Partisan Competition and the Decline in Legislative Capacity among Congressional Offices

Author(s):  
Jesse M. Crosson ◽  
Alexander C. Furnas ◽  
Timothy Lapira ◽  
Casey Burgat
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Devin Caughey

This introductory chapter lays down the groundwork for the argument that the white polyarchy model provides the best account of congressional representation in the one-party South. This framework characterizes the South as an exclusionary one-party enclave, which departed from normal democratic politics in three major respects: its exclusion of many citizens from the franchise, its lack of partisan competition, and its embeddedness within a national democratic regime. Each of these features had important implications for Southern politics. The argument here is that white polyarchy provides the best description of congressional politics in the South, but this argument also rests on a number of empirical premises. To that end, the chapter outlines a focus on the issues of regulation, redistribution, and social welfare at the core of the New Deal agenda, largely bracketing explicitly racial issues except insofar as they intersected with economic policymaking. Finally, it outlines the major implications set out by this argument for our understanding of the character and persistence of the South's exclusionary one-party enclaves.


2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110297
Author(s):  
James G. Gimpel ◽  
Tristan M. Hightower ◽  
Patrick C. Wohlfarth

Knowing where legal complaints arise can tell us something about them and reveal clues about their conditions of origin. In this paper, we examine the geographic origins of litigation challenging the boundaries of electoral districts—an increasingly salient and prominent source of political conflict. We construct an original dataset of all redistricting cases in state and federal courts nationwide, from 1960 to 2019. We show that redistricting litigation surfaces not just in states where there are regions undergoing rapid population change or that have a greater proportion of aggrieved racial minority groups but also in areas where there is close partisan competition. The filing of redistricting litigation is highly responsive to hypercompetitive political environments, suggesting that parties pursue judicial intervention vigorously when political power hangs in the balance and not simply due to demographic changes associated with decennial population measurement. These findings have important implications for understanding the temporal and spatial dynamics of redistricting politics and the consequences of intense partisan electoral competition in the United States.


Author(s):  
Alfred Moore

Distrust is an essential part of democratic politics. Familiar institutions and practices, such as the separation of powers, partisan competition, and public vigilance, are premised on a positive expectation that others intend to harm our interests. Such practices can organize and domesticate distrust, and make it productive for the democratic system. Yet distrust can go wrong in two sorts of ways. One is through partisan distrust spiraling into what I call conspiracy politics as a result of the process of seeking to represent conspiracy-minded constituents. The other is that public vigilance premised on distrust can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, generating the behavior that fulfills those low expectations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Meyer-Gutbrod

Abstract The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to grant states the authority to reject Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act without penalty threatened the implementation of this polarized health policy. While many Republican-controlled states followed their national allies and rejected Medicaid expansion, others engaged in bipartisan implementation. Why were some Republican states willing to reject the national partisan agenda and cooperate with Democrats in Washington? I focus on the role of electoral competition within states. I conclude that although electoral competition has been shown to encourage partisan polarization within the states, the combination of intergovernmental implementation and Medicaid expansion’s association with public welfare reverses this dynamic. I employ a Cox proportional-hazards model to examine the impact of state partisan ideology and competition on the likelihood of state Medicaid expansion. I find that strong inter-party competition mitigates the impact of more extreme partisan ideologies, encouraging potentially bipartisan negotiation with the federal administration.


2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 532-548 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth M. Roberts

The study of party system institutionalization in Latin America is complicated by the fact that political development in the region has been indelibly marked by period-specific stages and challenges of capitalist development. These periods are associated with distinct patterns of social mobilization, class conflict and political incorporation or exclusion of labour and popular constituencies. These patterns heavily condition the programmatic structuring of partisan competition and its impact on party system institutionalization. Important theoretical insights can be derived from the study of intra-regional variation in period-specific challenges and effects, but this requires careful attention to the factors that differentiate cases.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Zanotti

