Disclosure of beneficial ownership of companies in Hong Kong

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 251-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Kong Shan Ho
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Money Laundering ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Company Law ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Beneficial Ownership ◽  
Ultimate Owners ◽  
Combat Money Laundering

In early 2017, the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau of Hong Kong conducted a consultation and proposed to put in place a regime under its Companies Ordinance to enhance the transparency of beneficial ownership of companies by requiring them to publish the names of their ultimate owners on company registers in an effort to meet prevailing international standards to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The consultation conclusion was published in April 2017 which stated that based on the overall support for the proposed legislation, it seeks to introduce such regime by late 2017. This article is written against such background and highlights the rationales for Hong Kong in introducing such a law. In doing so, the article will make reference to the United Kingdom and Singapore which have also recently implemented a similar regime under their company law.

Saudi Arabia’s efforts on combating money laundering and terrorist financing

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammed Ahmad Naheem
Keyword(s):  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Money Laundering ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
Independent Evaluation ◽  
Financing Risk ◽  
Regulatory Analysis ◽  
Combat Money Laundering

Purpose This paper aims to study Saudi Arabia’s approach to combat money laundering and terrorist financing through legislation, regulation and implementation. Saudi Arabia is an integral part of the global economy and energy market. Saudi Arabia is also an important nexus for incoming foreign investment in the region. The country has, for many years, confronted negative exposure on challenging money laundering and terrorist financing. This paper analyses Saudi Arabia’s efforts to maintain international standards of AML/CTF and distinguishes regulatory practice from the existing comments and conjecture on the country’s performance. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses a qualitative study of Saudi Arabia’s approach to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The approach is spread across three stages of AML/CTF policy – namely, legislative, regulatory and implementation. Further, the paper also uses independent evaluation to understand Saudi Arabia’s performance in comparison to the international standards of good AML/CTF practice. Findings The paper finds Saudi Arabia in compliance with international standards of AML/CTF practice. The paper also traces strengthening of AML/CTF-related legislation and regulation in Saudi Arabia over the past two decades. The paper also finds significant evidence that suggests a biased representation of Saudi Arabia’s AML/CTF practices. The factual analysis of Saudi Arabia and its AML/CTF practice is in contradiction of the established discourse on the country’s money laundering and terrorist financing risk profile. Practical implications The paper presents a legislative and regulatory analysis of Saudi Arabia’s AML/CTF practice. It is important to understand the implications of injudicious conjecture on Saudi Arabia’s financial strategy to diversify the country’s economy (Mouawad, 2005). Commentators and observers must consider the evidence presented in this paper and reassess the discourse regarding Saudi Arabia’s adherence to international standards of AML/CTF. Originality/value Understanding Saudi Arabia’s approach to combat money laundering and terrorist financing is essential to the factors that maintain stability in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has participated in the region with government forces to maintain stability. The paper examines the overall risk as per international standards, which can be attributed to Saudi Arabia’s AML/CTF profile.

Analysis of Bahrain’s anti-money laundering (AML) and combatting of terrorist financing (CTF) practices

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammed Ahmad Naheem
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
East Region ◽  
Compliance Level ◽  
Terrorism Financing ◽  
Enforcement Mechanisms

Purpose This paper aims to examine the level of anti-money laundering (AML) and combatting terrorist financing (CTF) practices incorporated within the legal framework of the Kingdom of Bahrain. The paper also studies the application of AML/CTF legislation in regulatory practice and implementation. Bahrain is an important state within the Middle-East region and is an integral part to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The paper analyzes Bahrain’s compliance to international AML/CTF standards and presents recommendations on remaining deficiencies. Design/methodology/approach The paper studies the level of AML/CTF legislation enacted by the Kingdom of Bahrain by first examining the regulatory application, and then, the level of implementation. To understand the level of AML/CTF implementation, the paper uses literature on increased prosecution, penalties and reports for AML/CTF crimes in the Kingdom of Bahrain. In addition, the paper analyzes Bahrain’s compliance level to international standards of AML/CTF legislation and regulation. Findings The paper finds evidence of significant progress in the application of best practices of AML/CTF within the Kingdom of Bahrain. The paper also finds an increase in levels of implementation – i.e. suspicious transaction reports, investigations and prosecutions – with respect to AML/CTF violations. Additionally, the paper finds a limited number of deficiencies in Bahrain’s effort to establish strong reporting and enforcement mechanisms. Practical implications Bahrain is an important member of the international trade network and one of the fastest growing non-oil economies in the region. The country sought to diversify the economy, with more industry- and service-intensive sectors. The level of AML/CTF implementation represents an important risk-averse approach to financial services in the country. Evidence of the country’s strengthening approach is an important factor in determining foreign investment confidence and the country’s policy on combatting terrorism financing. Originality/value Commentators have previously recognized key deficiencies in Bahrain’s enactment and application of AML/CTF legislation. However, the analysis does not incorporate externalities arising from regulatory delay in domestic AML/CTF policy. The following paper studies the progress made by Bahrain since 2000-2001 and subsequent attempts at improving enforcement to maintain international compliance.

