

10.3828/liverpool/9781786940445.003.0008 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 259-276

Author(s):

Andrew Sanders

Keyword(s):

Northern Ireland ◽

Presidential Election ◽

Barack Obama ◽

The State ◽

The Political ◽

Hillary Clinton ◽

Northern Irish ◽

2008 Presidential Election ◽

Post Conflict

After Clinton’s second term in office ended, President George W Bush moved the Special Envoy to Northern Ireland to the State Department, but his Envoys, led by Richard Haass and Mitchell Reiss, were no less engaged in Northern Irish affairs as the political figures there sought to create a functional government at Stormont Parliament Buildings. A series of significant obstacles emerged, but the Northern Ireland Assembly finally formed in 2007 before Bush left office. He was succeeded by President Barack Obama who had little interest in Northern Ireland but Obama’s initial Secretary of State, former Senator Hillary Clinton, was well-versed in Northern Irish issues. This chapter also examines the role of Northern Ireland in the 2008 Democratic Primary contest and, to a lesser extent, the 2008 Presidential Election.

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The Ghost of Helms-Burton

The Cuba-U.S. Bilateral Relationship ◽

10.1093/oso/9780190687366.003.0009 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 205-224

Author(s):

Jonathan C. Benjamin-Alvarado

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

The United States ◽

Barack Obama ◽

Obama Administration ◽

Policy Initiatives ◽

Executive Action ◽

Normalization Process ◽

The U.S

In spite of the significant policy initiatives undertaken by the Barack Obama administration to “normalize” U.S. relations with Cuba, serious barriers and impediments lie ahead. This chapter investigates the daunting policy challenges that face the United States and Cuba in their effort to advance their bilateral diplomatic and economic affairs, owing largely to the draconian conditionality codified in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms–Burton Act). Given the highly partisan and divided nature of executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, it remains uncertain as to whether Congress will allow progress in the normalization process to move beyond the limits of executive action. The chapter identifies and details the concrete steps that must be undertaken by the Congress to dismantle Helms-Burton, and under what conditions that might occur.

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The Reagan Presidency and US Foreign Relations

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.013.540 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Simon Miles

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

Soviet Union ◽

Foreign Relations ◽

Reagan Administration ◽

Financial Burden ◽

Vice President ◽

The United States ◽

White House ◽

The Soviet Union ◽

The Cold War

Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy legacy remains hotly contested, and as new archival sources come to light, those debates are more likely to intensify than to recede into the background. In dealings with the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration set the superpowers on a course for the (largely) peaceful end of the Cold War. Reagan began his outreach to Soviet leaders almost immediately after taking office and enjoyed some success, even if the dominant theme of the period remains fears of Reagan as a “button-pusher” in the public’s perception. Mikhail Gorbachev’s election to the post of General Secretary proved the turning point. Reagan, now confident in US strength, and Gorbachev, keen to reduce the financial burden of the arms race, ushered in a new, cooperative phase of the Cold War. Elsewhere, in particular Latin America, the administration’s focus on fighting communism led it to support human rights–abusing regimes at the same time as it lambasted Moscow’s transgressions in that regard. But even so, over the course of the 1980s, the United States began pushing for democratization around the world, even where Reagan and his advisors had initially resisted it, fearing a communist takeover. In part, this was a result of public pressure, but the White House recognized and came to support the rising tide of democratization. When Reagan left office, a great many countries that had been authoritarian were no longer, often at least in part because of US policy. US–Soviet relations had improved to such an extent that Reagan’s successor, Vice President George H. W. Bush, worried that they had gone too far in working with Gorbachev and been hoodwinked.

