Deepening counter institutions: Property, lands, relations, and the economic future of the Tŝilhqot’in

The recognition of Aboriginal title by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2014 affirmed the existence and relevance of a Tŝilhqot’in legal order governing the relationship that Tŝilhqot’in people have with their lands, with each other, and with outsiders. The challenge now for the Tŝilhqot’in is to articulate and enact these laws in ways that respond to their modern socio-economic and cultural-ecological needs and goals without betraying their fundamental principles. Complicating this is a dominant narrative which rationalizes First Nations compliance with liberal institutions of British common law, property, and market-based economic growth as requirements for socio-economic improvements and well-being within First Nations communities. This article interrogates some of the logics and fundamental assumptions that underpin the arguments of liberal property rights enthusiasts, questioning their applicability to the values and aspirations of the Tŝilhqot’in people and First Nations broadly. The Tŝilhqot’in, empowered through title, at once resist liberal private property while at the same recognize the need for institutional developments in relation to lands, housing, and ‘ownership’. This indicates a need for new legal conceptualizations of property that are more comprehensively rooted in, and reflective of, Indigenous laws and land relations.

Why Is Aboriginal Title Property if It Looks Like Sovereignty?

According to the Supreme Court of Canada, Aboriginal title is a property right, albeit of a distinctive kind. Most significantly, the right is subject to an inherent limit: title lands cannot be used in a way that deprives present and future generations of the right to use the land. Aboriginal title is also encumbered by a restraint on alienation, and has its source in Aboriginal legal systems that predate and survive the assertion of Crown sovereignty. In this paper, we argue that these features of Aboriginal title are not burdensome judicial innovations on a property right, but are instead the essential contours of a sovereign right. That is, the Court’s own description of Aboriginal title does not comport with sound theoretical understandings of a property right. Aboriginal title is much more akin to a right of sovereignty—the right to make laws about the use of a territory. Aboriginal title is the right of law-making jurisdiction over the title lands. The existing literature, while edging towards the view that Aboriginal title is a sovereign right, has lacked the unifying theoretical basis needed to decisively dispatch the Court’s property paradigm. In particular, all extant accounts find the inherent limit inexplicable. The account in this article theorizes and explains the inherent limit, as well as all of the sui generis elements of Aboriginal title, and shows their interconnectedness. Our view additionally answers a number of questions that the Court’s property paradigm does not, including: (1) what laws primarily govern title lands; (2) who has standing to question whether any particular use of title land violates the inherent limit; (3) what is the status of private land interests that overlap with Aboriginal title lands; and (4) how should the doctrine of Aboriginal title be updated in light of jurisprudential developments emphasizing that Indigenous peoples never ceded their sovereignty?

Akimiski Island, Nunavut, Canada: The Use of Cree Oral History and Sea-Level Retrodiction to Resolve Aboriginal Title

On 1 April 1999, Akimiski Island of the western James Bay region of northern Ontario, Canada, was included in the newly formed territory of Nunavut, Canada—an Inuit-dominated territory—even though the Inuit had never asserted Aboriginal title to the island. By contrast, the Omushkegowuk Cree of the western James Bay region have asserted Aboriginal title to Akimiski Island. The Government of Canada by their action (or inaction) has reversed the onus of responsibility for proof of Aboriginal title from the Inuit to the Cree. In other words, the Government of Canada did not follow their own guidelines and the common-law test for proof of Aboriginal title. In this paper, we documented and employed Cree oral history as well as a sea-level retrodiction (based on state-of-the-art numerical modeling of past sea-level changes in James Bay), which incorporated a modified ICE-6G ice history and a 3-D model of Earth structure, to establish that criterion 2 of the test for Aboriginal title has now been fully met. In other words, Cree traditional use and occupancy of Akimiski Island was considered sufficiently factual at the time of assertion of sovereignty by European nations. As all the criteria of the common-law test for proof of Aboriginal title in Canada, with respect to Akimiski Island, have now been addressed, the Cree have sufficient basis to initiate the process of a formal land claim.

Aboriginal rights and title for archaeologists: A history of archaeological evidence in Canadian litigation

Archaeological evidence has been used to assess pre-contact occupation and use of land since the first modern Aboriginal title claim in Canada. Archaeology’s ability to alternately challenge, support, and add substantive spatial and temporal dimensions to oral histories and documentary histories makes it a crucial tool in the resolution of Aboriginal rights and title. This article assesses how archaeological evidence has been considered in Aboriginal rights and title litigation in Canada, both over time and in different types of cases. The examination indicates that archaeological data have been judged to be sufficient evidence of pre-contact occupation and use. However, some limitations inherent in archaeological data, especially challenges in archaeology’s capacities to demonstrate continuous occupation and exclude possibilities for co-occupation, mean that it is best used in conjunction with ethnographies, oral histories, and historical documents. So long as courts affirm that it is the sole material evidence of pre-contact occupation, archaeological data will continue to be considered in future litigation.