Why Is Aboriginal Title Property if It Looks Like Sovereignty?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-44
Author(s):  
Douglas Sanderson ◽  
Amitpal C. Singh
Keyword(s):  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Property Right ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Private Land ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Aboriginal Title ◽  
The Right

According to the Supreme Court of Canada, Aboriginal title is a property right, albeit of a distinctive kind. Most significantly, the right is subject to an inherent limit: title lands cannot be used in a way that deprives present and future generations of the right to use the land. Aboriginal title is also encumbered by a restraint on alienation, and has its source in Aboriginal legal systems that predate and survive the assertion of Crown sovereignty. In this paper, we argue that these features of Aboriginal title are not burdensome judicial innovations on a property right, but are instead the essential contours of a sovereign right. That is, the Court’s own description of Aboriginal title does not comport with sound theoretical understandings of a property right. Aboriginal title is much more akin to a right of sovereignty—the right to make laws about the use of a territory. Aboriginal title is the right of law-making jurisdiction over the title lands. The existing literature, while edging towards the view that Aboriginal title is a sovereign right, has lacked the unifying theoretical basis needed to decisively dispatch the Court’s property paradigm. In particular, all extant accounts find the inherent limit inexplicable. The account in this article theorizes and explains the inherent limit, as well as all of the sui generis elements of Aboriginal title, and shows their interconnectedness. Our view additionally answers a number of questions that the Court’s property paradigm does not, including: (1) what laws primarily govern title lands; (2) who has standing to question whether any particular use of title land violates the inherent limit; (3) what is the status of private land interests that overlap with Aboriginal title lands; and (4) how should the doctrine of Aboriginal title be updated in light of jurisprudential developments emphasizing that Indigenous peoples never ceded their sovereignty?

The Israeli Unfinished Constitutional Revolution: Has the Time Come for Protecting Economic and Social Rights?

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 299-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Rabin ◽  
Yuval Shany
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Hard Core ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Cultural Rights ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Interpretive Strategies ◽  
The Right

AbstractThis article addresses the constitutional discourse surrounding the status of economic and social rights in Israel. It examines the principal interpretive strategies adopted by the Supreme Court with regard to the 1992 basic laws (in particular, with respect to the right to human dignity) and criticizes the Court's reluctance to apply analogous strategies to incorporate economic and social rights into Israeli constitutional law. Potential explanations for this biased approach are also critically discussed. The ensuing outcome is a constitutional imbalance in Israeli law, which perpetuates the unjustified view that economic and social rights are inherently inferior to their civil and political counterparts, and puts in question Israel's compliance with its obligations under the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. At the same time, encouraging recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly the YATED and Marciano judgments, indicate growing acceptance on the part of the Court of the role of economic and social rights in Israeli constitutional law, and raise hopes for a belated judicial change of heart concerning the need to protect at least a ‘hard core’ of economic and social rights. Still, the article posits that the possibilities of promoting the constitutional status of economic and social rights through case-to-case litigation are limited and calls for the renewal of the legislation procedures of draft Basic Law: Social Rights in the Knesset.

The Right to Assisted Dying: Constitutional Jurisprudence and Its Impact in Canada, Germany and Austria

ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Braun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Assisted Dying ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence

Abstract Many states are grappling with the regulation of assistance in suicide and ending the life of another upon their request. Initially punishable in most countries, a growing number of jurisdictions have now introduced permissive frameworks decriminalising, to varying degrees, rendering assistance in dying. Other countries, however, have proceeded with the criminal prohibition and several courts have upheld the lawfulness of the respective criminal laws during human rights and constitutional challenges. Yet, the Supreme Court of Canada in 2015, the German Federal Constitutional Court in February 2020 and the Austrian Constitutional Court in December 2020 have respectively declared unconstitutional and void national criminal laws prohibiting rendering assistance in dying. This article first outlines the criminal law framework relating to assisted dying in Canada, Germany and Austria. It subsequently analyses the judgments before pondering their impact on the legal landscape in the three countries. The article concludes that while the Canadian Supreme Court decision appears to have had a significant impact on the introduction of subsequent legislation in Canada, the effects of the Constitutional Courts’ judgments seem much more subdued in Germany and are yet to unfold in Austria.

