"if other arrangements can reasonably be made": the interior architecture of Children's Courts in New Zealand in the 1930s

In 1925, the Child Welfare Act was passed. The Act introduced the idea of the Children's Court as a space "separate from the premises in which another Court usually exercises jurisdiction" (s28). In 1927, an amendment to the Act provided further elaboration, clarifying that: "persons attending any sittings of a Children's Court shall not be brought into contact with persons in attendance at any other Court." To achieve this the amendment stipulated that: "for this purpose the sittings of the Children's Court shall not, except in cases where no other suitable room is available, be held in any room in which any other Court ordinarily exercises jurisdiction; nor shall a sitting of the Children's Court, if held in the same premises as any other Court, be held at a time when such other Court is sitting, if other arrangements can reasonably be made" (s18(1)). This paper investigates the locations, and interior architectures of Children's Courts in New Zealand in the 1930s. It aims to establish whether or not the interior architecture of Children's Courts, with their legislated requirement to be physically distinct from the rest of the court system, was also distinct, and in what ways children were specifically accommodated for in this interior architecture.

BREAKING THE SILENCE – FRIENDS OF THE COURT CAN ADDUCE EVIDENCE Children’s Institute v Presiding Officer of the Children’s Court District of Krugersdorp Case CCT 69/12 [2012] ZACC 25

An amicus curiae, literally friend of the court, is a person or organization with a strong interest or views on the subject matter of an action, but not a party to the action who may petition a court for permission to file an application on behalf of a party. Other definitions state that the amicus is able to advise the court on matters of fact. An amicus curiae educates the court on points of law that are in doubt, gathers or organizes information, or raises awareness about some aspect of the case that the court might otherwise overlook. Justice O’Connor of the United States Supreme Court has justified the amicus procedure on ground that “[t]he ‘friends’ who appear today usually file briefs calling our attention to points of law, policy considerations, or other points of view that the parties themselves have not discussed”. The participation of amicus curiae in litigation is a practice which has been entrenched in the common law and civil law of various jurisdictions. It is for this reason that an amicus has become versatile and is said to fulfil a wide range of important functions. The participation of amicus curiae in litigation is a well-established practice in South African legal history. Indeed, the South African courts “are increasingly recognizing that certain matters must necessarily involve the perspectives and voices of organizations or entities that may not have a direct legal interest in the matter”. Amicus curiae briefs have helped the courts to clarify and develop judicial approaches that would assist the courtsin handling intricate issues. The role of amicus curiae in South Africa must be viewed against the background of public-interest litigation which is largely the result of the “apartheid” era in which human-rights activists and civil society organizations sought to fight the inequalities of the “apartheid” regime. With the advent of the Constitution the challenge has now moved away from addressinginequalities of the past but towards ensuring that all persons benefit from the rights enshrined in the Constitution. This has been greatly helped due to the South African Constitution adopting a liberal position with regard to locus standi. This approach has been usefulespecially for those wishing to enforce the rights in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution by litigating in the public interest. Although, technically, locus standi can be distinguished from the amicus curiae procedure, the courts have applied the same locus standi flexibility to the amicus curiae procedure. In light of this, organizations sought to be admitted as amicus curiae in order to adduce statistical evidence, initiate court cases or have sought to be admitted as amicus curiae on behalf of individuals or groups in litigation. The Children’s Institute at the University of Cape Town in the case of Children’s Institute v Presiding Officer of the Children’s Court District of Krugersdorp (Case CCT 69/12 [2012] ZACC 25) is a classic example of such a case. The Children’s Institute sought to be admitted as amicus curiae in order to adduce statistical evidence demonstrating why orphaned children living with family members should receive the foster child grant. The Children’s Institute contended that the Children’s Court decision would lead to roughly 350 000 orphaned children (who live with family members) losing their foster grants.

