Changes in Market Response to Stock Repurchases during the COVID-19 Crisis

This study analyzed the impact of COVID-19, which, in 2020, globally increased uncertainty about the stock repurchase of South Korean listed companies. The results suggest that the market reaction to stock repurchases during the COVID-19 period was significantly subdued. In particular, the market reaction to KOSPI companies, on stock repurchase, was positive, while it was negative in the case of KOSDAQ companies. It has also been reported that the market ranks lower on the reliability of the signal after the onset of COVID-19. This means that if a company discloses a stock repurchase in a situation where the value of the market as a whole has declined, it cannot be accepted as an undervalued signal. Furthermore, it was revealed that the market responded more positively to the announcement of repurchases by companies that had actively managed shareholder wealth by repeatedly making stock repurchases before COVID-19. These results suggest that companies should always be aware of this, as the market response to stock repurchases in market shockers such as COVID-19 is weaker. Additionally, managers can manage their stock prices more effectively through stock repurchases during market shockers if they consistently manage their stock prices through stock repurchases when companies are undervalued.

The Price Effect of Stock Repurchases: Evidence from Dual Class Firms

We examine a sample of dual-class firms to isolate the magnitude and duration of the demand-driven price effect from stock repurchases. In this novel setting, the non-repurchased class serves as a near-perfect counterfactual to the repurchased class and controls for private information about firm value contained in the repurchases. The average repurchase in our sample, 0.30% of outstanding shares within a month, increases the stock price by 40 to 70 basis points relative to the non-repurchased class of stock. The effect dissipates completely over the subsequent month unless extended by continued repurchases. This small, short-lived price effect leaves little scope for CEOs to benefit from value-destroying repurchases motivated by self-interest. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance.

The Effect of Unsuccessful Past Repurchases on Future Repurchasing Decisions

We find that managers are less likely to repurchase stocks when they lose money on past stock repurchases but find no robust evidence that past gains on repurchases influence future repurchasing activity. This asymmetric sensitivity is strongest for young CEOs and those with the shortest tenure. Also, future repurchases are more sensitive to past repurchase losses for CEOs whose previous lifetime experience with the stock market is unfavorable. The sensitivity of future repurchases to past losses costs firms, on average, about 3.7% per year. When this cost is decomposed into systematic and idiosyncratic components, we find that nearly half (1.8%) comes from mistiming idiosyncratic shocks. Past losses on repurchases have a significant and negative impact on the CEO’s future bonus and increase the likelihood that future CEO termination is involuntary. We also find that negative outcomes from past repurchases encourage the subsequent use of dividends. Our findings suggest that outcomes of past repurchases have economically significant consequences through both nonbehavioral (career concerns) and behavioral (snakebite effect) factors. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance.

Dividends versus Stock Repurchases and Long-Run Stock Returns under Heterogeneous Beliefs

We analyze a firm’s choice between dividends and stock repurchases under heterogeneous beliefs. Firm insiders, owning a certain fraction of equity, choose between paying out cash available through a dividend payment or a stock repurchase, and simultaneously choose the scale of the firm’s project. Outsiders have heterogeneous beliefs about project success and may disagree with insiders. In equilibrium, the firm distributes value through dividends alone, through a repurchase alone, or through a combination of both. In some situations, the firm may raise external financing to fund its payout. We also develop results for long-run stock returns following dividends and repurchases.

Incomplete Share Repurchase Programs in Vietnam: Completion Rates and Short-Term Returns

Stock repurchases have become a preferred method of distributing cash to stockholders. However, given the high level of information asymmetry and weak corporate governance as well as poor investor protection in Vietnam, many Vietnamese firms use stock repurchases as a tool to manipulate stock prices in the market. Using event study methodology and Tobit regression models, this study examines the stock price behaviors surrounding the event dates and the impact of earnings management activities prior to the stock repurchases on the completion of repurchase announcements in Vietnam. The results show that earnings management practices prior to stock repurchase programs, the percentage of intended buyback shares, and CEO characteristics have a significant impact on the completion of these repurchase programs. Moreover, most of the windows surrounding the event dates do not have any significant abnormal movement of the stock prices. A plausible explanation is that, due to weak corporate governance and poor investor protection, Vietnamese firms send lots of misleading signals through various corporate activities, especially stock repurchase programs. Thus, these signals have less meaning to investors.

Why Does Equity Capital Flow out of High Tobin’s $\boldsymbol{q}$ Industries?

High Tobin’s $q$ industries receive more funding from capital markets than low Tobin’s $q$ industries from 1971 to 1996. Since then, the opposite is true. The key to understanding this shift is that large firms, for which $q$ is more a proxy for rents than investment opportunities, have become more important within industries. For these firms, repurchases but not capital expenditures increase in the cross-section with $q$, so that $q$ explains the variation of repurchases more than of capital expenditures. Consequently, equity capital flows out of high $q$ industries because for these industries stock repurchases are high and issuances are low.