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Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vishal Surbun

On 27 February 2007, the council of the eThekwini Municipality, the governing entity of the Durban and surrounding metropolitan region, passed the first of two resolutions in terms whereof certain byways and landmarks would be renamed. In a public municipal advertisement, the City’s mayor announced: “The street renaming is indeed an ultimate step towards honouring all the heroes and heroines who fought a fight for a good cause. Chief among these are those who in the pursuit of freedom ventured their way through the troubled bridges of apartheid. Therefore as eThekwini council, we feel honoured to be part of such a historic process of ensuring that names of these great men and women of the struggle remain known even to the generations to come … It is indeed a democratic process: members of the public were consulted and given an opportunity to suggest names. This will ensure that the city we live in is indeed accurately reflecting its people and its history …” Notwithstanding these sentiments, on 1 May 2007, about 10 000 demonstrators marched through the city’s central business district and converged on the City Hall, where the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the Democratic Alliance (DA) held a joint protest to complain, not about the fact that the streets and landmarks were being renamed, but about the new names themselves. The suggested names of SWAPO, Griffiths Mxenge, Andrew Zondo and Che Guevara spawned a public outcry and accusations that the process was carried out without proper consultation. The controversy prompted the New York Times to observe that “Durban is different. Intentional or not, some of the proposed name changes clearly flick at scabs covering deep divisions”. Against this background, the DA and the IFP launched an application in the public interest in the Durban High Court which will be analyzed hereunder. The Applicants prayed for an order to the effect that the decision by the Municipality to rename the streets must be set aside and for the old names to be restored. A representative for the DA announced that:“We took this case to court because we believed, and still do believe that the rights and opinions of thousands of eThekwini’s citizens were trampled by the actions of the municipality who simply roughshod over their objections”.


2020 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-299
Author(s):  
Neil Southern

AbstractA key political feature of South Africa's transformation was the African National Congress, the National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party working together in a grand coalition. This arrangement was praised by leading power-sharing theorist Arend Lijphart. The unity government began in 1994 but two years later the National Party withdrew. This article explores power sharing during the initial phase of the settlement and discusses three aspects of it. First, the South African example points to the electoral drawbacks of power sharing for minor parties. Second, the National Party's participation in the coalition stifled the early development of substantial political opposition which slowed the pace of democratic consolidation. Third, participation in a power-sharing arrangement undermined the National Party's electoral fortunes contributing to its dissolution in 2005. This was an unexpected outcome for a party which had co-authored the country's settlement a little over a decade earlier.


Significance COSATU is part of the longstanding tripartite alliance with the ruling ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Relations between Zuma and COSATU are irreparably damaged: the union has endorsed South Africa's deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, to succeed Zuma as ANC head at December's national conference. Impacts Whoever wins the ANC presidency will struggle to end party divisions, although Ramaphosa looks best placed to do so. The United Democratic Movement and Inkatha Freedom Party could make electoral gains in Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, respectively. The ANC's control of economically vital Gauteng province could be in jeopardy in 2019.


2015 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 4-17
Author(s):  
Simangaliso Raymond Kumalo ◽  
Henry Mbaya

This article examines the response of Bishop Alphaeus Hamilton Zulu to the racism that was prevalent in both the church and society when he was elected as the first African Bishop of the Anglican Church in South Africa. Clergy, especially bishops, are by virtue of their ecclesial positions expected to transcend racial prejudices, to embrace all members of their churches and to transform their churches to multi-racial ones. This means that they have to deal with racial stereotypes both within the church and society at large. This study is based on interviews with key leaders of the Anglican Church who knew and worked with Bishop Zulu, as well as an analysis of media releases and minutes of meetings that he was part of and some that were written about him. This article argues that Bishop Zulu played a pivotal role in the fight against racism, through his episcopal ministry which brought politics and religion into a creative tension, when he worked as bishop, speaker of the Legislative Assembly in Natal and key founder of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). It also argues that church leaders must hold politics and religion together for their ministry to bring transformation to both the church and society.


2004 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Rudakoff

In post-apartheid South Africa, economic inequity between the races, street violence, rivalries between the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party, and the AIDS pandemic continue to vex the nation. In this context, the larger narratives of apartheid and colonialism are joined by personal narratives of individual discovery. The result is theatre that is finding new forms, performance situations, and audiences.


1998 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marlene Roefs ◽  
Bert Klandermans ◽  
Johan Olivier

In fall 1994 South Africa was preparing for its first nonracial, democratic elections. Uncertainty about the future characterized the political and social climate. Would the ANC be capable of governing? What would the conservative white population do? Would Buthulezi's Inkatha Freedom Party participate? Would violence continue? This article examines how, in a situation of maximum uncertainty, optimism or pessimism about the future influenced willingness to protest. Using random samples of Africans (n=1252) and whites (n=600), interviews were conducted in the weeks before the elections. Among African respondents, optimism/pessimism moderated the impact that feelings of relative deprivation, mistrust in government, and perceived lack of influence on government had on the reported intention to participate in militant protest. Concerning moderate collective action, differing expectations for the future only changed the correlation between perceived influence and willingness to participate. Except for dissatisfaction among white respondents, optimism/pessimism affected the correlations for both moderate and militant protest. Among whites, dissatisfaction was not related to preparedness for moderate action, irrespective of expectations for the future. The results are interpreted in terms of social justice and relative deprivation theories.


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