Utilitarianism and the Westernization of Modern Mohist Studies

The term “utilitarianism” in English translates into Chinese as gongli zhuyi. When Liang Qichao and Hu Shi first imported the concept of utilitarianism into the study of Mohist thought, the term was initially translated as shili zhuyi or leli zhuyi. The use of gongli zhuyi in Mohist studies was established only through the efforts of Yan Fu and Wu Yu to break down the negative connotations of gongli in traditional Chinese culture and through the systematic research and scholarly influence of Feng Youlan. The study of Mohist thought within the framework of utilitarianism as gongli zhuyi is now common practice throughout academia with few scholars objecting to the use of this term.

Considering the Present from the Past: On Mohist Thought and Its Modern Transformation

Pre-Qin era Mohist thought was endowed with a Confucian legacy as well as a critical eye and a unique set of ideas. These ideas later affected Legalist thought and attracted criticism from Mencius, Xunzi, and Zhuangzi, and many disputes arose thereafter between the later Mohists. Mohist thought can be broadly characterized as possessing distinctively ethical, rational, and practical features, and we can identify three main aspects of the modern transformation of Mohist philosophy. The first derives from Mozi’s statement on “[the endeavor to] procure benefits for the world and eliminate its calamities,” which can be interpreted as calling on humanity to resolve regional issues from a global viewpoint. The second draws upon Mozi’s statement on “universal love and mutual aid” to promote a manner of thinking that embraces peace at a global level and cultivates strong worldwide environmental awareness. The third draws upon Mozi’s ideas of “identification with the superior” and “Mohist methods of thinking” to promote a type of technological integration that incorporates cultural and social approaches and scientific thought to establish a global teaching system.

Mozi’s Doctrines of “Opposing Military Aggression” and “Impartial Love” and Kant’s “Perpetual Peace”

Mozi and Immanuel Kant are two of the best-known philosophers in history to have meditated on the topics of war and peace. Their philosophical outlooks on the origins of conflict and on ways to prevent war and preserve peace for all humankind are similar. But conceptual differences reveal the distinct cultures from which they emerged. Governed by a clear-cut opposition to war, Mozi’s thought remains unique. The propositions of “impartial love” and “opposing military aggression” are grounded in this belief, and so are Mozi’s effective defense theories and his practice of pacifism, as well as his rational and reflective approach to overcoming warfare – that is, how to go from a state of passive peace to active peace. Kant’s program of “perpetual peace” is similar in many regards to Mozi’s thinking, but it is also more revealing of the modernity of its own logic, especially because it refers to notions such as democracy, government, and institutions, which are in turn rooted in the more systematic theories advanced in Kant’s Three Critiques. The ideas of both philosophers profoundly influenced human history, and their value and brilliance are still celebrated today. However, many regions of the world remain afflicted by unceasing conflict between religious or ethnic groups. This is precisely why it can still prove valuable for us to carefully consider the intellectual legacy of two of the greatest thinkers in history. The limitations of their philosophies, especially when it comes to the new challenges now faced by humanity, offer an opportunity for pondering historical issues and modern solutions.

Interpretations of Mohism’s “Impartial Love” in the Republic of China: A Comparative Approach to Confucianism and Mohism

Since the reign of Qianlong and Jiaqing in the Qing dynasty, there have been signs of a resurgence of interest in Mohism. Intellectuals became particularly invested in Mozi’s teachings during the period of the Republic of China. “Impartial love,” the notion of equity advocated by Mozi, received the most attention. At the time, most discussions primarily attempted to respond to Mencius’s criticism of Mozi’s doctrine. Some scholars stressed Mohism’s high regard for filial piety and demonstrated persuasively that the concept of impartial love did not closely correspond to Mencius’s labelling of it as “disregarding one’s father.” Other scholars drew a distinction between Mozi and his disciples and identified only the latter as deserving of Mencius’s criticism. Some thinkers affirmed impartial love’s practical significance and saw it as a significant tool for condemning the autocracy and saving the country from imminent downfall. Others vehemently denounced the principle’s impracticability. A close look at these different trends can provide us with a better understanding of the different attitudes of intellectuals in the period of the Republic of China regarding Confucianism and the relationship between Confucianism and Mohism.

Consequentialism and the Possibility of a Confucian-Mohist Encounter

Mohism and Confucianism are usually characterized as utilitarian and anti-utilitarian, respectively. This article argues that although Confucians do not espouse the kind of utilitarianism found in the Mozi, both Confucianism and Mohism qualify as forms of consequentialism in emphasizing that the outcome of a given behavior or action constitutes the basis for determining whether the latter qualifies as morally good. Through an analysis of the classical texts of the Analects and the Mengzi, I demonstrate that the similarities between the Confucian and Mohist perspectives on yi 義 and li 利 are much greater than their supposed differences, which have generally been taken for granted. Like Mohism, Confucianism upholds what we might call a “deliberated utilitarianism.”

On the English Translation of Jian’ai by Late Qing Missionary-Sinologists

With an increasing volume of research being conducted on the transmission of premodern Chinese thought in the Western world, a plethora of studies have been published on the English translation of the ancient text Mozi, primarily through the lens of cross-cultural translation studies. Discussions on how the concept of jian’ai – often rendered as “universal love” – should be expressed in English have also taken place in this framework, while the topic has rarely been examined hermeneutically or with reference to histories of knowledge transfer, intellectuals, or scholarship. This article discusses the translation of jian’ai into English by the missionary-sinologists Joseph Edkins and James Legge during the mid-to-late 1800s. It points out that, while both scholars used the term “universal” to translate the concept, they differed on whether “equal” could be used. The author also demonstrates how differences in translation can signify differences in thinking. Using the “unit of thought” of hermeneutics as a methodology to study the translators’ conception of jian’ai via a comparison of common structural levels, a case can be made that both of them used the criticism by Mengzi of Mozi as a kind of “situational construction”. However, in terms of “situational processing”, Edkin’s demonstrated the necessity and equality of jian’ai by quoting the words of ancient sages and wise rulers just as Mozi did, while Legge focused on the “Teng Wen Gong I” chapter of the Mengzi, arguing that the idea of “equality” was not espoused by Mozi himself but rather his later followers. From the perspective of “situational fusion”, Edkins pointed out that, while jian’ai is similar in form to the love of Christ, it in fact shares more similarities with utilitarianism. By contrast, Legge believed that jian’ai was more in line with the thought of Confucius, while he also discussed the similarities and differences between jian’ai and the love of Christ. The differing understandings of jian’ai arrived at by these two scholars demonstrates that missionaries sent to China after the mid-nineteenth century underwent a transition from amateur to professional sinologists. Moreover, by examining how Mohism was introduced to the West in modern times, it can be shown how Legge’s interpretation of jian’ai coined a longstanding translated name for the concept.