The Undulating Path of Merger Policy

2020 ◽  
pp. 196-230
Author(s):  
Rex Ahdar
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Merger Policy ◽  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Notification System ◽  
Large Market ◽  
Potential Competition ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Substantive Law

Merger control has been marked by two major changes to both procedural and substantive law; the mandatory pre-merger notification regime was becoming increasingly burdensome for both businesses and the Commission. In 1990, the pre-merger notification system was abruptly abolished in favour of a voluntary notification system. The so-called “strike down” system already existed in Australia, but the change was probably due less to harmonization and more to some effective lobbying by big business. Regarding the substantive test, the “dominance” standard proved to be highly permissive. Few mergers were halted and the presence of very large market shares post-merger could still be overcome by an unduly generous view of the likelihood of new entry disciplining the merged firm. An idealized version of potential competition (contestability theory) held sway. In 2001, the test in s 47 was changed to the SLC threshold in an effort to toughen up the law. Horizontal mergers, increasing the likelihood of collusion (due to increased market concentration), could now be caught. Yet it is doubtful that the sterner test actually resulted in more mergers being prohibited. This chapter briefly explores the experience of vertical and conglomerate mergers as well as a new section (s 47A) that addresses overseas mergers that have effects upon New Zealand markets.

Capacity Constraints and Horizontal Merger Effects

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-454
Author(s):  
Jay Ezrielev
Keyword(s):  
Binding Capacity ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Capacity Constraints ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Price Effects ◽  
Analytical Tools ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Merger Simulation

This article examines how capacity constraints affect horizontal mergers. Binding capacity constraints for merging firms may mitigate merger price effects, but capacity constraints for nonmerging firms may either amplify or mitigate such effects. The presence of capacity constraints for both the merging and nonmerging firms in a market further complicates the analysis of merger price effects. Capacity constraints may also confound the relationship between market concentration and merger price effects. In addition, capacity constraints affect market definition analysis and analytical tools such as merger simulation and upward pricing pressure indexes. Analyzing the effects of capacity constraints on mergers continues to be a challenge for merger reviews.

scholarly journals Local nexus in merger control regimes

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-160
Author(s):  
Daniela Lukáčová
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Potential Effect ◽  
The State ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
National Legislation ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Economic Size ◽  
The Eu

Merger control is one of the competition law tools. While competition authorities in EU act primarily on the basis of national legislation, European Commission controls mergers with EU dimension. The jurisdictional tests relate only to the economic size of the parties and do not depend on the market shares of the parties or substantive impact of the transaction, or on whether the concentration will have any effects within the state. Globalization increases the number of multijurisdictional mergers that are subject to control of several competition authorities within or outside the EU. Differences in merger control proceedings in such cases with regard to the timeframe, or the result of the proceeding, could have a negative impact on the economy in another country. Parties to the concentration could decide to neglect the merger notification due to the timeframe, or complications connected with approving of multijurisdictional merger in other countries with jurisdiction. Therefore, the national authorities’ effort to set in their legislation turnover criteria with local nexus could help to control concentrations with potential effect on competition in their country.

Potential competition in merger control; how soon is now?

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 26-36
Author(s):  
Pedro Caro de Sousa ◽  
Chris Pike
Keyword(s):  
Merger Control ◽  
Potential Competition

The impact of data on EU merger control

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-161
Author(s):  
Stephen Whitfield ◽  
Richard J. Brown ◽  
Ingrid Rogers
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Global Competition ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Legal Frameworks ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Concentration Levels

There has been an increased focus of the European Commission and numerous national competition authorities on data-related mergers, which also fits more generally in the context of a broader global competition law focus on the ‘FAANGs’ (i.e., Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google) and the wider tech sector. This article considers the impact of data on EU merger control and explores the theories of harm and legal frameworks which have been applied and developed in considering data-related competition concerns, in particular the notable developments in the Commission's recent consideration of Apple's acquisition of Shazam. The article considers that the impact of these developments is that data-related mergers should no longer be assessed by reference to traditional economic indicators such as market shares and concentration levels only, but rather also in the context of the broader global competition law focus on big tech.

scholarly journals Merger Policy with Merger Choice

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (2) ◽  
pp. 1006-1033 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Nocke ◽  
Michael D Whinston
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Optimal Policy ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Merger Policy ◽  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Antitrust Authority

We analyze the optimal policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and firms choose among alternative mergers. In our model, the optimal policy of an antitrust authority that seeks to maximize expected consumer surplus imposes a tougher standard on “larger” mergers, i.e., those involving firms with a larger pre-merger market share. The optimal policy is a response to a bias in firms' proposal incentives: firms always propose a larger merger when it is better for consumers than a smaller one, but sometimes will propose the larger one even when it is worse for consumers.

28. Competition Law:

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Merger Policy ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Academic Debate ◽  
The Way

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses EU law on mergers, first examining the policy reasons underlying merger control. It then considers the jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive aspects to EU merger policy. Jurisdictional issues cover the types of concentration that are subject to the Merger Regulation and the inter-relationship between merger control at EU and national levels. Procedural issues cover matters such as the way in which notice of a proposed merger must be given and the investigative powers possessed by the Commission. Substantive issues of merger policy include matters such as the test for determining whether a merger or concentration should be allowed and the extent to which efficiencies produced by the concentration should be taken into account.

scholarly journals Diversity of Sources for Fresh Produce: Implications for Local Markets

1995 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 510-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luanne Lohr ◽  
Steven D. Hanson
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Fruits And Vegetables ◽  
Fresh Produce ◽  
Market Condition ◽  
Local Markets ◽  
Large Market ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Growing Conditions

AbstractNumber of suppliers, approximation of equal-shares market condition and market share held by in-state sources were calculated to determine diversity of sources for 10 fresh fruits and vegetables in eight U.S. wholesale markets. Specificity of growing conditions is associated with few supply sources, unequal market shares and limited purchases from in-state suppliers. For crops with few sources, lower perishability and greater transportability are correlated with greater balance in market shares. For crops with many supply sources, greater perishability and greater transportability are consistent with large market share from imports. Diversity across all commodities can increase market share for local producers.

29. Competition Law: Mergers

EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1163-1189
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Merger Policy ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Academic Debate ◽  
The Way

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses EU law on mergers, first examining the policy reasons underlying merger control. It then considers the jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive aspects to EU merger policy. Jurisdictional issues cover the types of concentration that are subject to the Merger Regulation and the inter-relationship between merger control at EU and national levels. Procedural issues cover matters such as the way in which notice of a proposed merger must be given and the investigative powers possessed by the Commission. Substantive issues of merger policy include matters such as the test for determining whether a merger or concentration should be allowed and the extent to which efficiencies produced by the concentration should be taken into account. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit.

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