The Normativity of Evidence

2019 ◽  
pp. 160-178
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Evidential Support ◽  
Support Relations ◽  
Argument From Analogy ◽  
Normative Relation ◽  
Support Relation

Any case against the argument from analogy appears to rely on the assumption that the evidential-support relation is not itself a normative relation. This chapter identifies three ways in which one might challenge this assumption and responds to each. In doing so it claims that existing responses to this problem in the literature are insufficient: they rely on objective conceptions of probability that are ill-suited to account for epistemic probabilities. It claims that epistemic error theorists may be forced to deny that there are any evidential-support relations but that, surprisingly, this is less of a concession than it may at first appear.

A survey of different approaches to support in argumentation systems

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 513-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Cohen ◽  
Sebastian Gottifredi ◽  
Alejandro J. García ◽  
Guillermo R. Simari
Keyword(s):  
Abstract Argumentation ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
Argumentation Systems ◽  
Support Relation ◽  
Comprehensive Study

AbstractIn the last decades, most works in the literature have been devoted to study argumentation formalisms that focus on a defeat relation among arguments. Recently, the study of a support relation between arguments regained attention among researchers; the bulk of the research has been centered on the study of support within the context of abstract argumentation by considering support as an explicit interaction between arguments. However, there exist other approaches that take support into account in a different setting. This article surveys several interpretations of the notion of support as proposed in the literature, such as deductive support, necessary support, evidential support, subargument, and backing, among others. The aim is to provide a comprehensive study where similarities and differences among these interpretations are highlighted, as well as discuss how they are addressed by different argumentation formalisms.

scholarly journals Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat

2021 ◽  
pp. 116-145
Author(s):  
Errol Lord ◽  
Kurt Sylvan
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Functional Profile ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Support Relations ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Suspension Of Judgment ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

This paper has two main goals. The first and most central goal is to develop a framework for understanding higher-order defeat. The framework rests on the idea that higher-order evidence provides direct reasons for suspending judgment which leave evidential support relations on the first order intact. Equally importantly, we also seek to explain how this sort of defeat is possible by showing how direct reasons for suspension of judgment flow from the functional profile of suspension of judgment. As a result, our framework is embedded within an account of the nature of suspension of judgment that shows how new insights about its nature lead to a different picture of its rational profile. A second and subsidiary goal of the paper is to show how our framework provides a compelling basis for more moderate positions about disagreement and epistemic akrasia. We show that the puzzles about these topics rest on more fundamental mistakes about suspension and the relationship between reasons for suspension, reasons for belief, and evidence.

scholarly journals Reasons and Theoretical Rationality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clayton Littlejohn
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Support Relations ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter explores the relationship between reasons and epistemic rationality. In recent debates about rationality and evidence, internalist evidentialism is quite popular. Using this theory as our stalking horse, we examine debates about the ontology of evidence and reasons, a puzzle about rationality and evidential support relations, work on the relationship between reasons and rationality, and some underexplored issues concerning the relationship between knowledge, evidence, and normative reasons. We shall see that there are good grounds for thinking that the normative reasons that matter in epistemology are not always pieces of evidence, that there is no simple story about the relationship between believing rationally and responding correctly to the evidence or the reasons, that there are problems with formal accounts of evidential support, and that attractive views about the ontology of reasons suggest that it can be rational to believe without having a belief based on reasons.

scholarly journals BEST EXPLANATIONISM AND JUSTIFICATION FOR BELIEFS ABOUT THE FUTURE

Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Stoutenburg
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Explanatory Coherence ◽  
The Future ◽  
Promising Solution ◽  
Beliefs About The Future ◽  
Support Relation

AbstractEarl Conee and Richard Feldman have recently argued that the evidential support relation should be understood in terms of explanatory coherence: roughly, one's evidence supports a proposition if and only if that proposition is part of the best available explanation of the evidence (2008). Their thesis has been criticized through alleged counterexamples, perhaps the most important of which are cases where a subject has a justified belief about the future (Byerly 2013; Byerly and Martin forthcoming). Kevin McCain has defended the thesis against Byerly's counterexample (2013, 2014a). I argue that McCain's defense is inadequate before pointing toward a more promising solution for explanationism. The Byerly–McCain exchange is important because it casts light on the difficult issues of the standards for justification and the nature of epistemic support. Furthermore, McCain's defense of explanationism about epistemic support represents an important recent development of the burgeoning explanationist program in epistemology and philosophy of science.

