Why Reagan was not impeached

In the aftermath of Watergate and Vietnam, Congressional investigations uncovered the largely unknown activities of the CIA and other agencies, which included arming and interfering in the domestic politics of regimes in both Central America and Iran. These programmes had also involved supporting reactionary regimes in ways that some saw as drawing the United States into conflicts, like Vietnam, without public knowledge or consent. In 1987, it was revealed that the Reagan administration had operated a clandestine policy in Nicaragua that evaded the restrictions placed upon the executive by the Boland Amendment in terms of aid given to the Nicaraguan Contras and that National Security Council (NSC) staff had lied to Congress and concealed these illegal actions. They had solicited funds from foreign allies and smuggled arms to the Contra insurgents in support of their efforts to topple the Sandinista regime. Contrary to the Arms Export Control Act and to its own publicly stated policy, the administration had also sold arms, particularly missiles, to Iran, which had been branded a sponsor of international terrorism since the Iranian revolution, and which was currently at war with its neighbour, Iraq. Such deals had formed part of ‘arms for hostages’ negotiations that were also contrary to official policy. Finally, it was disclosed that profits from the arms sales had been diverted to fund the Contras and hence to evade Congressional restrictions on funding. This article explores why these illegal actions did not result in President Reagan’s impeachment. It considers the merits of the administration’s claims that this was a ‘rogue operation’ by zealots within the NSC, and the success of its efforts to present Reagan as eager to cooperate with efforts to discover the truth of what had happened. It reviews the interactions between the Tower Commission, Congressional investigations and Office of Independent Counsel probe (Lawrence Walsh) and shows how these contributed to Reagan’s ‘escape’ from impeachment. It reviews the argument that Reagan’s underlying health problems contributed to his lax management of NSC operations and it considers the importance of televised testimony, particularly that of Oliver North, in shaping public opinion in the administration’s favour. Finally, it considers how this significant episode in 1980s politics foreshadowed major trends in US politics that can be seen as culminating in the present, acute partisan divide, Donald Trump’s double impeachment, and a manifest decline in public trust and respect for American political institutions.

Introduction

This chapter introduces the book’s sociocultural history of expertise as analyzed in arts and music grantmaking during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, It explains the origins of the Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Foundation, and National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) as grantmaking institutions, the individuals involved, and how the missions of the two foundations eventually came to include arts funding. The 1960s and 1970s were a period of “cultural explosion,” as characterized by the popular press. During the early part of the Cold War, both foundations were also subject to congressional investigations which impacted their grantmaking. Finally, the introduction includes a chapter overview of the book, as well as its division into two parts: “Who Were the Experts?” and “Experts in Action.”

“Interests” and Elections

This empirical chapter draws on a series of congressional investigations into election campaigns and lobbying conducted between 1912 and 1957 (plus additional data on the early 1960s) to identify interest groups and related organizations—including early PACs—that participated in elections during this period. The major groups so identified—primarily business organizations, labor unions, and ideological groups—form the spine of the narrative throughout the book. This chapter highlights changes in their major organizational features and electoral practices over time. Furthermore, it explores the controversies surrounding both political parties and “special interests” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly concerning the influx of money into election campaigns, which prompted these congressional investigations in the first place. It also offers an overview of campaign finance legislation and reforms that Congress passed in response.

The 1950s: Part Two

This chapter continues with the examination of the church–state events of the 1950s. It begins with the Protestant–Catholic tensions associated with the Red Scare and the congressional investigations into communism, particularly the controversy surrounding Catholic support for the activities of Senator Joseph McCarthy. It continues with an examination of a thawing of religious tensions brought about by the religious revival of the 1950s and the growth of ecumenism and religious cooperation. This section focuses on the impact of three religious figures: Bishop Fulton Sheen, Billy Graham, and Norman Vincent Peale. The chapter concludes with an examination of the Protestant opposition to the candidacy of John F. Kennedy for U.S. president, an effort that was led by Graham, Peale, and POAU.

The Direct Influence of Congressional Investigations on Policy Outcomes

This chapter focuses on two direct pathways through which congressional investigations can produce concrete changes in the specific policy area targeted by the investigation. First, investigations may provide the impetus for new legislation that otherwise would not have passed in its absence. Investigative hearings can spur congressional action and generate political pressure on the president and members of his party to vote for and sign legislation that they may have otherwise resisted through the filibuster or veto. Second, even when investigations are not followed by legislative action compelling the administration to change its behavior, high-profile committee inquiries into executive-branch actions may bring enough political pressure to bear on the White House that it opts to make concessions rather than continue a bruising public fight with the legislature.