scholarly journals Research on retail channel decisions considering consumer’s fairness concern

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mengli Huang ◽  
YULIN ZHANG ◽  
HAOWEN FAN
Keyword(s):  
Single Channel ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Sales Channels ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Channel Mode ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Market Channel

Online retailing provides alternative shopping channels, where the retail platform can either let manufacturers directly sell to consumers or open a self-operated channel, or even both. Regardless of sales channels, consumers often pay attention to the income gap between themselves and enterprises (named consumer's fairness concern). In this work, we explore how consumers’ fairness concerns affect the optimal decisions of both manufacturer and retail platform under different retail channel modes (single-channel mode and mixed-channel mode). The results show that consumer’s fairness concern has a negative impact on the retail price under low production cost in single-channel mode, while the retail prices in mix-channel mode are jointly determined by consumer’s fairness concern and revenue sharing ratio. Besides, if the market channel mode has not yet formed, the retail platform can choose either a self-operated channel or manufacturer consignment channel, depending on the consumer’s fairness concern level and revenue sharing ratio. By contrast, if the market channel mode has already been formed, the retail platform should make effort to reduce consumer’s fairness concern if only the self-operated channel exists, while maintain consumer’s fairness concern and revenue sharing ratio at a moderate level if there exist mixed channels.

scholarly journals Research of Dual-channel Supply Chain Decision with Consideration of Low-carbon and Fairness Concerns

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 02062
Author(s):  
Guoshuai Niu ◽  
Qi Wei
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Double Channel

With in-depth implementation of policies on energy conservation and emission reduction and rising of low-carbon production practice in enterprises, low-carbon supply chain has gradually become a research issue which causes extensive attentions from scholars. However, most existing researches focus on supply chain decision and coordination under the background of single channel or mere consideration of fairness concerns of retailers. Therefore, the fairness concerns of manufacturers were taken into account in the double-channel low-carbon supply chain. A double-channel low-carbon supply chain model was constructed to research the influence of manufacturers’ fairness concerns to the optimal decision-making of all parties in the supply chain and to the overall performance of supply chain. The research results suggested that: with improvement of manufacturers’ fairness concern coefficient, the decision-making of supply chain members demonstrated different changing strength; the manufacturers’ fairness concern caused harm to overall profit of supply chain.

scholarly journals Coordination of Supply Chains with Competing Manufacturers considering Fairness Concerns

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Jian ◽  
Yuyao Zhang ◽  
Lin Jiang ◽  
Jiafu Su
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Cooperative Relationships ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Distributional Fairness ◽  
Fairness Concern

In this study, we examined the contract coordination between manufacturers with peer-induced and distributional fairness concerns. A revenue sharing contract was introduced to coordinate a competitive supply chain, in which the manufacturers have different fairness concerns based on centralized decision-making in terms of fairness neutrality. Then, we constructed two game models—the manufacturer’s peer-induced fairness concern model and the manufacturer’s distributional fairness concern model and analyzed the influence of a revenue sharing contract on the pricing decisions and profit distribution of a competitive supply chain considering fairness concerns. The results show that there is a revenue-sharing contract parameter in both the peer-induced and distributional fairness concerns of manufacturers, which can effectively realize Pareto improvements in a supply chain. Meanwhile, the retail and wholesale prices both decreased with the increase in the revenue-sharing ratio between retailers and manufacturers, and the profits of retailers decreased accordingly, but the overall utility of manufacturers and supply chains improved markedly. Moreover, the coordination condition is closely related to the level of fairness concerns of the manufacturers and the competition intensity between two manufacturers. The sharing contract designed in this study can not only effectively improve the utility of retailers and manufacturers but also enhance the total utility of the channel to ensure that node enterprises have long-term, stable, and cooperative relationships and to strengthen the overall competitiveness of the supply chain.

scholarly journals Green Manufacturing Strategy Considering Retailers’ Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 4646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhang ◽  
Zhang ◽  
Pu ◽  
Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Green Manufacturing ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Manufacturing Strategy ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
High Level

