Optimal Simple Objectives for Monetary Policy when Banks Matter

We reconsider the design of welfare-optimal monetary policy when financing frictions impair the supply of bank credit, and when the objectives set for monetary policy must be simple enough to be implementable and allow for effective accountability. We show that a flexible inflation targeting approach that places weight on stabilizing inflation, a measure of resource utilization, and a financial variable produces welfare benefits that are almost indistinguishable from fully-optimal Ramsey policy. The macro-financial trade-off in our estimated model of the euro area turns out to be modest, implying that the effects of financial frictions can be ameliorated at little cost in terms of inflation. A range of different financial objectives and policy preferences lead to similar conclusions.

Growth Options and Credit Risk

We calibrate a dynamic model of credit risk and analyze the relation between growth options and credit spreads. Our model features real and financing frictions, a technology with decreasing returns to scale, and endogenous investment options driven by both systematic and idiosyncratic shocks. We find a negative relation between credit spreads and growth options after controlling for determinants of credit risk. This negative relation is a result of the current decision to invest and the associated change in leverage, which, in the presence of external financing needs and financing frictions, increase credit spreads while reducing the value of future investments. We do not find evidence that growth options accrue value in response to systematic risk, thus increasing credit risk premia. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance.

Real Effects of PCAOB International Inspections

ABSTRACT This paper examines the effect of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international inspection program on companies' financing and investing decisions. Difference-in-differences regression estimates suggest that companies respond to their auditor receiving a “deficiency-free” inspection report by issuing additional external capital amounting to 1.4 percent of assets and increasing investment by 0.5 percent of assets. These effects are larger for (1) financially constrained companies and (2) companies located in countries where there is no regulator or the regulator does not conduct inspections. Further, the effect on financing decisions is stronger in countries with (1) low corruption, (2) strong rule of law, and (3) high regulatory quality. Descriptive evidence suggests that inspections increase the use of financial covenants in debt contracts, which is likely one of the mechanisms through which inspections generate real effects. This paper documents the value of PCAOB inspections in mitigating financing frictions for non-U.S. companies. JEL Classifications: D8; D25; G15; G31; G38; M4; M41; M42. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Index Membership and Small Firm Financing

This paper investigates the extent to which index membership affects small firm financing. Using a regression discontinuity specification around the lower cutoff of the Russell 2000 small-cap index, we find that index membership causes small firms to transition away from bank financing in favor of seasoned equity offerings. These effects are concentrated in the year following Russell 2000 additions and do not reverse immediately upon deletions. Liquidity, the elasticity of demand for equity, and analyst coverage also significantly increase following Russell 2000 additions but do not significantly decrease following deletions. Finally, firms added to the Russell 2000 obtain lower spreads and have fewer covenants on the bank loans that they do initiate. Our findings are consistent with index membership mitigating the financing frictions of small firms by improving their information environment through increased investor awareness. This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.

Financing Constraints, Radical versus Incremental Innovation, and Aggregate Productivity

I provide new empirical evidence on the negative relationship between financial frictions and productivity growth over a firm’s life cycle. I show that a model of firm dynamics with incremental innovation cannot explain this evidence. However, further including radical innovation, which is very risky but potentially very productive, allows for the joint replication of several stylized facts about the dynamics of young and old firms and the differences in productivity growth in industries with different degrees of financing frictions. These frictions matter because they act as a barrier to entry that reduces competition and the risk-taking of young firms. (JEL D22, D24, D25, G32, L25, L60, O31)

Labor and Capital Dynamics under Financing Frictions*

We assemble a new, quarterly panel dataset that links firms’ investment and financing to their employment and wages. In the data, wages and leverage are negatively related, both cross-sectionally and within firms. This pattern contradicts models in which firms insure workers against unemployment risk. We reconcile this fact with a model that integrates factor adjustment frictions and wage bargaining with costly external financing. In the model, the probability of default rises with debt. Because default incurs deadweight costs, the expected surplus over which firms and workers bargain falls, thus depressing wages. We show that raising financing costs reduces employment and wages, in line with recent reduced-form evidence.

How Do Frictions Affect Corporate Investment? A Structural Approach

This paper provides a structural approach to testing investment equations based on the log-likelihood function of a nonlinear investment rule. The analysis integrates the predictions of theq-theory for the commonly studied active region of investment and provides new inferences on how real and financing frictions affect the probability that a firm invests. The empirical findings are consistent with the macro-finance literature suggesting thatq-theory models with nonconvex investment frictions better explain the data. I also find that both real and financing costs of investment are related to the capital intensity of the industry in which firms operate.