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Netanyahu's Congress gamble could backfire on Israel

Emerald Expert Briefings ◽

10.1108/oxan-db197932 ◽

2015 ◽

Keyword(s):

Barack Obama ◽

Military Cooperation ◽

Political Candidates ◽

Framework Agreement ◽

Obama Administration ◽

Content Type ◽

White House ◽

Parliamentary Elections ◽

Intelligence Sharing ◽

Senior Administration

Significance The speech comes two weeks before Israeli parliamentary elections on March 17 and a looming end of March deadline for reaching a framework agreement on Iran's nuclear programme. Netanyahu's speech aims to convince Congress to pass new sanctions legislation, which President Barack Obama has threatened to veto. The Obama administration accuses Netanyahu of trying to sabotage Iran negotiations and of meddling in US politics, while Netanyahu counters that world powers appear to have given up on their pledge to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. The president and other senior administration officials have refused to meet Netanyahu during his visit, which was orchestrated by Republican Congressional leaders without White House coordination, citing the long-standing policy of not appearing with foreign political candidates close to elections. Impacts Some Democratic lawmakers will boycott Netanyahu's speech, threatening to erode bipartisan support for Israel in Congress. US distrust of Netanyahu is limiting intelligence sharing, and could disrupt military cooperation, including some Israeli defence sales. The Obama administration could respond to the tensions by supporting a UNSC resolution laying out the parameters of a two state solution.

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Trump targets South-east Asia-US policy continuity

Emerald Expert Briefings ◽

10.1108/oxan-db220443 ◽

2017 ◽

Keyword(s):

East Asia ◽

Trade Agreement ◽

Vice President ◽

The United States ◽

The Philippines ◽

South East Asia ◽

Content Type ◽

White House ◽

East Asia Summit ◽

Trump Administration

Subject Emerging US policy towards South-east Asia under the Trump administration. Significance On May 5, the 30th US-ASEAN Dialogue opens in Washington, to be co-chaired by US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. This follows Vice-President Mike Pence’s visit to Indonesia of April 20-22, the first to South-east Asia by a cabinet-level official from the Trump administration. The White House used that occasion to announce that President Donald Trump will attend the APEC meeting in Vietnam and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in the Philippines in November. Impacts Trump may co-chair a US-ASEAN Summit with Philippines president on the EAS’s margins, which could improve frayed bilateral ties. Congress could frustrate any Trump administration plans to sanction countries with trade surpluses with the United States. An ASEAN-US free trade agreement is unlikely soon. Trump has invited Vietnam’s prime minister to visit Washington later, which could make Hanoi more bullish towards China.

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Who Can Be President of the United States?: Candidate Hillary Clinton and the Problem of Statutory Qualifications

British Journal of American Legal Studies ◽

10.1515/bjals-2016-0003 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 5 (1) ◽

pp. 95-121

Author(s):

Seth Barrett Tillman

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Democratic Party ◽

Vice President ◽

The United States ◽

Primary Elections ◽

Hillary Clinton ◽

Record Keeping ◽

Secretary Of State ◽

Federal Statute ◽

The U.S

Abstract Qualifications for public office restrict democratic choice, but such restrictions have a long pedigree in many jurisdictions. For example, the U.S. Constitution sets out qualifications for elected federal officials: i.e., Representative, Senator, President, and Vice President. Qualifications for those positions include provisions relating to age, citizenship, and residence. It has been long debated whether these textual qualifications are exclusive (i.e., floors and ceilings) or whether they are merely floors, which can be supplemented by additional qualifications imposed by Congress or by the States. Once again, this issue has become topical. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is a prominent candidate in now-ongoing Democratic Party primary elections. These primaries select delegates to a national convention which will choose the Democratic Party’s candidate for the 2016 popular presidential election. It has been alleged that, during her term as Secretary of State, Clinton violated a provision of the federal statute mandating government record keeping. 18 U.S.C. § 2071 provides: “Whoever, having the custody of any … record … willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, falsifies, or destroys the same … shall forfeit his office and be disqualified from holding any office under the United States.” This Article addresses two interesting interpretive challenges posed by Section 2071. First, does Section 2071’s “office under the United States” language reach the presidency? Second, if Section 2071’s “office under the United States” language encompasses the presidency, is the statute constitutional? In other words, does Congress have the power to create additional qualifications for the presidency?

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