The Learning of the Mind as an Ideological Movement: Probing the Historical Origins of the School of Wang Yangming

As an influential scholar, the Ming 明 Neo-Confucian master Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) was also active in the political world. While showing philosophical ingenuity, Wang launched an ideological movement which reached beyond Neo-Confucian discourse and into the social and political spheres. By promoting his xinxue 心學 teachings, Wang aimed to change Ming political life through fostering a moral retrenchment among future officials. To achieve his goals, Wang Yangming implemented several strategies, such as turning to humble local literati for a following, teaching them as a sitting official, and supporting nonofficial academies with his political power. These strategies succeeded to some extent, in part because the Ming court had relaxed the ideological intolerance of the early Ming. The real-world background of Wang Yangming's success can be further explored by comparing Wang with his two predecessors, Xue Xuan 薛瑄 (1389–1464) and Wu Yubi 吳與弼 (1391–1469).

Mencius, Xunzi, and the Third Stage of Confucianism

According to Karl Jaspers’s theory of the Axial age, many important cultures in the world experienced a “transcendental breakthrough” between 800 and 200 BCE; no more transformations occurred until Martin Luther’s Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, which eventually ushered in the modern era. The implication of this theory is that only the West had a second cultural breakthrough, thus rendering moot the discussion of a third Confucian epoch. But, in reality, Confucianism had a second breakthrough during the Song—Ming period (tenth to seventeenth centuries) and spread from China to East Asia; this new form of Confucianism is called “neo-Confucianism” by Western scholars. The third Confucian epoch is a forward-looking concept that uses the lexicon of Western science and democracy to trace Confucianism’s philosophical transformation from a Chinese tradition into a part of world culture, and the integration of Mencian and Xunzian thought has to be treated in this light. Faced with Western cultural challenges, modern Confucianism has broken new ground in many ways. Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 is Mencian (as represented by Lu Xiangshan 陸象山, Wang Yangming 王陽明, and Liu Jishan 劉蕺山) in spirit and Xunzian (as represented by Zhu Xi 朱熹) in practice. Li Zehou 李澤厚, by contrast, exhorts us to talk the Mencian talk but walk the Xunzian walk; this contradictory stratagem, which he thinks will lead to a brighter and healthier future, only accentuates the power of Mencius 孟子 as a philosopher of the mind. Mencius and Xunzi 荀子 are very important in a modern deconstruction of Confucianism and the integration of their thought may very well become the impetus for another transcendental breakthrough. Is integration possible? How should they be integrated? We await the results of Confucian scholars’ open-minded explorations.

Wang Yangming’s Notions of Primary Knowledge and Primary Ability

Rad najprije utvrđuje da iz pojma prvobitnog znanja (liangzhi 良知) Wanga Yangminga王陽明 (1472. – 1529.) ne slijedi subjektivni idealizam te da je vezan za transcendentalnu subjektivnost u smislu fenomenologije. Zatim, raspravlja se o pitanju ima li Wang pojam prvobitne sposobnosti (liangneng 良能). Argumentira se da se može naći u dvije glavne Wangove teme – »znanje i radnja jedno su« (zhixing heyi 知行合一) te »razmatrati Nebo i Zemlju i mnoštvo stvari kao jedno (rizomatično) tijelo« (以天地萬物為一體) ili ih smatrati »izvorno jednim s mojim (rizomatičnim) tijelom« (本吾一體). Pokazuje se da su prvobitno znanje i sposobnost dva aspekta isto fenomena. Istinito je na razini virtualnog »rizomatskog tijela« (ti 體), a ne na razini stvari razmatranih kao potpuno oblikovane i aktualizirane (xing 形), kako se pojavljuju u empirijskom umu, zamagljeni žudnjama (yu 欲) koje postaju fiksirane na razini aktualnog. Te se žudnje mogu razriješiti putem »proširenja (prvobitnog) znanja« zhi (liang)zhi 致(良)知. Usporedni pojam »proširenja (prvobitne) sposobnosti« (zhi liangneng 致良能), koji Wang Yangming ne koristi, može se unijeti u sustav.

From Relativism to Expressivism

This chapter begins with a relativist challenge: it is not clear that every philosophical tradition recognizes a clear distinction between aesthetics and morality. The chapter includes a discussion of ancient Greek, classical Chinese, and Yoruban conceptions of the relationship between moral and aesthetic judgment, as well as some familiar relativist arguments. Then it develops Alain Locke’s response to the relativist challenge: an expressivist account of different modes of valuing. Finally, the chapter draws on Wang Yangming to make an argument about the link between feeling and value. The chapter concludes that expressivism explains the variation in value at least as well as relativism does.