Promoting the rule of rationality over positive law and legal thinking

The paper makes the following claims. First, the most important problem for contemporary legal philosophy is contrasting the morally disgusting state of the world. Second, qua jurisprudents, the problem must be dealt with indirectly. Third, the indirect way of dealing with the problem requires pursuing the goal of promoting the rule of reason, the dominance of rationality, over law and legal thinking. Fourth, such an overall goal is to be pursued by breaking it down into five more specific goals: namely, promoting the epistemic, methodological, conceptual, instrumental, and substantive rationality of law and/or legal thinking. Fifth, pretentious and idle ways of doing jurisprudence must be put aside.

Which Reason? Which Rationality?

The slogan that rationality is about responding to reasons has a turbulent history: once taken for granted; then widely rejected; now enjoying a resurgence. The slogan is made harder to assess by an ever-increasing plethora of distinctions pertaining to reasons and rationality. Here we are occupied with two such distinctions: that between subjective and objective reasons, and that between structural rationality (a.k.a. coherence) and substantive rationality (a.k.a. reasonableness). Our paper has two main aims. The first is to defend dualism about rationality—the view that affirms a deep distinction between structural and substantive rationality—against its monistic competitors. The second aim is to answer the question: with the two distinctions drawn, what becomes of the slogan that rationality is about responding to reasons? We’ll argue that structural rationality cannot be identified with responsiveness to any kind of reasons. As for substantive rationality, we join others in thinking that the most promising reasons-responsiveness account of substantive rationality will involve an “evidence-relative” understanding of reasons. But we also pose a challenge for making this idea precise—a challenge that ultimately calls into question the fundamentality of the notion of a reason even with respect to the analysis of substantive rationality.

A Rough Account of Substantive Rationality

This chapter gives a rough account of substantive rationality, the kind of rationality that contrasts with the book’s main topic, structural rationality. On this account, which mirrors some recently popular accounts in the literature, substantive rationality consists in responding to evidence-relative, right-kind reasons. It also argues against further restrictions on the kinds of reasons relevant to structural rationality—such as a “practical condition” and a condition excluding moral reasons—and introduces the distinction between ex ante and ex post substantive rationality. Finally, it explores accounts of structural rationality that closely mirror the offered account of substantive rationality by understanding the former as responsiveness to “subjective” or belief-relative reasons and argues that these accounts fail.

Coda: The Tyranny of Value

This coda concludes the book by considering the demand to show that it’s valuable to be structurally rational, issuing a brief polemic against this demand and the broader value-centric picture of normativity that underlies it. It suggests that neither the requirements of structural rationality nor the requirements of substantive rationality are best understood in terms of value and that this is just an instance of a more general moral that not all normativity can be understood in terms of value.

Eliminations and Reductions II

This chapter examines and argues against attempts to eliminate the category of substantive rationality or reduce it to structural rationality. Together with the previous chapter—which argues against eliminations and reductions of the converse kind—it thereby provides a positive case for dualism about rationality according to which both kinds of rationality are genuine and neither is reducible to the other. On the way, it also argues against ideal attitudes accounts of reasons; neo-Kantian views according to which it’s structurally irrational to be immoral; and radical forms of coherentism and Bayesianism in epistemology.

Eliminations and Reductions I

This chapter examines and argues against attempts to eliminate the category of structural rationality or reduce it to substantive rationality. Together with the following chapter—which argues against eliminations and reductions of the converse kind—it thereby provides a positive case for dualism about rationality, according to which both kinds of rationality are genuine and neither is reducible to the other. On the way, it also argues that there are cases where being substantively rational does not suffice for being structurally rational, and examines the preface paradox and cases of misleading higher-order evidence.

Fitting Things Together

Some combinations of attitudes—beliefs, credences, intentions, preferences, hopes, fears, and so on—don’t fit together right: they are incoherent. A natural idea is that there is a class of rational requirements—the requirements of structural rationality—that forbid these incoherent states. Yet there are surprisingly deep challenges that arise for this natural idea. First, there are challenges about how these requirements relate to “substantive” rational requirements that require us to have attitudes that are supported by good reasons. Second, there are challenges about what, if anything, unifies the diverse class of instances of incoherence. And third, there are challenges about how, if at all, facts about coherence are normatively significant. These challenges have led many philosophers to deny that structural rationality is a genuine kind of rationality after all. And even the most prominent philosophers who do believe in requirements of structural rationality have often been reticent to defend the claims that such requirements are unified or normatively significant, or reticent to give accounts of how this could be so. By contrast, this book provides a sustained defense of the view that structural rationality is a genuine kind of rationality—distinct from and irreducible to substantive rationality—and of the view that it is unified and normatively significant. In developing a theory of structural rationality, it also aims to show how such a theory can help to illuminate numerous standing debates in both ethics and epistemology.

