Price negotiation and coordination in outsourcing supply chain under yield and demand uncertainties

This paper considers the issues of pricing, lot-sizing decisions and coordination in a supply chain consisting of one original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and one contract manufacturer (CM). A Bayesian game accounting for asymmetric information is established to optimize the CM’s outsourcing price and the OEM’s selling price. A Stackelberg game incorporating yield and demand uncertainties is subsequently modeled to optimize the CM’s production quantity and the OEM’s order quantity. Finally, a shortage penalty with surplus purchase contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain. It is found that the optimal outsourcing price is either the lower limit or the stationary point of the common price domain, while the optimal selling price is the upper limit. Whether the CM adopts a conservative or an aggressive production strategy depends on the threshold of the outsourcing price. Moreover, the coordination contract offers great flexibility in parameter selection. By setting the order quantity, penalty price and surplus purchase price properly, the supply chain can realize a win-win situation.

E-Commerce Supply Chain Models under Altruistic Preference

This paper reviews the decisions, coordination contract, and altruistic preference of an e-commerce supply chain (eSC) composed of a manufacturer and a third-party e-commerce platform (platform). The research derives optimal decisions in a decentralized model with altruistic preference; it is indicated that altruistic preference can help increase the sales price and sales service level. Although the platform’s altruistic preference is not beneficial to its own profits, it can help increase the manufacturer’s profits. Moreover, when the degree of altruistic preference is kept within a limit, the profit of the decentralized system is higher in a model with altruistic preferences, which indicates that altruistic preference can contribute toward maintaining a friendly, harmonious, and cooperative a relationship between the platform and manufacturers. Contrary to a traditional offline supply chain, where the sales price is the lowest in the centralized model, the sales price is highest in a centralized eSC model. In the proposed coordination contract, the platform with a certain degree of altruistic preference offers zero-commission sales service and charges a certain amount for a fixed professional service fee. The proposed contract is more applicable to products whose market demands are less affected by sales prices and more affected by the sales service level.

Coordination Strategy for a New Retail Supply Chain Based on Combination Contract

The supply chain in the new retail context demands higher requirements on the price, service, and logistics level. It is very important to seek the coordination among the optimal price, service level, and logistics level. In this paper, we propose the coordination of pricing, the service level, and delivery time of a new retail supply chain composed of one product supplier, one platform service provider, and one logistics provider. Firstly, the profit function mode of product pricing, platform service level, and logistics distribution level that influence the consumers’ demand is constructed in two modes, namely, the centralized and decentralized decision mode. Then, we calculate and compare the optimal product price, the optimal platform service level, the optimal delivery time, and the profit of each member of the supply chain from both decision modes. We discovered that cooperation improves the service level, logistics level, and the income of each member of the new retail supply chain. Therefore, we propose a novel mode called the coordination mode as a strategy for the supply chain based on the combination contract. We performed a numerical analysis to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the coordination contract.

Coordination strategy for a dual-channel electricity supply chain with sustainability

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper describes the construction of a dual-channel electricity supply chain, with an electricity generation enterprise as the leader and an electricity retail enterprise as the follower, examining sustainability and price decision-making, and formulates a coordination contract to improve electricity supply chain performance. The main results are as follows. Firstly, sensitivity to electricity sustainability contributes to increased electricity sustainability, electricity price, electricity demand, and supply chain enterprises' profits. Secondly, a centralized model is conducive to investment in more sustainable energy production. Finally, electricity supply chain system coordination can be realized by combining revenue-sharing and cost-sharing in a fixed compensation contract.</p>

The effect of capacity constraint on pricing decision and coordination contract in recycling channels

Considering the capacity constraints of reverse channels, this paper explores the influences of channel competition and collection choice on the optimal strategies and profits of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), in which consists of a manufacturer and two symmetric retailers. Based on the game theory, we design four different scenarios: Neither retailer collects (NN), only a retailer collects (CN/NC) and both retailers collect (CC). On this basis, we find that the higher saving cost and lower competition intensity are incentive to the retailer to recycle. Further, if both the retailers are with constrained capcaities , the same strategies can bring the significant profit improvement; nevertheless, when the strategies are inconsistent, they may suffer a loss of profits. In addition, we try to coordinate the supply chain through two-part tariff contract to achieve Pareto improvement.

Joint Emission Reduction Strategy in Green Supply Chain under Environmental Regulation

Under the threat of global warming, joint emission reduction strategy has been widely adopted as an effective solution for the industry to guarantee environmental sustainability. In the practice of supply chain, environmental regulations and supply chain contracts are applied with the attempt to improve environmental performance. However, whether these measures are actually effective remains unanswered. In this paper, we study a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer adopting joint emission reduction strategy. We first investigate under what circumstance the environmental regulation can effectively result in higher emission reduction efforts. The result shows that when the cost coefficient satisfies certain conditions, the increase of penalty or subsidy can lead to more investment in emission reduction. In addition, if the environmental impact caused by the production process is extremely high, the enforcement of the regulation is ineffective. We also explore how the cost-revenue-sharing contract affects the emission reduction strategy and the coordination of the members in the supply chain. The results suggest that the incentive effect of environmental regulation is more effective when the supply chain coordination contract exists. Numerical experiments are also presented to verify our analytical conclusions.