This paper addresses the problem of green manufacturing decision making for a green dual-channel supply chain (SC). In the investigated SC, the manufacturer will decide whether to adopt green manufacturing under the influence of the retailer’s fairness concern-based dual-channel. Thus, we discuss two decision scenarios: the no green manufacturing strategy with retailer fairness (NM model), and green manufacturing with retailer fairness (GM model). Our study has several findings: Firstly, adopting a green manufacturing strategy is not always beneficial to supply-chain members when a retailer has fairness. In particular, when fairness is at a relatively high level, the manufacturer will not adopt green manufacturing. Secondly, under green manufacturing, the product’s green degree and subsidies have a positive impact on the price and demand and the members’ profit and utility. Besides, the subsidies and retailer fairness have a counter effect on the optimal decision. Thirdly, comparing the two scenarios (NM & GM), we found that the channel price of the GM model is lower than the NM model. Finally, from the perspective of the supply chain system, the system tends toward the manufacturer adopting green manufacturing and maintaining retailer fairness concerns at a lower level.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Reverse Supply Chains Considering Fairness Concern

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (9) ◽  
pp. 1657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Di Wu ◽  
Juhong Chen ◽  
Ruyu Yan ◽  
Ruijun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Transfer Price ◽  
Internet Technology ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Offline Channels

The fierce competition in the recycling industry and the rapid development of internet technology has prompted recycling centers to develop a dual-channel reverse supply chain with both offline and online recycling channels. After the introduction of online channels, recycling centers and third-party recyclers (TPR) have paid attention to the division of profits in supply chain systems and the behavior of fairness concerns. Therefore, it is necessary to help recycling enterprises make pricing decisions in consideration of fairness concerns. This paper is aimed at answering the following two main questions: (1) When the recycling center or TPR have fairness concerns, how does the optimal pricing and revenue of supply chain members change when both sides are neutral? (2) When the fairness concern coefficient changes, how does the overall revenue of the supply chain system change? How should supply chain members adjust their pricing decisions to maximize their own profits? In order to solve the above problems, Stackelberg game models were made from three aspects: both sides are neutral, only the TPR has fairness concerns, and only the recycling center has fairness concerns. Based on the results of the example analyses for the model, we found that when only the TPR has fairness concerns, the profit of the recycling center and the transfer price of offline channels will decrease, while the profit of TPR is the opposite. Furthermore, when only a recycling center has fairness concerns, it will lead to the reduction of not only the recycling price and transfer price of offline channels, but also the profits of the entire supply chain system. Specially, whether it is for a recycling center or TPR, a lower level of fairness concern coefficient has a stronger impact on pricing and revenue than at high levels.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhang Zhijian ◽  
Peng Wang ◽  
Miyu Wan ◽  
Junhua Guo ◽  
Jian Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern

The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effect of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain decisions and design contracts to achieve a win-win situation within the supply chain. For this study, a centralized supply chain model was established without considering the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concern. Furthermore, the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concerns were introduced into the decentralized supply chain, while the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was built. Furthermore, an innovative supply chain contract, i.e., buyback contract, with promotional cost sharing was designed to achieve supply chain coordination along with overconfidence and fairness concern. Finally, a numerical analysis was also conducted to analyze the effect of overconfidence, fairness concern, and the validity of the contract. The principal findings of the study include the positive correlation between retailers’ overconfidence and optimal order quantity, sales effort, expected utility, and profit. Although the order quantity and sales efforts were not affected by the fairness concern of the retailer, the contract achieved coordination with a win-win outcome when the level of overconfidence and fairness concern was moderate.

scholarly journals Joint emission reduction dynamic optimization and coordination in the supply chain considering fairness concern and reference low-carbon effect

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Zhang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Optimization ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
The Impact

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In the context of low-carbon economy, in order to explore the impact of the fairness concern and reference low-carbon effect on supply chain members' balanced emission reduction decisions and profits, supply chain joint emission reduction dynamic optimization models under four different scenarios are built, in which the manufacturer's optimal emission reduction strategy, the retailer's optimal low-carbon promotion strategy and other equilibrium solutions are solved by differential game theory. On the basis of analysis, a contract is designed to achieve the coordination of the supply chain when members are fairness concern. Some findings are as follows. First, when consumers' purchasing behavior is significantly affected by the reference low-carbon effect, and they have higher expectations for the product's emission reduction level, consumers' reference low-carbon effect will discourage the manufacturer's enthusiasm to reduce emissions, and do harm to the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. Second, the fairness concern behavior of both parties will aggravate the adverse effects of reference low-carbon effect, bring a detrimental effect on the performance of the supply chain, aggravate the double marginal effect of the supply chain, and cause continuous negative social influence. Third, the bilateral cost-sharing contract can encourage the manufacturer to increase emission reduction investment, the retailer to increase low-carbon promotion investment, and can achieve a Pareto improvement of both parties' profits and utilities. In addition, the two cost-sharing ratios are only proportional to the marginal revenue and fairness concern intensity of both parties. Finally, when the two cost-sharing ratios and the revenue-sharing coefficient meet a certain relationship and are within a reasonable range, the bilateral cost sharing-revenue sharing hybrid contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.</p>