Populism is a hot topic in academia. The causes of this phenomenon have received much attention with many studies focusing on the role of the high levels of unresponsiveness of mainstream parties in triggering a populist response. In this respect, in many cases, populist parties have become a relevant electoral force in the concomitance with an electoral decline of mainstream political options, mostly in the last decades. This article considers a situation in which the whole party system’s unresponsiveness reaches its zenith, and the party system collapses. A collapse is the result of the incapacity of most of the parties in the system to fulfill their basic function, i.e., to represent voters’ interests. When this happens, none of the types of linkages—programmatic, clientelist, or personalist—that tie parties and voters are effective. Empirical observation shows that in those cases populism can perform as a sort of representation linkage to re-connect parti(es) and voters on the basis of the moral distinction between “the people” and “the elite.” Through a discursive strategy of blame attribution, populistm can attract a large portion of the vote. At this point, its opposing ideology—anti-populism—also arouses. In other words, populism/anti-populism may result in a political cleavage that structures the party system by itself or, more frequently, with other cleavages. To elucidate this argument, the paper explores the case of Italy between 1994 and 2018. The electoral relevance of populist parties translated first into a discursive cleavage, which, in turn, changed the space of competition with the emergence of a new political axis, namely populism/anti-populism. This paper's central claim is that the dynamics of partisan competition cannot be understood by overlooking the populism/anti-populism political divide. The conclusion touches on one implication of the emergence of this political cleavage, namely change of the incentives for coalition building. In fact, when populism and anti-populism structure, at least partially, the party system changing the space of interparty competition, this in turn may affect the determinants behind parties’ coalition-building choices.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Jaclyn J. Kettler ◽  
Luke Fowler ◽  
Stephanie L. Witt

Abstract While many scholars and analysts have observed a decline in civility in recent years, there have been few examinations of how political, economic, and institutional structures may partially explain inter-state differences in these trends. We suggest three potential explanations: (1) institutional structures, such as legislative professionalism and gubernatorial power, have created different contexts in which legislators build and maintain inter-personal relationships; (2) partisan competition has led to less bipartisan cooperation and contributed to strained relationships between members of different parties; and, (3) economic inequity and change has contributed to economic anxiety among citizens, contributing to conflict in legislative bodies as elected officials attempt to navigate emerging policy challenges. To test these explanations, we develop an innovative measure of civility using a national survey of lobbyists and a partial Multilevel Regression and Poststratification (MRP) design. Findings suggest that there is some validity to all three explanations, and signifying that civility is at least partially a result of structural issues.


1983 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 691-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel C. Patterson ◽  
Gregory A. Caldeira

In this inquiry, we focus upon the question, “Why are political parties more competitive in some states than they are in others?” We have measured partisan competition as the closeness between the two major political parties in the results of state-level elections, and we have chosen to analyze elections in American states in the 1970s. To account for variations among the states on the dimension of partisan competitiveness, we formulate and present four discrete lines of reasoning—including socio-demographics, urbanization, diversity, and the strength of party organizations. We test each of these avenues of explanation in turn, always taking into account the watershed between North and South in partisan competition. The results vindicate the utility of our general approach, although we do find that each of the four modes of explanation is wanting in some respect. In a full-blown multivariate context, we report that educational levels and urbanization do influence variations among states in partisan competition. Equally compelling and perhaps more interesting, the strength and activism of local party organizations in the states profoundly affect political competitiveness, even when we take stark regional differences into consideration.


2018 ◽  
pp. 17-34
Author(s):  
Devin Caughey

This chapter develops a theory of electoral politics and representation in the one-party South, conceptualized as an exclusionary one-party enclave. It begins with a stylized description of the logic of electoral democracy and how it induces government to represent its citizens. Here, democracy is defined as a system for collective decision making that treats all participants as political equals. Next, the chapter considers the role of political parties, especially partisan competition, in democratic theory and practice. Having developed this framework with respect to democratic regimes, this chapter then proposes a modified version of it to describe electoral politics in the one-party South. It focuses on three important factors distinguishing the South from democratic regimes: its political exclusion of many citizens, its lack of partisan competition, and its status as a subnational enclave embedded in a national democratic regime. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the empirical implications of this theoretical framework and what we can learn through examination of the one-party South.


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