FIFA – highlighting the links between global banking and international money laundering

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 498-512 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammed Ahmad Naheem
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Services Sector ◽  
Financial Services Sector ◽  
Global Banking ◽  
Beneficial Ownership ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThis paper uses the recent (August 2015) FIFA arrests to provide an example of how illicit financial flows are occurring through the formal banking and financial services sector. The purpose of this paper is to explore which elements of anti-money laundering (AML) compliance need to be addressed to strengthen the banking response and reduce the impact of IFFs within the banking sector.Design/methodology/approachThe paper is based on the indictment document currently prepared for the FIFA arrests and the District Court case of Chuck Blazer the FIFA Whistleblower. It uses the banking examples identified in the indictment as typologies of money laundering and wire fraud. Corresponding industry reports on AML compliance are included to determine where the major weaknesses and gaps are across the financial service.FindingsThe main findings from the analysis are that banks still have weak areas within AML compliance. Even recognised red flag areas such as off shore havens, large wire transfers and front companies are still being used. The largest gaps still appear to be due diligence and beneficial ownership information.Research limitations/implicationsThe research topic is very new and emerging topic; therefore, analysis papers and other academic writing on this topic are limited.Practical implicationsThe research paper has identified a number of implications for the banking sector, addressing AML deficiencies, especially the need to consider the source of funds and the need for further enhanced due diligence systems for politically exposed and influential people and the importance of beneficial ownership information.Social implicationsThis paper has implications for the international development and the global banking sector. It will also influence approaches to AML regulation, risk assessment and audit within the broader financial services sector.Originality/valueThe originality of this paper is the link between the emerging issues associated with allegations of bribery and corruption within FIFA and the illicit financial flow implications across the banking sector.

Measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in Palestine

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Murrar Firas
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Evaluation Process ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Assessment Process ◽  
National Committee ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
Mutual Evaluation ◽  
Combat Money Laundering

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the evolution of anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) procedures in Palestine since 2004 in accordance with the standards issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Design/methodology/approach This study is qualitative in nature and involves studying the most important improvements made by Palestinian authorities in the state’s legislative and institutional frameworks to enhance the AML/CFT regime. Findings Palestine has established the necessary legal basis to combat money laundering and terrorist financing crimes. At the institutional level, the Financial Follow-up Unit was granted all the required powers of Financial Intelligence Units. The National Committee for Combating Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism has also played a vital role in issuing policies and plans to respond to the outcomes of the National Risk Assessment process. In contrast, a number of challenges still exist mainly with respect to the political factors and their expected consequences on the process of preparing for and conducting the mutual evaluation process for Palestine. Originality/value This study focusses on the AML/CFT efforts in Palestine owing to the nature and specificity of the Palestinian situation, as Palestine’s AML/CFT procedures have not been subject to any previous mutual evaluation process by the MENAFATF. Such efforts have rarely addressed the Palestinian case, making this study important to researchers and those interested in this field.

The treatment of Austrian private foundations under the Ultimate Beneficial Ownership Act

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 650-655
Author(s):  
Michael Petritz ◽  
Cordula Horkel-Wytrzens
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
Private Foundations ◽  
Ultimate Ownership ◽  
Natural Person ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Beneficial Ownership ◽  
Breach Of Duty ◽  
And Control

Abstract As part of the implementation of the fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive in Austria, the Wirtschaftliche Eigentümer Register Gesetz, (The Ultimate Beneficial Owner Register Act) was introduced. The main aim of this Act is to provide accurate and up-to-date information on the ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) of entities, trusts, and foundations. This information is seen as a key factor in combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Paragraph 2 of the Ultimate Beneficial Ownership Act defines the UBO, which corresponds to the definition in paragraph 3 subparagraph 6 of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive. In the case of corporate entities, ultimate ownership and control are relevant for determining the UBO. In the case of trusts and private foundations, it is not ownership and control that are relevant for determining the UBO, but the function the person has with respect to the trust/foundation. All definitions have in common that the UBO has to be a natural person. Obliged entities are required to identify and report their UBOs to the register, in the case of a breach of duty/law severe penalties apply.

