Negotiating in Distributive Bargaining Scenarios: The Effect of Sharing One’s Alternative

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
San Bolkan ◽  
Alan K. Goodboy
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Bargaining

Conflict Resolution in E-HRM Environments

2009 ◽  
pp. 178-184
Author(s):  
Joseph Abiodun Bello ◽  
Adeniji Anthonia Adenike
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Problem Solving ◽  
Human Resource ◽  
Human Interaction ◽  
International Conflicts ◽  
Organizational Processes ◽  
The World ◽  
Conflict Resolutions ◽  
Distributive Bargaining ◽  
Conducive Environment

There have been studies on conflict resolutions but many focused on regional inter-tribe and international conflicts between or among nations of the world. Only very few have written about industrial conflict recently, even these few did not touch the mechanism of resolving conflicts in the organization in depth. Therefore, this article will focus on various conflict resolution mechanisms and the three major models of conflict resolutions—namely distributive bargaining, integrated bargaining, and interactive problem solving as given by Cross, Susan, Rosenthal, and Robert (1999). To do this effectively, we will explore the available literature on the antecedents of conflicts in human resource systems. Varieties of views and notions held by individuals and groups in respect of the role and the consequences of conflicts in the functioning of humans in our modern complex organizations will be considered. The consequences of conflicts on interpersonal, inter-group, and inter-organizational processes, when conflict may empower, distress, or lubricate the wheels of human interaction in the context of human resource management will be traced. The views of experts, professionals and academicians on how and why conflicts should be handled to ensure a healthier and conducive environment to work will be traced.

Multinational Negotiation Parties: The Case of the European Community

1973 ◽  
Vol 8 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 173-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arild Underdal
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Community ◽  
Structural Complexity ◽  
Choice Of Procedure ◽  
Decision Making Capacity ◽  
Negotiation Processes ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Distributive Bargaining

An outline and explanation are given of some of the main characteristics in the negotiating behaviour of the European Community, and — more generally — of multinational actors at a similar level of integration. The EC is considered to be a coalition of states — more pluralistic and more complex than state actors. In this analysis focus is on the implications of pluralism. The dimension of pluralism itself is held to be relevant, first, to decision-making capacity, and, second, to the decisions produced, and — by implication — to the character and outcome of the negotiation processes. One main proposition submitted is that decision-making capacity is inversely related to pluralism of authority and structural complexity. Two main characteristics with regard to the actual decisions produced arc found and discussed: First, the decisions taken usually have to be close to the position advocated by the member that feels its vital interests at stake on a particular issue, and second, very often Community decisions are hard to modify or change. Throughout the article, the significance of the characteristics described is analysed in relation to three models of negotiation: integrative negotiations, negotiations governed by the principle of fairness, and distributive bargaining. Finally, the author explains to what extent and how the choice of procedure might affect the conclusions arrived at.

Parliaments in Time

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Koß
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Process Tracing ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Ideal Types ◽  
Legislative Procedures ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Western European ◽  
System Threat ◽  
Distributive Bargaining

This book sheds light on the institutional development of four (emerging) Western European parliaments. Parliaments in Western Europe are noteworthy for several reasons. Their institutional designs differ remarkably, with distinct consequences for their policy output. Scholars have diagnosed the decline of legislatures for over a century now. Based on a model of distributive bargaining over legislative procedures, this book engages in a comparative process-tracing analysis of ninety reforms, which restructured control over the plenary agenda and committee power in Britain, France, Sweden, and Germany between 1866 and 2015. The analysis presented suggests that legislators in Western Europe rationalize procedures as a response to growing levels of legislative workload. As a consequence, legislatures evolve towards one of two procedural ideal types: talking or working legislatures. In talking legislatures, governments enjoy privileges in legislative agenda-setting (resulting in centralized agenda control) and committees are weak. In contrast, working legislatures combine decentralized agenda control with powerful committees. Which path legislators chose is determined by the appearance of anti-system obstruction. If anti-system parties obstruct legislative business, legislators surrender ancient procedural privileges and agree to a centralization of agenda control. Otherwise, their demand for legislative mega-seats on committees triggers the evolution of working legislatures. If legislators fail to respond to an anti-system threat, legislative procedures break down. For this reason, the central aim of procedural reforms in Western European parliaments is to maintain legislative democracy. Rather than a decline of legislatures, for talking legislatures to successfully overcome an anti-system threat indicates the resilience of legislative democracy.

An Application of Group Decision Support Technology in Collective Bargaining

1991 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 176-183
Author(s):  
Chang-Tseh Hsieh ◽  
Michael L. Menefee
Keyword(s):  
Decision Support ◽  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Group Decision Support ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Group Decision Support System ◽  
Decision Variables ◽  
Foundation Model ◽  
Distributive Bargaining ◽  
Qualitative Decision

An enhanced distributive bargaining model is developed to be used as the foundation model of a group-decision support system for facilitating collective bargaining. The proposed system takes into account the multiple objectives decision process and is able to handle qualitative decision variables. The implementation of the proposed system can expedite bargaining and minimize the possibility of a work stoppage.

Team negotiation: An examination of integrative and distributive bargaining.

1996 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leigh Thompson ◽  
Erika Peterson ◽  
Susan E. Brodt
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Bargaining

Bargaining, Uncertainty, and Property Rights in Fisheries

2002 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 437-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Alcock
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Widespread Application ◽  
Global Commons ◽  
Exclusive Economic Zones ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Economic Zones ◽  
Bargaining Problems ◽  
Distributive Bargaining

Garrett Hardin's “tragedy of the commons” metaphor is commonly invoked to account for the unfortunate state of world fisheries. But the world s oceans are no longer a global commons and have not been so for the past two decades. Open-access regimes have persisted within many exclusive economic zones (EEZs) during this time, but coastal states' authority to regulate domestic fisheries has existed for more than a generation. Faced with the prospect of Hardin's tragedy, coastal states have had more than twenty years to devise institutional constraints that would prevent it. This article asserts that the dismal experience with EEZs is in large part attributable to distributive bargaining problems that arose within coastal states in the wake of EEZ extension. Moreover, the article argues that high levels of uncertainty that characterize the early stages of institutional development have exacerbated these problems. Finally, the article demonstrates how the variety of institutional designs and paths of institutional development that are observed in the cases of Iceland, Norway, and Atlantic Canada result from the different configurations of political power and political structure within each case. While the empirical discussion is focused upon property rights and fisheries, the theoretical discussion of bargaining and uncertainty has widespread application across comparative and international politics.

scholarly journals Integrative Versus Distributive Bargaining: Choosing a Problem Resolution Process

2005 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 546-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick Coleman ◽  
C. R.P. Fraser
Keyword(s):  
Problem Resolution ◽  
Resolution Process ◽  
Distributive Bargaining

This paper examines the antithetical nature of two methods of resolving conflict through negotiation, and suggests there is an appropriate process depending upon how a party views the problem, and how he perceives it being viewed by his opponent.

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