The Paradox of Scientific Progress in the Evolutionary Dimension

The article proposes a solution to the paradox of scientific progress, formulated by Max Weber. Science formulates true and objective judgments, and only this distinguishes it from the world of value judgments, ideology, religion, art. On the other hand, the “lifespan of truths” is extremely small and any statement about scientific progress looks unconvincing just in comparison with the pro­gress of value discourses, where each stage of development (style or work of art), if not replaced by the “best” at least they retain or even increase their value over the centuries. A way out of this paradox, according to the authors, can be offered by a socio-evolutionary interpretation of science, where the “criterion” of a better (or more grounded) theory is viewed as “fitness”, as the ability to respond to the challenge of the external environment, to which the best theory adapts bet­ter, and as a consequence is selected. The article is devoted to the problems that the biologically based general theory of evolution is facing today when it is ex­trapolated to the problem of scientific progress. The question is investigated in what sense scientific theories can be interpreted as replacing each other and competing with each other by analogy with organic formations (genotypes, phe­notypes, populations); what the external environment of scientific communica­tion is and what institutions are responsible for the selection of the best theories; about the extent to which the autonomous mechanisms of scientific evolution are differentiated, namely, the mechanisms of random variation, natural selection and stabilization of newly acquired traits. The authors analyze the solutions to these problems in the concepts of causal individuation of the scientific theories of David Hull, the concept of semantic individuation of Stephen Gould’s theory, and the possibilities of reconciliation and synthesis of these evolutionary ap­proaches in the system-communicative theory of evolution by Niklas Luhmann.

Popper as a process: revisiting the appropriation of the Popperian philosophy by the cladists during the “systematics wars”

The philosophy of Karl Popper was strongly used by the cladists in their battle against evolutionary and numerical taxonomy. It became known as “Systematics Wars” by David Hull. His historical account in Science as a Process, described the outcome of that era that end up with the victory of cladistics. Claiming it as hypothetico-deductivist, and falsificationist, cladists have transformed and distorted Popper, that almost nothing of these ideas survived scrutiny. One of the Hull’s conclusion was that the success of cladistics was largely due to their ability to maintain social cohesion and intellectual orthodoxy during the years of the Systematic Wars. In this paper, I will provide a concise historical development about the appropriation of Popper’s ideas that were used by systematics, both as a defense and as a critic, trying to make clear the interpretations of these authors in relation to Popper and their research program. Using David Hull’s General Theory of Selection Processes, I will argue that these facts were, partially, to a heavy adherence to Popper’s philosophy.

Genidentity and Biological Processes

A crucial question for a process view of life is how to identify a process and how to follow it through time. The genidentity view (first proposed by Kurt Lewin and later elaborated by Hans Reichenbach) can contribute decisively to this project. It says that the identity through time of an entity X is given by a well-identified series of continuous states of affairs. Genidentity helps address the problem of diachronic identity in the living world. This chapter describes the centrality of the concept of genidentity for David Hull and proposes an extension of Hull’s view to the ubiquitous phenomenon of symbiosis. Finally, using immunology as a key example, it shows that the genidentity view suggests that the main interest of a process approach is epistemological rather than ontological and that its principal claim is one of priority, namely that processes precede and define things, and not vice versa.

Sceptical Reflections on Human Nature

David Hull famously argued that the very idea of human nature was pre-Darwinian; once we genuinely embrace Darwin’s insights into unbounded variation and plasticity over time, no robust account of human nature can survive. There have been a variety of responses to Hull’s critique, variously showing that some concept of human nature can be rebuilt in ways consistent with contemporary evolutionary biology. In this chapter, I argue that, in one sense, some of these reconstructive attempts succeed. One can develop a concept of human nature consistent with evolutionary insights into variation and potentially unbounded change. But in a deeper sense these reconstructive projects are in trouble: the cost of making a concept of human nature evolutionarily credible is, arguably, to rob that concept of explanatory salience.