Seemings

2019 ◽  
pp. 380-418
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Phenomenal Conservatism ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Global Principle ◽  
Support Relation

Chapter 12 concludes the book by contrasting phenomenal accessibilism with Michael Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism. Section 12.1 defines phenomenal conservatism as the global principle that you have epistemic justification to believe a proposition just when it seems strongly enough on balance to be true. Section 12.2 explains the concept of a seeming and outlines an argument that there are no nonperceptual seemings. Section 12.3 argues that phenomenal conservatism imposes implausible restrictions on evidence: all seemings are evidence, but not all evidence is seemings. Section 12.4 argues that phenomenal conservatism gives an overly simplistic account of the evidential support relation: it cannot explain why epistemic rationality requires not only perceptual coherence, but also introspective coherence, logical coherence, and metacoherence. Section 12.5 argues that phenomenal accessibilism is needed to explain these essential characteristics of epistemically rational thinkers. Section 12.6 concludes by summarizing why phenomenal accessibilism is superior to phenomenal conservatism.

Human-Machine Integration as Support Relation: Individual and Task-Related Hybrid Systems in Industrial Production

i-com ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Weidner ◽  
Andreas Argubi-Wollesen ◽  
Athanasios Karafillidis ◽  
Bernward Otten
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Conceptual Approach ◽  
Ongoing Research ◽  
Physical Support ◽  
Societal Challenges ◽  
Wearable Systems ◽  
Support Relations ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Support Relation ◽  
And Task

AbstractOne of the greatest societal challenges right now can be seen in the design of the interaction between human and technology. Especially in recent years this has become more intense. In almost all life situations, we are already supported or assisted by technology. Such systems come in various forms and characteristics. This paper will report on an ongoing research project named smartASSIST which aims to establish methods for the development of wearable systems for physical support as well as exemplary supporting technologies. The research is based upon a theoretical foundation of human-machine support relations which leads to the conceptual approach of constructing Human-Hybrid-Robot (HHR) systems.

scholarly journals Probability and Nonclassical Logic

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Robert G. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Broad Class ◽  
Order Relation ◽  
Confirmation Theory ◽  
Bayesian Confirmation Theory ◽  
Bayesian Confirmation ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Support Relations ◽  
Comparative Relations ◽  
Popper Functions

This chapter presents axioms for comparative conditional probability relations. The axioms presented here are more general than usual. Each comparative relation is a weak partial order on pairs of sentences but need not be a complete order relation. The axioms for these comparative relations are probabilistically sound for the broad class of conditional probability functions known as Popper functions. Furthermore, these axioms are probabilistically complete. Arguably, the notion of comparative conditional probability provides a foundation for Bayesian confirmation theory. Bayesian confirmation functions are overly precise probabilistic representations of the more fundamental logic of comparative support. The most important features of evidential support are captured by comparative relationships among argument strengths, realized by the comparative support relations and their logic.

Bipolar Abstract Argumentation with Dual Attacks and Supports

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nico Potyka
Keyword(s):  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Decision Problems ◽  
Abstract Argumentation ◽  
Stable Semantics ◽  
Support Relations ◽  
Support Relationships ◽  
Computational Properties ◽  
Inherent Tendency

Bipolar abstract argumentation frameworks allow modeling decision problems by defining pro and contra arguments and their relationships. In some popular bipolar frameworks, there is an inherent tendency to favor either attack or support relationships. However, for some applications, it seems sensible to treat attack and support equally. Roughly speaking, turning an attack edge into a support edge, should just invert its meaning. We look at a recently introduced bipolar argumentation semantics and two novel alternatives and discuss their semantical and computational properties. Interestingly, the two novel semantics correspond to stable semantics if no support relations are present and maintain the computational complexity of stable semantics in general bipolar frameworks.

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