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Pricing Models in a Dyadic Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhishek Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Fairness Concern

The existing studies on fairness in channel coordination assume markets as the group of oligopolies in which a few firms dominate, scant evidence has been provided where fairness concerns are investigated for a market scenario where all firms share equal dominance. This article considers a dyadic supply chain composed of one fair-minded manufacturer and one fair-minded retailer and investigate their pricing decisions under two different non-cooperative game-theoretic frameworks: manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and Vertical Nash game and provide a comparative analysis. The results show that the prices of the Stackelberg game model are always higher than that of the corresponding prices of the Vertical Nash game. We also find that the prices gap between the two models decreases with the retailer's fairness concern, and is uncertain with respect to manufacturer's fairness. In addition, the manufacturer's (retailer's) profit in the Stackelberg game is decreasing (increasing) in its own fairness and is uncertain in the Vertical Nash game. Furthermore, findings are illustrated through a numerical example.

scholarly journals Modelling and performance analysis of dual-channel switched reluctance motor

2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-105
Author(s):  
Piotr Bogusz ◽  
Mariusz Korkosz ◽  
Jan Prokop
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Tests ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Switched Reluctance Motor ◽  
Position Angle ◽  
Static Characteristics ◽  
Switched Reluctance ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Reluctance Motor ◽  
Channel Mode ◽  
And Performance

Abstract The paper is a presentation of an analysis concerning performance of a 12/8 dual-channel switched reluctance motor (DCSRM). Formulas constituting a base for a non-linear mathematical model of DCSRM are presented. Simulation and laboratory tests were carried out for the motor operating in the dual-channel and single-channel mode. The results of the field theory-based calculations are presented in the form of fluxes in individual phases expressed as functions of currents and a rotor position angle. The results of the computer simulations are shown as the static characteristics of fluxes and the torque as well as voltage, current, and torque waveforms. The results of the laboratory tests are also presented.

Integration of online and offline channels in retail: feasibility of BOPS?

Kybernetes ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinyi Zhang ◽  
Wen Cao ◽  
Yongmei Liu ◽  
Zhichao Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Original Research ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Compensation Strategy ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Offline Channels ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Service Strategies

Purpose As one of the omnichannel sales models, “buy online and pick up in store” (BOPS) not only is used in the commercial field but also has gradually attracted many scholars’ interests. However, although there are numerous research ideas, most of the current work is still limited to theoretical and empirical research, and few scholars study BOPS through models. This paper aims to discuss the best market conditions and opportunities for the implementation of BOPS against the backdrop of omnichannel by means of mathematical models and data simulations and discuss the optimal price–service strategies under different sales models. Design/methodology/approach First, from the perspective of different consumer shopping types, this paper separately divides consumers into different groups in traditional “dual channel” and BOPS models. Then, the authors analyze the impact of company market size, consumer service sensitivity and the scale of BOPS on companies’ strategies and the profit of the supply chain. Subsequently, they conduct an empirical analysis through specific values. Finally, the authors further expand the model on the basis of the original research, and discuss the retailer’s fairness concerns and unit compensation strategy to ensure that the research content is more rigorous. Findings It is observed that whether companies adopt BOPS depends on consumers’ service sensitivity degree and the scale of BOPS consumers and online retailers: when the sensitivity and the proportion of online consumers are high or the number of BOPS consumers is large, it is more advantageous for companies to implement BOPS. Moreover, companies should not only consider the market scale and production cost but also have a precise orientation of consumers’ experience sensitivity and willingness to engage in extra consumption when making price and service strategies. At the same time, the compensation strategy of companies and the peer-regarding fairness concern behavior of offline retailers will affect the optimal price and service strategy in the BOPS model. Social implications These results provide managerial insights for companies preparing to implement BOPS and promote the development of relevant theories in the channel field. Originality/value At present, most of the research on BOPS is based on empirical reviews. However, this paper analyzes the applicability and feasibility of implementing BOPS by using specific models, and it will provide some reference for companies preparing to implement BOPS. In addition, this paper also discusses the unit compensation strategy and peer-regarding fairness concern behavior in the BOPS model, which have not been studied by relevant scholars.

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