Limiting too-big-to-fail: market reactions to policy announcements and actions

Banks considered too-big-to-fail (TBTF) tend to benefit from funding cost advantages as their debt is considered implicitly guaranteed by public authorities, even if the latter have undertaken substantial effort to limit TBTF. This paper focuses on the changes in related market perceptions in response to bank regulatory and resolution reform announcements as well as actual failure resolution actions. It analyses how premia on risky bank debt have reacted to such events, using data for senior and subordinated debt CDS quotes for 45 European banks from January 2007 to May 2020. The empirical results are consistent with progress being made in reducing the value of implicit bank debt guarantees, especially on subordinated bank liabilities. Some earlier bank failure resolution actions appeared to significantly raise risk premia, although more recent failure resolution cases either had no effect on risk premia or moved them in the opposite direction. Several of these events consisted of no-action, that is, in particular, they did not entail any bail-in. As opposed to resolution actions, the reactions of risk premia to policy and regulatory announcements are more difficult to explain and no clear pattern seems to be emerging, confirming the view that action speaks louder than words.

Legal nature of subordinated debt of financial institutions in Ukraine

In the article, the author argues that from the point of view of private law, the relationship that arises between the debtor (financial institution) and the creditor in attracting funds on terms of subordinated debt, is an economic relationship for attracting, respectively, loan, loan, bank deposit, which is performed on the terms of subordinated debt. Liabilities arising from borrowing on a subordinated debt basis are long-term, unsecured, repayable, and that change the order of creditors' claims to be applied in the event of the debtor's liquidation or bankruptcy. The existence of public-law rules governing the attraction of funds on subordinated debt does not affect the legal nature of the said transactions. Therefore, the failure of a debtor to comply with a transaction with the requirements of public law to attract funds on the basis of subordinated debt does not affect its validity. The funds attracted by the debtor bank acquire the status of subordinated debt, subject to obtaining the permission of the National Bank of Ukraine to take into account the borrowed funds on terms of subordinated debt to the capital of the bank. In the absence or revocation of the said permit, there is no reason to include such funds in the equity of the debtor bank and to assign the claims of the lender to such transaction in the event of liquidation or bankruptcy of the debtor bank to the queue established by law to satisfy the claims of creditors on subordinated debt. The article gives a comparative description of subordinated debt and hybrid capital instruments as components of the bank's additional capital, and offers suggestions for improvement of the current legislation of Ukraine.

International Environment: Recovery and Resolution Regimes as the Pillar of the Banking Union

The purpose of the article is to present the possible regimes of bank resolution in the euro system and to highlight open questions concerning additional capital buffers and the valuation of assets according to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The bail-in tool is used to write down or to convert certain liabilities with the purpose of restoring the capital adequacy. The valuation exercise would determine the amount of loss absorbtion to restore viability of the institution and capital adequacy. The bridge bank tool offers deeper restructuring powers to the competent resolution authority. Sale of the business tool is actually a variation of the bridge bank tool, enabling the resolution authority to transfer assets and liabilities to investors. The asset separation tool always is combined with another tool. The write-down is not a resolution tool, as it affects equity, while a bail-in tool goes further to other subordinated debt and senior debt. It is possible to establish additional resolution tools in the national legislation, as long as these tools are compatible with the principles of directive and national legislation in order to support cross-border group resolution. The issue of bank overregulation and the ability to meet the requirements without negative effects on the economy is emphasized.

Priority Spreading of Corporate Debt

Priority spreading refers to the practice of firms increasing their reliance on secured and subordinated debt and reducing their reliance on senior debt as their credit quality deteriorates. We argue that priority spreading occurs because security provides creditors with greater protection from dilution from other creditors than do covenants that prioritize payments. Consistent with this argument, we find that secured bank creditors are rarely diluted by junior creditors in distressed restructurings, whereas senior unsecured creditors are frequently diluted, exogenous increases in asset volatility result in greater priority spreading and yields on senior and subordinated bonds converge as asset volatility increases. Received January 22, 2018; editorial decision January 27, 2019 by Editor David Denis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Beyond Subsidies: A Study of Sustainable Public Subordinated Debt in Spain

Evidence from business shows that small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are fragile. They suffer from a high mortality rate that primarily owes to difficulties in securing financing as a result of major information asymmetries. Despite these difficulties, SMEs provide the economic backbone of all economically developed countries. Aware of the key role of SMEs in national economic stability and of the financial problems that SMEs face, governments have designed a range of financial and tax measures to protect them. These financial measures include a highly specific form of public financing called subordinated debt. This concept refers to debt with the lowest credit seniority, just before equity. Subordination makes sense when companies go into liquidation because subordinated debt creditors are the last creditors to receive repayment, making recovery of this debt virtually impossible. Therefore, the risk borne by lenders of subordinated debt is similar to that of shareholders of the borrowing firm. This paper presents an ordinary least squares regression model to estimate the cash flows of SMEs financed by public subordinated debt. This provides public authorities with a tool to estimate the ability of SMEs to repay their debt and to thereby ensure that public subordinated debt financing is sustainable.