The Problems and Promise of Spraytech v. Hudson

2002 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 371-385
Author(s):  
Gibran van Ert
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Precautionary Principle ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
The Precautionary Principle ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status

SummaryIn Spraytech v. Hudson, the Supreme Court of Canada made a bold declaration on the status of the precautionary principle in international law. While the methodology of the majority is open to criticism, the judgment is a welcome clarification of the court’s groundbreaking decision in Baker v. Canada and, building on that case, offers the prospect of a truly internationalized Canadian jurisprudence. In a postscript to this comment, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh v. Canada is briefly considered.

scholarly journals Feu la D.C.D. L'arrêt Miller et la peine de mort

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.

The Status of Indigenous Peoples under International Law: Greenland and the Right to Self-Determination

1995 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 243-257
Author(s):  
Frederik Harhoff
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
De Se ◽  
The Status ◽  
Droit International ◽  
The Right ◽  
Peuples Autochtones

SommaireL'autodétermination des peuples autochtones suscite la controverse en droit international contemporain depuis que le processus de décolonisation s'est achevé, à la fin des années 1960. Parce qu’ils craignaient avant tout des désordres nationaux, de nombreux pays ont refusé de reconnaître que les peuples autochtones ont le droit de se séparer du territoire national et d'obtenir leur indépendance. Cependant, même la reconnaissance d'un droit moins vaste, soit un droit de recevoir un statut spécial et d'obtenir l'autonomie politique dans le cadre des frontières étatiques existantes, demeure une question litigieuse, car aucune définition claire des bénéficiaires et de la substance de ces droits ne peut être établie. De toute façon, la disparité des conditions politiques, économiques, sociales et climatiques dans lesquelles vivent les peuples autochtones du monde entier rend futile la création d'un seul et unique concept d'autodétermination qui s'appliquerait au monde entier. Pour sortir de cette impasse, on propose d'adopter une approche procédurale, au lieu d'essayer de fixer ces questions dans des termes juridiques stricts.Le fait de qualifier le concept d'autodétermination de processus, au lieu de le décrire comme étant une série de règles exactes et préétablies, a pour avantage d'apporter un élément de flexibilité, car il permet aux deux parties, c'est-à-dire les États et les peuples autochtones, de trouver des appuis pour défendre leurs intérêts et d'imaginer une solution viable qui tienne compte des circonstances particulières de chaque cas. Mais toutes les parties concernées devraient tout d'abord accepter trois conditions préalables:(1) Le droit de sécession immédiate et d'indépendance complète, en tant qu'aspect du droit à l'autodétermination, devrait être réservé aux peuples autochtones des territoires d'outre-mer.(2) Les États ont le devoir de favoriser l'autonomie de leurs peuples autochtones et le fardeau de prouver qu 'ih offrent la plus grande autonomie possible aux peuples autochtones vivant sur leurs territoires.(3) Une fois que des ententes relatives à l'autonomie ont été conclues, les États ne peuvent pas les révoquer, les abréger ou les modifier unilatéralement.L'auteur de cette note examine ensuite le régime d'autonomie du Groenland et conclut que ce régime semble satisfaire aux critères énoncés, bien que la question du statut actuel du Groenland (et des îles Faroe) au sein du royaume danois demeure incertaine sur le plan constitutionnel. Le régime d'autonomie implique un transfert irrévocable des pouvoirs législatifs et administratifs des autorités danoùes aux autorités du Groenland, ce qui a pour effet de créer un régime juridique indépendant au Groenland. Par ailleurs, il est entendu que le régime d'autonomie du Groenland permet d'établir un système judiciaire indépendant, si les tribunaux danois du Groenland ne reconnaissent pas la validité de la Loi d'autonomie du Groenland.

scholarly journals Was the Supreme Court right to change the law on the right to a speedy trial?

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leonid Sirota
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Reasonable Time ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Speedy Trial

In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada held, by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagreement of the concurrence, that criminal prosecutions in which a trial does not conclude by a set deadline will be presumed to breach the right to be tried within a reasonable time, protected by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The acceptable length of proceedings set out in the decision is of 18 months from the day charges are laid for cases that proceed without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months otherwise. The Crown can still show that exceptional circumstances outside of its control have arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a stay of proceedings will be the automatic consequence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will be able to show that delay below these ceilings is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by demonstrating not only that the delay is “markedly” greater than reasonable, but also that he or she diligently sought to have the case heard sooner.

scholarly journals Algunos de los desafíos legales y políticos que debe afrontar el movimiento de independencia de Quebec

2016 ◽  
pp. 135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens
Keyword(s):  
Legal Framework ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Independence Movement ◽  
Political Events ◽  
Legal Foundation ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Potential Impact ◽  
The Right ◽  
Democratic Country ◽  
Secessionist Movement

