Pastoralists’ Herding Strategies and Camp Selection in the Local Commons—A Case Study of Pastoral Societies in Mongolia

Local commons are underutilized in resource management models, thus limiting the effectiveness of the commons concept. This study examined the actual situation of the local commons in Altanbulag soum, a suburb of Ulaanbaatar City, Mongolia, where land degradation is a concern, using the case study method. Interviews using semi-structured questionnaires were conducted with pastoralists. It investigated land use and pastoralists’ relationships to open-access summer pastures, summer camp selection, grazing practice, and acceptance of migrants. The study concludes that herders in Altanbulag select their summer camp locations considering four elements: attachment to the place, territorial bonding, convenient environment, and winter camp safety. We also defined four types of herding strategies that identify the positive and negative aspects of local commons. The study suggests a potential gap between the community-based resource management promoted by international donors and the actual practices around local commons. It also highlights the need for further research into assessing local commons.

Shifting Strategies between Generations in Sami Reindeer Husbandry: the Challenges of Maintaining Traditions while Adapting to a Changing Context

Many traditional pastoralist systems are greatly impacted by cumulative encroachments of other land users and by climate change. Understanding land degradation and the adaptive capacity of people who are dependent on the rangelands is an urgent priority for many areas in the world. In this research we explore how changing environmental conditions affect herding strategies on winter pastures and the role of indigenous and local traditional knowledge (ILK) in Sami reindeer husbandry. Our results indicate that traditional Sami reindeer herding strategies are still practiced, but that rapidly changing environmental circumstances are forcing herders into uncharted territories where these traditional strategies and the transmission of knowledge between generations may be of limited use. For example, rotational grazing is no longer possible as all pastures are being used, and changes in climate result in unpredictable weather patterns unknown to earlier generations.

Fund managers’ herding and mutual fund governance

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to identify the implications of managerial herding for investors’ wealth and capital allocation across funds, and the critical role played by fund governance in monitoring herding incentives. Design/methodology/approach – The author adopt the fund herding measure first proposed by Grinblatt et al. (1995) over the long sample period 1992-2007. Univariate and multivariate tests are then constructed to examine the relationship between managerial herding, performance, and investors’ sensitivities. OLS, fixed-effect panel data models are utilized to conduct the tests. Findings – The author show that managers that do not herd have above-average managerial skills, trade less on noise, and significantly outperform herding managers. The author also illustrate that although fund herding could be used as a signal of managerial quality, underperforming herding funds manage to survive in equilibrium, indicating that investor flows do not adequately respond to the information content of a persistent herding behavior. Finally, the author demonstrate that better governance in the form of stronger managerial incentive schemes constitutes a significant deterrent against detrimental herding strategies, representing an effective monitoring device of the response of fund managers to poor flow-performance sensitivity. Originality/value – The paper provides original evidence on the efficacy of external and internal governance in deterring wealth-reducing herding strategies. The author document that where more effective managerial incentives schemes are put in place by the management companies, fund managers are more likely to be better informed, resulting in fewer incentives to mimic the trading decisions of their peers.