Mind’s Selective Attention to Previous Experience

The basic arguments for a mental image model of thought are based on neuropsychological evidence. Farah found that the same brain regions are activated during both mental representation and actual perception, while Bishiah found that brain traumas that affected perception, also affected the ability to create mental images. Pylyshyn on the other hand, argues that all mental images are guided by ‘’cognitive penetrability’’, thus on their very basis, are manipulated by certain propositional elements. Given this difficulty, Kargopoulos hinted towards further research, featuring shapes and solid objects, for which subjects have no prior extensive knowledge. This would force subjects to use non-semantic strategies of representation, meaning mental imagery. Hinton’s cube problem conforms to these requirements. Hinton’s problem aligns with the idea that spatial tasks (especially tasks with cubes that change layout) are guided by propositional cues (our knowledge about squares) and supports Pylyshyn’s position. Using one of the simplest objects, a cube, Hinton showed that as soon as this shape changes its mental arrangement in space, even suspicious -as to the nature of the experiment- participants will make mistakes that are not present when they manipulate a mental image of the cube sitting on its typical array [1-5]. Aim: Our goal was to investigate the relationship between spatio-visual skill and the ability for mental partitioning in healthy subjects. Methodology: We used 2 groups (344 participants) a control and an experimental one. In the control group, we presented a Moebius’ strip, in the experimental group, we presented the same Moebius’ strip and asked them to mentally represent it. All participants asked to mentally partition the strip. Results: Of the 344 participants, only 31 managed to give the correct number of vertices in space. Though people had a hard time manipulating the cube’s mental image, their success rates were much higher for the Hinton 1 task in which propositional representation was more accessible. Only 9 of the 344 participants could find the correct answer for the Moebius strip task in which mental manipulation of the strip image was impossible. Conclusions: We come to the conclusion that the relationship between ‘’seeing’’ and ‘’knowing’’ is more complex, not just on the level of the mental image level but also on the level of perception. Our findings bring back to the scientific background the idea that the mind’s selective attention to previous experience and cognitive schemas will decidedly affect human thought

Mind’s Selective Attention to Previous Experience

The basic arguments for a mental image model of thought are based on neuropsychological evidence. Farah found that the same brain regions are activated during both mental representation and actual perception, while Bishiah found that brain traumas that affected perception, also affected the ability to create mental images. Pylyshyn on the other hand, argues that all mental images are guided by ‘’cognitive penetrability’’, thus on their very basis, are manipulated by certain propositional elements. Given this difficulty, Kargopoulos hinted towards further research, featuring shapes and solid objects, for which subjects have no prior extensive knowledge. This would force subjects to use non-semantic strategies of representation, meaning mental imagery. Hinton’s cube problem conforms to these requirements. Hinton’s problem aligns with the idea that spatial tasks (especially tasks with cubes that change layout) are guided by propositional cues (our knowledge about squares) and supports Pylyshyn’s position. Using one of the simplest objects, a cube, Hinton showed that as soon as this shape changes its mental arrangement in space, even suspicious -as to the nature of the experiment- participants will make mistakes that are not present when they manipulate a mental image of the cube sitting on its typical array [1-5]. Aim: Our goal was to investigate the relationship between spatio-visual skill and the ability for mental partitioning in healthy subjects. Methodology: We used 2 groups (344 participants) a control and an experimental one. In the control group, we presented a Moebius’ strip, in the experimental group, we presented the same Moebius’ strip and asked them to mentally represent it. All participants asked to mentally partition the strip. Results: Of the 344 participants, only 31 managed to give the correct number of vertices in space. Though people had a hard time manipulating the cube’s mental image, their success rates were much higher for the Hinton 1 task in which propositional representation was more accessible. Only 9 of the 344 participants could find the correct answer for the Moebius strip task in which mental manipulation of the strip image was impossible. Conclusions: We come to the conclusion that the relationship between ‘’seeing’’ and ‘’knowing’’ is more complex, not just on the level of the mental image level but also on the level of perception. Our findings bring back to the scientific background the idea that the mind’s selective attention to previous experience and cognitive schemas will decidedly affect human thought

Mind’s selective attention to previous experience

The basic arguments for a mental image model of thought are based on neuropsychological evidence. France (2000) found that the same brain regions are activated during both mental representation and actual perception, while Bishiah (1993) found that brain traumas that affected perception, also affected the ability to create mental images. Pylyshyn(2003) on the other hand, argues that all mental images are guided by ‘’cognitive penetrability’’, thus on their very basis, are manipulated by certain propositional elements. Given this difficulty, Kargopoulos (2009) hinted towards further research, featuring shapes and solid objects, for which subjects have no priorextensive knowledge. This would force subjects to use non-semantic strategies of representation, meaning mental imagery. Hinton’s (1979) cube problem conforms to these requirements. Hinton’s problem aligns with the idea that spatial tasks (especially tasks with cubes that change layout) are guided by propositional cues (our knowledge about squares) and supports Pylyshyn’s position. Using one of the simplest objects, a cube, Hinton showed that as soon as this shape changes its mental arrangement in space, even suspicious -as to the nature of the experiment- participants will make mistakes that are not present when they manipulate a mental image of the cube sitting on its typicalarray. Aim: Our goal was to investigate the relationship between spatio-visual skill and the ability for mental partitioning in healthy subjects. Methodology: We used 2 groups (344 participants) a control and an experimental one. In the control group, we presented a Moebius’ strip, in the experimental group, we presented the same Moebius’ strip and asked them to mentally represent it. All participants asked to mentally partition the strip. Results: Of the 344 participants, only 31 managed to give the correct number of vertices in space. Though people had a hard time manipulating the cube’s mental image, their success rates were much higher for the Hinton 1 task in which propositional representation was more accessible. Only 9 of the 344 participants could find the correct answer for the Moebius strip task in which mental manipulation of the strip image was impossible. Conclusions: We come to the conclusion that the relationship between ‘’seeing’’ and ‘’knowing’’ is more complex, not just on the level of the mental image level but also on the level of perception. Our findings bring back to the scientific background the idea that the mind’s selective attention to previous experience and cognitive schemas will decidedly affect human thought.