El movimiento secesionista de Quebec, uno de los más antiguos de ese tipo en un país democrático, continúa suscitando interés en otras partes del mundo. Pero este movimiento actualmente se enfrenta importantes desafíos. El objetivo principal de este artículo es de proporcionar a sus lectores una visión general de algunos de los principales obstáculos políticos y legales que afronta en la actualidad el movimiento independentista de Quebec. El primero obstáculo se debe poner en relación con el marco legal aplicable al intento de secesión provincial desde la decisión de 1998, del Tribunal Supremo de Canadá en la Reference re Secession of Quebec. El segundo se encuentra en el impacto potencial del proceso del reciente referéndum en Escocia sobre la estrategia del movimiento secesionista de Quebec. El tercero se creó como consecuencia de la división interna de este movimiento. Por último, se estudia una nueva pretendida base legal para reivindicar la secesión, es decir, el denominado «derecho a decidir», en tanto distinto del derecho a la auto-determinación externa.Quebec’s secessionist movement is one of the oldest of the sort in any democratic country. This paper seeks to provide an overview of some of the main political and legal hurdles currently faced by the Quebec independence movement. First it revisits the domestic legal framework applicable to a provincial secession attempt since the seminal 1998 opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Secession of Quebec, which was a major game changer in the debate over Quebec’s potential secession. Then it examines the potential impact of recent political events, as the Scotland’s recent referendum process, on the strategy of the Quebec secessionist movement. And last it looks at an alleged new legal foundation for secession, i.e. a so-called “right to decide” distinct from the right to external self-determination.

Human Rights and the Arctic

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 233-243
Author(s):  
Gudmundur Alfredsson
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Independent State ◽  
The Status ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Right

Abstract This article surveys some of the many international human rights law issues that come up in connection with the Arctic, such as the rights of indigenous peoples and the formulation of these rights in a draft Nordic Sami Convention. The focus, however, is on recent developments concerning the status of Greenland as a result of an agreement concluded in 2008 between the Danish and Greenlandic authorities. This agreement foresees not only a significant increase in self-government but also opens the door for the Greenlandic people to create an independent State through the exercise of the right to external self-determination as a matter of political decolonisation of an overseas colonial territory.

Recent Developments in Canadian Aboriginal Law: Overview of Case Law and of Certain Principles of Aboriginal Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-350
Author(s):  
Patricia Ochman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Treaty Rights ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Aboriginal Law

AbstractThe author reviews the most recent judgments rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada and certain provincial courts, in order to provide an update in the sphere of Aboriginal law practice in Canada, destined mainly for foreign lawyers and academics. Throughout the review of those recent judgments, the author provides an overview of certain key principles and concepts of Canadian Aboriginal law. Besides providing an overview of recent judgments in the sphere of Aboriginal law, the author seeks to illustrate how meaningful the protection and recognition of Aboriginal rights and treaty rights are in practice, through the overview of key concepts and principles of Canadian Aboriginal law and how they were recently interpreted by Canadian courts. The author briefly addresses Canada's vote against the adoption of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Assimilation and Partition: How Settler Colonialism and Racial Capitalism Co-produce the Borders of Indigenous Economies

2020 ◽  
Vol 119 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-324
Author(s):  
Shiri Pasternak
Keyword(s):  
First Nations ◽  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Critical Material ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Economic Rights ◽  
Racial Capitalism ◽  
The Status ◽  
History Of ◽  
Settler Colonization

The history of colonialism in Canada has meant both the partition of Indigenous peoples from participating (physically, politically, legally) in the economy and a relentless demand to become assimilated as liberal capitalist citizens. Assimilation and segregation are both tendencies of colonization that protect the interests of white capital. But their respective prevalence seems to depend on the regime of racial capitalism at play. This paper examines the intersection of settler colonization and racial capitalism to shed light on the status of Indigenous economic rights in Canada. I ask, to what extent are Indigenous peoples understood to have economic rights—defined here as the governing authority to manage their lands and resources—and, how we can we analyze these rights to better understand the conjoined meanings of colonialism and capitalism as systems of power today? In this paper, I look at two sites to address this problem: first, I examine how the Supreme Court of Canada has defined the “Aboriginal right” to commercial economies since the patriation of Aboriginal rights into the Constitution in 1982; and, second, I examine how these rights are configured through state resource revenue-sharing schemes with First Nations, in particular from extractive projects, over the past few years. Each case study provides critical material for analyzing the economic opportunities available to First Nations through democratic channels of state “recognition,” as well as when and why tensions between state policies of segregation and assimilation emerge.

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