Articulating bargaining theories: movement, chance, and necessity as descriptive principles

The Nash Demand Game (NDG) has been one of the first models (Nash in Econometrica 21(1):128–140, 1953. 10.2307/1906951) that has tried to describe the process of negotiation, competition, and cooperation. This model has had enormous repercussions and has leveraged basic and applied research on bargaining processes. Therefore, we wonder whether it is possible to articulate extensive and multiple developments into a single unifying framework. The Viability Theory has this inclusive approach. Thus, we investigate the NDG under this point of view, and, carrying out this work, we find that the answer is not only affirmative but that we also advance in characterising viable NDGs. In particular, we found foundations describe the distributive Bargaining Theory: the principle of movement and the principle of chance and necessity. Finally, this initial work has many interesting perspectives. The probably most important idea is to integrate developments of the Bargaining Theory and thus capture the complexity of the real world in an articulated way.

The Agent-Selection Dilemma in Distributive Bargaining

Principals often bargain through agents, and past work suggests that such bargaining too often ends in costly impasse. We present experimental evidence that the agent-selection process which precedes bargaining may be a significant driver of failures to reach agreement. We find that principals select overly aggressive agents, such that those sent to the bargaining table are more polarized in their views than are potential agents in general. Agent-selection makes parties worse off than if they were assigned an agent at random and, conditional on engaging in agent-selection, both parties could improve their outcome by selecting a less aggressive agent.

Negotiating Quality and Productivity: An Experiential Exercise

This article presents an active experiential exercise that requires participants to negotiate over scarce resources while assigned separate managerial responsibilities. Students explore concepts associated with integrative and distributive bargaining while engaging in a realistic workplace role-play. Students form pairs and assume the role of either (1) a business line manager charged with product line production and profit/loss responsibilities or (2) a corporate finance manager who is tasked with achieving overarching corporate financial goals. Both face budgetary pressures and feel great responsibility for the achievement of their individual departmental goals. Participants must negotiate with each other to attempt to come to some resolution. Teaching notes are provided. The exercise is designed for undergraduate students and can readily be used in courses such as Organizational Behavior, Negotiations, and Leadership.

Parliaments in Time

This book sheds light on the institutional development of four (emerging) Western European parliaments. Parliaments in Western Europe are noteworthy for several reasons. Their institutional designs differ remarkably, with distinct consequences for their policy output. Scholars have diagnosed the decline of legislatures for over a century now. Based on a model of distributive bargaining over legislative procedures, this book engages in a comparative process-tracing analysis of ninety reforms, which restructured control over the plenary agenda and committee power in Britain, France, Sweden, and Germany between 1866 and 2015. The analysis presented suggests that legislators in Western Europe rationalize procedures as a response to growing levels of legislative workload. As a consequence, legislatures evolve towards one of two procedural ideal types: talking or working legislatures. In talking legislatures, governments enjoy privileges in legislative agenda-setting (resulting in centralized agenda control) and committees are weak. In contrast, working legislatures combine decentralized agenda control with powerful committees. Which path legislators chose is determined by the appearance of anti-system obstruction. If anti-system parties obstruct legislative business, legislators surrender ancient procedural privileges and agree to a centralization of agenda control. Otherwise, their demand for legislative mega-seats on committees triggers the evolution of working legislatures. If legislators fail to respond to an anti-system threat, legislative procedures break down. For this reason, the central aim of procedural reforms in Western European parliaments is to maintain legislative democracy. Rather than a decline of legislatures, for talking legislatures to successfully overcome an anti-system threat indicates the resilience of legislative democracy.

Myerson Industries

This case and its companion, “Centralia Construction Corporation” (UVA-QA-0298), constitute the materials for an exercise in role playing and negotiating. The exercise is a distributive-bargaining situation surrounding the negotiation of the price for the construction of a building (some minor opportunities exist for creating mutual value). Myerson is the purchaser of the building.

Centralia Construction Corporation

This case and its companion, “Myerson Industries” (UVA-QA-0299), constitute the materials for a negotiating exercise. The exercise is a distributive-bargaining situation surrounding the negotiation of the price for the construction of a building (some minor opportunities exist for creating mutual value).