Is a non-evolutionary psychology possible?

The last thirty years has seen the emergence of a self-styled ‘evolutionary’ paradigm within psychology (henceforth, EP). EP is often presented and critiqued as a distinctive, contentious paradigm, to be contrasted with other accounts of human psychology. However, little attention has been paid to the sense in which those other accounts are not evolutionary, or at least evolutionalizable. We distinguish between a commitment to evolution, and a more specific commitment to adaptationism. We argue that all formulable accounts of human psychology are evolutionary in a real sense: non-evolutionary psychology is impossible. Not all psychologies are explicitly adaptationist, but those that are not still draw on informal notions of organismal function, and thus implicitly require at least a weak version of adaptationism. We argue that the really distinctive and contentious feature of EP is not its commitment to evolution, or even adaptationism. It is the commitment to domain-specificity and the associated multiplicity of innately specialized psychological mechanisms. This commitment entails a narrow parsing of what an adaptive problem is, and has the consequence that the science of psychology ends up consisting of many narrow proximal explanations, rather than a few broad ones. We illustrate this thesis by examining a range of paradigms that can be seen as competitors to canonical EP: social role theory; cultural evolutionary psychology and dual inheritance theory; Bayesian cognitive science; and Giddens’ social theory. Narrow versus broad functional specialization emerges as the central locus of difference between the different psychologies we review.

The Cradle of Humankind

This chapter explores the relationship between parenting and technology from an evolutionary perspective. The exploration is organized around the “three styles” framework for understanding and differentiating between the three major evolutionary approaches to the study of human behavior: evolutionary psychology, human behavioral ecology, and dual inheritance theory. For each of these evolutionary approaches, the chapter provides two examples of the relationship between parenting and technology, one related to childbearing and the other related to childrearing. Is the evolutionary approach a useful one to understand this relationship? First, although each has as its focus the application of evolutionary theory to the study of human behavior, each of the three styles brings a different set of assumptions and priorities. Second, an evolutionary perspective points to specific, and theoretically justified, behavioral concomitants of technological change.

Towards a Pricean foundation for cultural evolutionary theory

The Price equation is currently considered one of the fundamental equations – or even the fundamental equation – of evolution. In this article, we explore the role of this equation within cultural evolutionary theory. More specifically, we use it to account for the explanatory power and the theoretical structure of a certain generalised version of dual-inheritance theory. First, we argue that, in spite of not having a definite empirical content, the Price equation offers a suitable formalisation of the processes of cultural evolution, and provides a powerful heuristic device for discovering the actual causes of cultural change and accumulation. Second, we argue that, as a consequence of this, a certain version of the Price equation is the fundamental law of cultural evolutionary theory. In order to support this claim, we sketch the ideal structure of dual-inheritance theory and we stress the unificatory role that the Price equation plays in it.

The role of evolution and invention of tradition in identity and the built environment

Tradition is often presented as simply the past and a static phenomenon. This view can be shared by some supporters of tradition in architecture and urbanism, leading to a valorisation of literal past form and detail. Social analysis of tradition acknowledges that it is a more complex and not static phenomenon. At the same time, the concept of the invention of tradition is widely used to discredit tradition itself. This paper departs from the work of Halbwachs and subsequent studies on collective identity, Boyd and Richerson on Dual Inheritance Theory, Shils on the ubiquity of tradition and Cohen on the sociology of identity, amongst others. This is combined with case studies in the evolution and invention of tradition. The paper presents the applicability of changing and invented traditions that foment social cohesion and how their use in design can respond to community identity.

Operationalizing niche construction theory with stone tools

One of the greatest difficulties with evolutionary approaches in the study of stone tools (lithics) has been finding a mechanism for tying culture and biology in a way that preserves human agency and operates at scales that are visible in the archaeological record. The concept of niche construction, whereby organisms actively construct their environments and change the conditions for selection, could provide a solution to this problem. In this review, we evaluate the utility of niche construction theory (NCT) for stone tool archaeology. We apply NCT to lithics both as part of the ‘extended phenotype’ and as residuals or precipitates of other niche-constructing activities, suggesting ways in which archaeologists can employ niche construction feedbacks to generate testable hypotheses about stone tool use. Finally, we compare NCT to other prominent evolutionary approaches, such as human behavioral ecology and dual-inheritance theory, concluding that NCT has several advantages.

París, California y la búsqueda por una teoría del cambio cultural

The debate on the possibility of an evolutionary theory of cultural change has heated up, over the last years, due to the supposed incompatibilities between the two main theoretical proposals in the field: dual inheritance theory and cultural epidemiology. The former, first formulated in the 1980’s by a group of biologists and anthropologists mostly hosted at Californian universities, supports an analogy between genetic inheritance and cultural transmission. Cultural epidemiology, more recently formulated by Dan Sperber and his collaborator (mostly hosted at Parisian universities), denies the defensibility of such an analogy and put forward a partially alternative model. But how much do these proposals actually differ with each other? In this article, I shall argue that less than what cultural epidemiologists use to think.

Sense or non-sense? a critical discussion of a recent evolutionary–cognitive approach to “folk-economic beliefs”

Laypeople hold beliefs about economics and policy issues—so-called folk-economic beliefs (FEBs)—that are often wrong or misleading according to professional economists. Here, I critically discuss a recent evolutionary–cognitive approach to understanding folk-economic beliefs. According to this approach (Boyer & Petersen 2018a), some economic beliefs are more prevalent than others, because such beliefs (i.e., folk-economic beliefs) resonate with evolved features of the human mind. I refer to this as the “FEB hypothesis”. A central challenge to the FEB hypothesis, with its heavy reliance on universal cognitive features, is to explain individual and cultural differences in economic beliefs and behavior. This challenge is the starting point for the discussion. Overall, the conclusion of this paper is that the FEB hypothesis relies on unnecessarily strong and controversial theoretical assumptions (e.g., “massive modularity” and the “Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness”), and that it overlooks important findings from adjacent fields, but that the FEB hypothesis, following some modifications inspired by Dual Inheritance Theory, can be integrated with robust findings from the rest of the evolutionary, cognitive, and anthropological sciences, as well as standard political psychology. Based on this discussion, the paper ends with brief reflections on how to correct inaccurate folk-economic beliefs.

7. Human behaviour, mind, and culture

‘Human behaviour, mind, and culture’ examines the implications of biology for humans, asking whether human behaviour and culture can be explained in biological terms. The intelligence, language use, cultural inventions, technological prowess, and social institutions of our own species, Homo sapiens, seem to set us apart from other species. Can biology shed any light on humanity and its achievements? One way to tackle this question is to ask whether human behaviour can be understood in biological terms. The nature vs nurture debate is discussed, followed by the approaches of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology to the study of human behaviour. Finally, cultural evolution—or dual inheritance theory—is considered and how this relates to biological evolution.

The Cradle of Humankind: Evolutionary Approaches to Technology and Parenting

This chapter explores the relevance of evolutionary theory for understanding the relationship between technology and parenting. It does this by elaborating two examples -- one related to childbearing and one to childrearing -- for each of the three major paradigms in the application of evolutionary theory to human behaviour: human behavioural ecology, evolutionary psychology, and dual-inheritance theory. The examples range from a cross-cultural test of the idea that heavier female contribution to subsistence will lead to the development of more elaborate baby-carrying technology, to the demonstrated role tv-broadcasted soap operas have played in lowering fertility rates in some developing countries.