When Direct Pressure Is Not Enough: An Educational Technique for Teaching Wound Packing in Athletic Training Education

Context Uncontrolled hemorrhage is a major cause of preventable death. Wound care and managing external hemorrhage are important skills for athletic trainers. Objective Describe a laboratory activity used to allow students to practice managing uncontrolled external hemorrhage and wound packing. Background The prevalence of active shooter and other mass casualty events has grown, and a trend to move military-based emergency skills into civilian casualty care has emerged. Athletic trainers are uniquely positioned to respond to catastrophic events at the time of injury. Controlling hemorrhage and rapidly applying a tourniquet or administering wound packing have a great effect in preventing death due to severe hemorrhage. Description An educational technique using a pork shoulder was implemented to provide students with experience in wound packing. Clinical Advantage(s) Students describe this activity as a beneficial way to gain experience on an important skill not often seen in the clinical education setting. Conclusion(s) Faculty may consider implementing wound packing using a pork shoulder as a laboratory activity when teaching wound care and external hemorrhage management.

Congress and the Trump Administration Spar Over U.S. Arms Sales to the Saudi-Led Coalition in Yemen

Longstanding tensions between Congress and the executive over U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen have spurred conflict between the branches over arms sales. In May 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo declared an emergency under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) to bypass congressional “freezes” on arms sales and complete $8.1 billion in sales to members of the Saudi-led coalition. In response, Congress requested that the State Department inspector general (IG) investigate the matter. In a report released in August 2020, the IG determined that the emergency declaration comported with the AECA's procedural requirements but that the State Department's risk assessments and civilian casualty mitigation measures did not fully address legal concerns about the sales. The Trump administration has continued to move forward with arms sales, including by unilaterally reinterpreting a nonbinding multilateral export control regime to eliminate prohibitions on the export of certain unmanned aerial systems (UAS). A bipartisan group of legislators has introduced a bill to prevent such sales to all countries except select U.S. allies. In September, a UN report criticized U.S. and other countries’ arms sales to the Saudi-led coalition and recommended referral of the situation in Yemen to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Reversible and Non lethal Weapons: A path to disarmament.

High casualty figures of innocent citizens in a conflict, proven internal and projected in political thinking and boundaries on neighbouring nations are often higher than insurgent threats, yet when war is inevitable, and armament needed to maintain a political identity, there is a need for a new paradigm, that of Peace Weapons(™). Peace Weapons(™) make conflicts reversible and non-lethal in armament and directed weaponry, in this paper we illustrate the armament with a design of a light pollution map based automated drone bomber, with the replacement of conventional payload with sleep weapons, EMI weapons of Alpha/Beta and Delta/Gamma, deep sleep inducers. We prove that this EMI weapon is reversible in civilian casualty and can be selectively reversed after the conflict is resolved.Keywords: EMI Weapons, Peace Weapons, Reversibility, Non- Lethal Weapons, Peace Movement, Disarmament, Sleep Inducing EMI Weapons.

Civilian Casualties, Humanitarian Aid, and Insurgent Violence in Civil Wars

Indiscriminate violence against civilians has long been viewed as a catalyst for new rounds of violence in civil wars. Can humanitarian assistance reduce violence after civilians have been harmed? Crossnational studies are pessimistic, drawing a connection between humanitarian aid and increased civil war violence, lethality, and duration. To date, however, we have few subnational studies of wartime aid and subsequent violence. To examine this relationship, I draw on the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP II), a USAID-funded initiative that investigated 1,061 civilian casualty incidents (2011–13). Aid was assigned as if randomly to about half (55.8%) of these incidents, facilitating counterfactual estimation of how assistance affected Taliban attacks against the International Security Assistance Force, Afghan forces, and civilians. Challenging prior studies, I find that ACAP was associated with an average 23 percent reduction in attacks against ISAF, but not Afghan forces or civilians, at the village level for up to two years after the initial incident.