Outside The City of Grace: appraising dystopia and global sustainability

'The City of Grace: An Urban Manifesto' (Wadley, 2020) models an ecotech settlement, aiming to achieve economic and social sustainability over a substantial period. The City is intended to be anti-dystopian and non-exclusive, with the possibility of replication in receptive settings. In this rejoinder to the book, the potential for dystopia attending population and sustainability issues in the outside world is appraised. Foundations are established in general systems, complexity and chaos theories, and an interpretation of procedural and substantive rationality. Two possible global failure modes are examined, one contained within the human sphere involving the future of capital and labour, and an external one founded in the familiar problematics of the human-environment nexus. Dilatory responses in advanced societies to these dilemmas are outlined. The subsequent prognosis regarding population and sustainability co-opts a meta-theory from environmental management to assess the viability of possible counterstrategies to dystopia although, in conclusion, its existence is instantiated.

Sustainability Is All about Values: The Challenges of Considering Moral and Benefit Values in Business Model Decisions

Despite indications in the literature about the existence of win-win business opportunities regarding sustainability, most companies are still producing limited social and environmental results that are disconnected from their value propositions. Studies on the rationales underlying decisions regarding sustainability can offer a better understanding of this challenge. In particular, substantive rationality suggests that the decision-making process consider collective values for sustainability. This study investigates the following research question: What are the main challenges of making business decisions based on moral values of sustainable development? Using strategic decisions as a unit of analysis, action research in a start-up environment identified the following business challenges: (1) recognizing the limits of applying the moral values of sustainable development to the current business context dominated by maximization of economic and financial benefit values; (2) recognizing the normative nature of sustainability goals, which implies that moral values related to sustainable development are still external and not naturally occurring in people’s personal moral values; (3) addressing conflicts between moral and benefit values and between collective and individual goals when including substantive rationality in business decisions; (4) engaging business stakeholders according to their personal moral values, as people are value driven; and (5) engaging workers in sustainable development values, as they play a central role in enabling benefit value creation for sustainable development. The paper offers interesting insights into moral value and benefit value. The former is the basis for individual decisions, while the latter represents benefits created by business models. Both concepts have been separately investigated, but this research delimits and differentiates them. Future studies can further investigate decision rationalities to enable sustainability in practice, as this is usually a theoretical discussion. Research on other start-ups and more mature organizations can also provide interesting insights.

Multiple rationalities of participatory budgeting in indigenous communities: evidence from Indonesia

PurposeThis paper analyses participatory budgeting (PB) in two Indonesian indigenous communities, illustrating how the World Bank sponsored neo-liberal model of “technical rational” PB is overshadowed by local values and wisdom, consisting of sophisticated, pre-existing rationalities for public participation.Design/methodology/approachAdopting a qualitative and interpretive case study approach, the study draws on data from semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and periods of participant observation. The paper utilises Weber's characterisations of rationality to analyse the PB process in indigenous communities.FindingsThe co-existence of both formal (technical) and substantive rationalities leads two Indonesian indigenous communities to execute participatory budgeting pragmatically. The formal budgetary mechanisms (Musrenbang), cascaded down from central and local governments, are melded with, and co-exist alongside, a tradition of public participation deriving from local cultural values and wisdom (Rembug warga). Reciprocal relationships and trust based on a pre-existing substantive rationality result in community members adapting budget practices while also preserving their local culture and resisting the encroachment of neo-liberal initiatives. The paper offers deeper analysis of the unintended consequences of attempting to implement technical rational accounting reforms and practices in indigenous settings.Originality/valueThe paper provides important insights into the way the interplay between formal and substantive rationality impacts on accounting and budgeting practices in indigenous communities. Our study also presents a unique case in emerging economy contexts in which neoliberal initiatives have been outmanoeuvred in the process of preserving indigenous values and wisdom. The informal participatory mechanism (Rembug warga) retained the community trust that neoliberalism systematically erodes.