The Geography of Law: Understanding the Origin of State and Federal Redistricting Cases

Knowing where legal complaints arise can tell us something about them and reveal clues about their conditions of origin. In this paper, we examine the geographic origins of litigation challenging the boundaries of electoral districts—an increasingly salient and prominent source of political conflict. We construct an original dataset of all redistricting cases in state and federal courts nationwide, from 1960 to 2019. We show that redistricting litigation surfaces not just in states where there are regions undergoing rapid population change or that have a greater proportion of aggrieved racial minority groups but also in areas where there is close partisan competition. The filing of redistricting litigation is highly responsive to hypercompetitive political environments, suggesting that parties pursue judicial intervention vigorously when political power hangs in the balance and not simply due to demographic changes associated with decennial population measurement. These findings have important implications for understanding the temporal and spatial dynamics of redistricting politics and the consequences of intense partisan electoral competition in the United States.

Is It Us? Is It Them? Or Is It This Place? Predicting Civility in State Legislatures

While many scholars and analysts have observed a decline in civility in recent years, there have been few examinations of how political, economic, and institutional structures may partially explain inter-state differences in these trends. We suggest three potential explanations: (1) institutional structures, such as legislative professionalism and gubernatorial power, have created different contexts in which legislators build and maintain inter-personal relationships; (2) partisan competition has led to less bipartisan cooperation and contributed to strained relationships between members of different parties; and, (3) economic inequity and change has contributed to economic anxiety among citizens, contributing to conflict in legislative bodies as elected officials attempt to navigate emerging policy challenges. To test these explanations, we develop an innovative measure of civility using a national survey of lobbyists and a partial Multilevel Regression and Poststratification (MRP) design. Findings suggest that there is some validity to all three explanations, and signifying that civility is at least partially a result of structural issues.

From Retrenchment to Selective Social Policy Expansion: The Politics of Federal Cash Benefits in Canada

While much has been written about the politics of retrenchment, in a number of advanced industrial societies social policy expansion does occur today, which raises issues about how to study it in a post-retrenchment era. The present article explores the new politics of social policy expansion in Canada. Drawing on the work of Paul Pierson, we use an integrated framework that highlights the interaction of five factors: the availability of fiscal resources; the emergence of new social risks; the intensity and nature of partisan competition; the policy preferences of the main political parties; and the role of political institutions, especially federalism. Empirically, the article studies the politics of federal social policy expansion during the Harper (2006–2015) and Justin Trudeau (2015–) years, with a focus on three policy areas: child benefits (Universal Child Care Benefit and Canada Child Benefit), pensions (Old Age Security and Canada/Quebec Pension Plan) and Employment Insurance.

How’s Life After the Collapse? Populism as a Representation Linkage and the Emergence of a Populist/Anti-Populist Political Divide in Italy (1994–2018)

Populism is a hot topic in academia. The causes of this phenomenon have received much attention with many studies focusing on the role of the high levels of unresponsiveness of mainstream parties in triggering a populist response. In this respect, in many cases, populist parties have become a relevant electoral force in the concomitance with an electoral decline of mainstream political options, mostly in the last decades. This article considers a situation in which the whole party system’s unresponsiveness reaches its zenith, and the party system collapses. A collapse is the result of the incapacity of most of the parties in the system to fulfill their basic function, i.e., to represent voters’ interests. When this happens, none of the types of linkages—programmatic, clientelist, or personalist—that tie parties and voters are effective. Empirical observation shows that in those cases populism can perform as a sort of representation linkage to re-connect parti(es) and voters on the basis of the moral distinction between “the people” and “the elite.” Through a discursive strategy of blame attribution, populistm can attract a large portion of the vote. At this point, its opposing ideology—anti-populism—also arouses. In other words, populism/anti-populism may result in a political cleavage that structures the party system by itself or, more frequently, with other cleavages. To elucidate this argument, the paper explores the case of Italy between 1994 and 2018. The electoral relevance of populist parties translated first into a discursive cleavage, which, in turn, changed the space of competition with the emergence of a new political axis, namely populism/anti-populism. This paper's central claim is that the dynamics of partisan competition cannot be understood by overlooking the populism/anti-populism political divide. The conclusion touches on one implication of the emergence of this political cleavage, namely change of the incentives for coalition building. In fact, when populism and anti-populism structure, at least partially, the party system changing the space of interparty competition, this in turn may affect the determinants behind parties’ coalition-building choices.