Anti-money laundering – the need for intelligence

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 472-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard John Lowe
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Organized Crime ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
National Level ◽  
Financial Sector ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to highlight the need for predictive intelligence to support anti-money laundering programs in the financial sector. Design/methodology/approach The methodology adopted herein consists of a literature review on the use of intelligence in anti-money laundering, the sources of intelligence and information used in the financial sector, supported by experience gained from investigating and prosecuting money laundering cases, and the assistance provided to financial services companies. Findings Banks and other regulated services are required to meet international standards to deny services to criminals and terrorists, identify suspicious activity and report to the authorities. Regulated businesses have large operations which check customers against sources that confirm their identity or against lists of proscribed or suspected offenders at an individual or national level. Their controls tend to look backwards when other organisations that rely on intelligence, such as the military, value predictive, forward-looking intelligence. The penalties that banks and others face for failure in their controls are increasingly severe, as looking backwards and not forwards reduces the extent to which the controls meet their purpose of reducing the impact of organized crime and terrorism. Originality/value This paper serves as a useful guide to alert and educate anti-money laundering professionals, law enforcement and policy makers of the importance of predictive intelligence in countering organized crime and terrorism. It also considers whether lessons in intelligence handling from other areas can inform a debate on how intelligence can be developed to counter money laundering.

Legal analysis of Qatar’santi-money laundering and combating terrorist financing legislation and regulation amidst the summer 2017 GCC crisis

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 793-804
Author(s):  
Mohammed Ahmad Naheem
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Legal Analysis ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
The Past ◽  
Regulatory Bodies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Financing Of Terrorism

Purpose The recent diplomatic split between members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Qatar with accusations of terrorist financing (TF). This paper aims to study Qatar’s domestic legislations, which specifically targets money laundering and TF activities. The country has stringently worked in compliance with international standards on combating financing of terrorism (CFT) and anti-money laundering (AML) practices by imparting autonomous power to regulatory bodies, such as the Qatar Central Bank and other agencies. Design/methodology/approach This paper studies independent legislations passed under the Emir’s decree over the past decade advancing Qatar’s AML ranking, with significant effort in CFT regulations. The paper also analyses the advancement in AML/CFT regulation and their validity with respect to international standards set by various governmental, intergovernmental and non-profit agencies. Findings The analysis finds Qatar in compliance with strong AML/CFT regulations. Further, it finds the government to have provided transparent oversight to international organizations that attest to the findings of the legislative efforts. This paper disproves claims and accusations that have possibly been presented to the GCC and subsequently led members to abruptly end diplomatic relations with Qatar over allegations of TF activities, amongst others. Originality/value The paper offers insight into Qatar’s legislative and regulatory advancement with respect to the AML/CTF in the past decade. The paper also discusses Qatar’s legislative advancement in relation to the evolutions of the country’s financial system, adopting a more robust mechanism to combat financing of terrorism and ML.

National risk assessment – the Croatian features

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Cindori
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Money Laundering ◽  
Financial Sector ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Beneficial Ownership ◽  
Inductive Methods ◽  
The Right

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present the risk of the non-financial sector in Croatia concerning the threats of money laundering through the prism of national and supranational risk assessment. In addition to a brief overview of the financial sector, the specifics of the non-financial sector have been highlighted. This paper aims to emphasize the peculiarities of the non-financial sector, focusing on the consequences of arbitrary application on the right to professional secrecy and independence. Design/methodology/approach Specifics of the national risk assessment in Croatia have been analyzed using deductive and inductive methods. To provide an overview of the non-financial sector, the risk assessment at the supranational level has been discussed and compared with the national one. Particular attention has been paid to the areas of increased risk. Findings The effectiveness of risk assessment depends on several factors such as the characteristic of the sector being observed, the specifics of each profession or business, changes at the level of awareness-raising and efficient and coherent supervision. Most deficiencies were observed in the area of beneficial ownership identification, conducting due diligence, awareness of the risk exposure and permanent education. Originality/value By recognizing the risk profile faced by the non-financial sector, this paper seeks to point out their role as “Gatekeepers” that is far from being negligible. By analyzing the risk of money laundering in Croatia, the tendencies of harmonization with international standards are pointed out along with the occurrences indicated by the practice.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document