FOSTERING BY CAREGIVERS WITH NO COMMON-LAW DUTY OF SUPPORT: AT LAST, SOME CLARITY IN THE LAW SS v Presiding Officer, Children’s Court, Krugersdorp 2012 (6) SA 45 (GSJ)

Some serious shortcomings in foster care law which adversely affected large numbers of children have been addressed recently in SS v Presiding Officer, Children’s Court, Krugersdorp (2012 (6) SA 45 (GSJ), hereinafter SS) and Manana v Presiding Officer, Children’s Court, Krugersdorp (SAFLI I (A3075/2011) [2013] ZAGPJHC 64 (12 April 2013), hereinafter Manana). For reasons of scope, and because the issues were somewhat different, the discussion below primarily offers an analysis of the former judgment. As will be seen, SS provided the first reported solutions to some severe problems affecting numerous children and is thus worthy of consideration in its own right. By way of background, one consequence of the AIDS pandemic in South Africa is that many children are left to be nurtured by extended family members or non-relatives, rather than by biological parents. Substitute caregivers often have limited financial means and apply to children’s courts to be designated as foster parents. Where they are successful they become eligible for monthly fostercare grants paid by the state. The best available legal ground for many foster-parent applications is contained in section 150(1)(a) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (the “Act”). Unfortunately, this provision has proved difficult for children’s courts to interpret. It sets as a ground for a child being “in need of care and protection” and thus eligible for foster care: “if, the child has been abandoned or orphaned and is without any visible means of support”. One uncertainty has been whether a child can be found to be abandoned in terms of this provision if currently receiving substitute care volunteered by a caregiver who has already replaced a parent. The phrase “without any visible means of support” has also been difficult tointerpret. It is unfortunate that in selecting this phrase the legislature relied on a vague, centuries-old description by English vagrancy law. Children’s court magistrates have understandably varied in their interpretations of section 150(1)(a). This has led to discrepancies in its application. A negative consequence has been that impoverished carers whose nurturing skills render them suitable parent substitutes sometimes fail in attempts to achieve foster-parent status. Vulnerable abandoned and orphaned children are then left with neither foster-care grants nor caregivers who can properly exercise parental responsibilities. This unfortunate situation, which is obviously not inthe best interests of children, has been a major concern for the department of social development. In SS, Saldulker J provided the first reported interpretation of section 150(1)(a). It will be shown that, although some issues were insufficiently dealt with, the judgment has brought much-needed clarity on several crucial aspects of foster-grant eligibility. It has also provided guidelines for eligibilityof foster-parent applicants who do not have a maintenance obligation in respect of the child. It has additionally provided directions for practitioners (particularly children's court magistrates and social workers) on evidence requirements and stages of proceedings in foster-care applications.

Comparison of Children's Court Law with Child Criminal Justice System Law

The purpose of this writing is to determine the examination of the child from the case of the arrangement of the Child Facing The Law in the Court according to the Law of the Children's Court with the Law of the Criminal Justice System of the Child. This research uses normative research supported by legal approach, analysis approach, and case approach. The results showed Law No. 3 of 1997 on The Children's Court was, in principle, born to protect and care for children in conflict with the law. However, it turns out that legally the Children's Court Law is not able to provide legal protection against Children Facing the Law. Therefore, Law No. 11 of 2012 on The Criminal Justice System of Children was born to replace the Children's Court Law. In the event of a change in the Law, there are striking differences in the handling of issues relating to children in the examination of criminal cases in court

Understanding Children’s Court Processes and Decisions: Perceptions of Children and Their Families

This article presents preliminary findings regarding children’s and families’ experiences of Children’s Court proceedings in which they are participants. The findings come from a systematic review of Australian and international qualitative literature in relation to how children and their families perceive and understand these court processes. The review reveals that we know little about children’s and parents’ perspectives. However, their insights are vital so that courts can reasonably address issues and concerns, give effect to obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1989 and foster a problem-solving, therapeutic court approach.