Confronting Disinformation: Journalists and the Conflict over Truth in #Elxn43

(Note: This is a pre-print, not copy-edited, of a chapter for publication in: Cyber-Threats to Canadian Democracy, ed. by Holly Ann Garnett and Michael Pal. McGill-Queen’s University Press.) In the run-up to the 2019 federal election in Canada, experts and policymakers raised the possibility that foreign or domestic actors might use disinformation tactics during the campaign. This prompted Canadian journalists to give unprecedented attention to threats that online disinformation might pose to the information ecosystem and thus to electoral integrity. This chapter analyzes how Canadian journalists understood and responded to disinformation in the 2019 federal election campaign.Drawing on interviews with over 30 journalists, we find that while they held competing conceptions of disinformation, most associated it with digitally enabled techniques of media manipulation (e.g. the use of automated social media accounts known as “bots”) pursued by both traditional and newly prominent actors (including foreign states, partisan organizations and loose networks of domestic trolls). To address online disinformation, some journalism organizations developed new reporting approaches and teams, while many journalists and senior editors reflected on how longstanding reporting practices may or may not address this new challenge. We then investigate key challenges that journalists face in countering disinformation by examining three illustrative cases from the 2019 campaign: the alleged role of bots and foreign accounts in online discourse; the salacious rumours about incumbent prime minister Justin Trudeau pushed by foreign and domestic actors, including the U.S.-based website The Buffalo Chronicle; and the potential for leaks of illegally acquired material acquired through hacking operations.Reflecting on disinformation in #elxn43, journalists described three general challenges. Two are relatively new: how to identify novel and sophisticated online disinformation tactics, and how to address disinformation without amplifying its spread on social media. The third is a dilemma that journalists have long faced in election reporting: how to report on misleading claims in a context of intense partisan competition, when journalists themselves are being scrutinized as actors in the political fray.

Pandemics and Partisanship: Following Old Paths into Uncharted Territory

Although partisan politics tend be set aside during crisis, the timing of gubernatorial actions in response to COVID-19 is telling about how partisanship is shaping the way elected officials are reacting to this pandemic. Using an event history analysis, the authors find that Democratic governors responded to the White House’s attempts to downplay the severity of the pandemic by declaring emergencies in order to draw citizen attention to and to prepare for a public health crisis. On the other hand, Republican governors resisted doing so until Trump declared a national emergency on March 13; however, Republican reactions were conditional on the president’s job approval in their states. While the COVID-19 pandemic has pushed governments into uncharted territory, state governors appear to be following patterns of vertical partisan competition that mirror those of more conventional policy areas in recent years.

It's All About Solidarity Stupid! How Solidarity Frames Structure the Party Political Sphere

Inspired by Lipset and Rokkan, the field of political science has primarily focused on party oppositions as a derivative of historically anchored conflicts among social groups. Yet parties are not mere social mirrors; they are also active interpreters of social context. In a globalized era they deploy conflicting frames on how solidarity may be preserved, as recent work on populist welfare chauvinism shows. However, the role of party political agency in framing solidarity lacks an overarching framework. This article therefore proposes a Durkheimian model that takes the integrative pole of the conflict–integration dialectic seriously and distinguishes among group-based, compassionate, exchange-based and empathic frames. The authors test this solidarity framework in Flanders (Belgium) – a good case study due to its fragmented party system and increasing economic and cultural openness. The content analyses of party manifestos presented here suggest that a solidarity-based deductive approach to studying partisan competition is relevant because partisan differentiation along solidarity lines is growing; this evolution converges with similar inductive expert-based and issue-based findings.

Electoral Competition, Polarization, and the Breakdown of Elite-Led Social Learning

This chapter evaluates the politics of the Obama administration's effort to promote comparative effectiveness research (CER) as the scientific foundation of health care quality improvements and cost control. It argues that elite polarization and a near parity of partisan competition degrades government problem solving in two ways. First, it creates incentives for politicians to transform what plausibly could be consensual “valence” issues, on which nearly all candidates and parties adopt the same stance, into contentious “position” issues, on which candidates and parties take different stances in a zero-sum competition for voter support. Second, elite partisan polarization can stimulate polarization among ordinary voters. Taken together, these twin dynamics can undercut the processes of elite-led social learning and technocratic problem solving on which social progress to no small extent depends. The chapter shows how these distortions played out in 2009–10, when the Obama administration moved forward with its proposal for a major investment in research on the comparative effectiveness of medical treatments, despite the lack of public buy-in for this reform project.

The Collapse of the Four-Party System and the Rise of Zero-Sum Politics

This chapter explains the role that America’s political institutions had in separating the party coalitions and raising the stakes. In an earlier era, when parties were looser coalitions, America had a hidden four-party system-with Liberal Democrats, Conservative Democrats, Liberal Republicans, and Conservative Republicans. This created space for more fluid and flexible coalitions that differed on an issue by issue basis. Especially from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s, this allowed for broadly responsive policymaking. However, as politics nationalized around "culture war" questions, conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans began to go extinct. Given the winner-take-all nature of elections, parties shrunk to their separate geographic cores, becoming much more distinct. The close balance of power nationally turned national partisan competition into trench warfare, with an increasingly dysfunctional Congress as ground zero.