Emergence and advancement of basic human capacities

The article departs from the Teilhardean opposition of the inside (le dedans) and the outside (le dehors), notions of reflection and self-enclosure (enroulement sur lui-même), and an experimental law of recurrence (une loi expérimentale de recurrence). The author supplements them with his own apparatus of simplex-complex transformations as an epistemic principle and a set of related practices. The article starts with quantum emergence, forging its inside and outside by an interface and an alternative way to represent it as Diracean membrane, branes of the string theory, and the eigenform. The interface instrumentality for operating the inside and outside of the quantum allows their structured totality to enact agency potential. Simplex-complex transformations allow to represent an evolutionary series of agency transformations as modules of a single model up to a developed human self. The article discusses the recurrence, enclosure, and other trickeries of emergence as well as their representation with the help of cognitive metaphors likme Ouroboros or mathematical formalisms like the Moebius strip. It proceeds to chemical catalysis and autocatalysis, further to emergence of autopoiesis, and finally to biogenesis. Forms of life internalize environmental productive factor (Umwelt) by duplication, recursion, enclosing, folding, etc. to evolve a series of codes, making up integral genetic agency and genome as its key vehicle. The article considers organismic symbiosis and respective autocatalytic recursions, addresses the emergence of signal systems and cognition, which is parallel to and duplicating neural processes. It discusses primary cognitive abilities and their further autocatalytic transformations into a range of more advanced capabilities, along with the emergence of higher levelhigher-level signal systems. Finally, it ends up by discussing anthropogenesis and stepwise emergence and advancement of human language and thought in a series of internalizations of communicative contexts (frames, typical communicative settings, mementoes and typical remembrances, etc.) into codes of the first, second, and further orders.

New extractive frontiers in Ireland and the moebius strip of wind/data

This article maps the interconnections between two emergent resource frontiers in Ireland: wind and data. Adding to literature about extraction and extractivism, we account for how these expanded extractive frontiers are mobilised within self-sustaining and automated formations. In Ireland, digital infrastructures such as data centres are developed by multinational tech companies to avail of a naturally cool climate and business environment friendly to their investment, part of a wider extractive system by which data are made valuable for their expansive operations. Wind farms similarly make use of Ireland’s climate to generate energy, often used to power digital infrastructures, and are increasingly embedded within ‘smart’ energy and data systems. Wind and data are seen discretely as ‘abundant’ resources, their infrastructures built on terra or (offshore) mare nullius, and their operations ‘green’. However, their infrastructures are entangled with non-renewable energy systems and tax evasive capital, and built across existing communities and environments through policy, planning logics and increasingly automated methods of maintenance and optimisation. Through what we call ‘the moebius strip of wind/data’, wind and data infrastructures are increasingly formidable in dictating our energy futures. In this article, we articulate how they are connected and how we can disentangle them, especially in their operation across urban and rural geographies.

The Bunker and the Desert

Dispensing with semiological terms inappropriately applied to comics, this article uses the concept of the ‘cube-panel’ to show that the comics panel is indissociable from drawing itself. There is no ‘code’, only drawing. The cube-panel is exemplified in Inside Moebius. Rather than sampling from a wider, out-of-frame space, it represents a retreat from that space, a prison or refuge, both suggestive of an inner life. The title promises just such a revelation, but it is in the nature of a Moebius strip, and of a graphic representation of the author’s self, for that inside to be inseparable from an outside. Two examples of the inside–outside pairing recur throughout: the desert, representing a creative void, and the bunker, in which the artist externalises himself.

The CVR narrative as a moebius strip

Drawing on teaching sessions that I conducted last year, alongside my own practice-based doctoral research in narrative or cinematic VR (CVR) predicated on the Deleuzian notion of immanence, I propose that the CVR screenplay is better understood as a moebius strip than a linear narrative; a tale that turns around on itself. But far from being unorientable like its mathematical paradigm, the moebius narrative can be both oriented and scripted, as I hope to illustrate using student work as well as my own script iterations. Taking it to be both a model and a metaphor, this article explores how a moebius narrative can be designed ‐ and why design thinking is more suitable for this process than traditional screenwriting methods. While still an understanding-in-progress, I find this conceptual framework useful for both practice and pedagogy. This article hopes additionally, therefore, to make a case for pedagogy as a research method in its own right, especially in the context of practice-based research.