The Just Allocation of Climate Burdens

<p>Human-induced climate change threatens the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable people. Preventing the worst effects of climate change and compensating those who will suffer are tasks that should be taken up by individuals, firms and states, tasks that constitute a burden. In this thesis I suggest the use of particular principles for justly allocating this "climate burden". I first defend my use of an orthodox ethical approach from Dale Jamieson’s challenge that the ethics of climate change must be revisionary. I also reply to Luc Bovens’ Lockean argument that a history of high emitting justifies giving past polluters more rights to emit. Then, I propose a two-track theory under which the climate burden is divided in two. These two different parts are allocated by a contribution-based "polluter pays" principle and by an "ability to pay" principle. The "fault burden" is the burden from greenhouse gas emissions produced since it became reasonable to suppose that such emissions were harmful, except for the emissions from the very poor, which are not included. The fault burden should be allocated to those who have contributed to it, in proportion to their contribution. The "no fault burden" is the remaining portion. The no-fault burden should be allocated by an "ability to pay" principle which requires all parties (except for the very poor) to shoulder burdens that constitute an equal drop in whatever goods we deem most relevant. Finally I defend the two track theory from the claim that a "beneficiary pays" principle better allocates the burden caused by past emissions.</p>

The Just Allocation of Climate Burdens

<p>Human-induced climate change threatens the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable people. Preventing the worst effects of climate change and compensating those who will suffer are tasks that should be taken up by individuals, firms and states, tasks that constitute a burden. In this thesis I suggest the use of particular principles for justly allocating this "climate burden". I first defend my use of an orthodox ethical approach from Dale Jamieson’s challenge that the ethics of climate change must be revisionary. I also reply to Luc Bovens’ Lockean argument that a history of high emitting justifies giving past polluters more rights to emit. Then, I propose a two-track theory under which the climate burden is divided in two. These two different parts are allocated by a contribution-based "polluter pays" principle and by an "ability to pay" principle. The "fault burden" is the burden from greenhouse gas emissions produced since it became reasonable to suppose that such emissions were harmful, except for the emissions from the very poor, which are not included. The fault burden should be allocated to those who have contributed to it, in proportion to their contribution. The "no fault burden" is the remaining portion. The no-fault burden should be allocated by an "ability to pay" principle which requires all parties (except for the very poor) to shoulder burdens that constitute an equal drop in whatever goods we deem most relevant. Finally I defend the two track theory from the claim that a "beneficiary pays" principle better allocates the burden caused by past emissions.</p>

What do climate change winners owe, and to whom?

Climate ethics have been concerned with polluter pays, beneficiary pays and ability to pay principles, all of which consider climate change as a single negative externality. This paper considers it as a constellation of externalities, positive and negative, with different associated demands of justice. This is important because explicitly considering positive externalities has not to our knowledge been done in the climate ethics literature. Specifically, it is argued that those who enjoy passive gains from climate change owe gains not to the net losers, but to the emitters, just as the emitters owe compensation to the net losers for the negative externality. This is defended by appeal to theoretical virtues and to the social benefits of generating positive externalities, even when those positive externalities are coupled with far greater negative externalities. We call this the Polluter Pays, Then Receives (‘PPTR', or ‘Peter') Principle.

Beneficiary Pays and Respect for Autonomy

This paper proposes that the “beneficiary pays principle” may be grounded in a brand of respect for autonomy. I first argue that on one understanding, such respect implies that as far as we are not morally required to make some sacrifice in service of some purpose, we each have (pro-tanto) legitimate authority to ourselves decide the purposes for which we should make sacrifices. I then argue that the problem with retaining benefits realized by imposed sacrifices, which the victim was not required to make in order to realize the benefits in question, is that doing so is disrespectful of the victim’s autonomy.

Historical Emissions Debt

This chapter turns to the question of historical responsibility for unavoided climate impacts. It introduces the climate debt claim, according to which certain wealthy or industrialized states owe a debt of compensation to some of those suffering from the unavoided impacts of climate change; where the notion of a debt indicates that the obligation in question falls within the domain of rectificatory justice. The Historical Emissions Debt view, according to which climate debts arise when parties emit more than their fair share of greenhouse gases, is rejected on the basis that there is no fair shares principle for historical use of the climate sink considered in isolation. Two interpretations of the beneficiary pays principle are found to face similar problems. Since none of these accounts appear defensible, it is concluded that those seeking to substantiate a climate debt claim would do better to attempt this by other means.

Financing higher education: the case for a graduate tax

The debate whether university education should be “free” seems misconstrued. Even in a system without tuition fees, someone will have to foot the bill. This paper argues that from the viewpoint of justice, a strong case can be made in higher education for adopting the beneficiary pays principle, and for institutionalising it in the form of a graduate tax. My evaluation from the perspective of justice will focus on the comparison between a “free” university system funded through the general tax system on the one hand, and one financed through a graduate tax on the other. On the beneficiary pays principle defended here, the regressive nature of the general-tax-funded higher education system renders it unjust. Furthermore, I believe we have three reasons to favour a graduate tax in practice. First, I will suggest that it does a better job at implementing the beneficiary pays principle. Second, I will argue that even though the distributive outcome of a corrected general-tax-funded education may be just, it is unlikely to be perceived to be just. A third point of comparison between the two approaches to fund higher education will be international mobility, which will reinforce the case for a graduate tax from the viewpoint of justice.

Have You Benefitted from Carbon Emissions? You May Be a “Morally Objectionable Free Rider”

Much of the climate ethics discussion centers on considerations of compensatory justice and historical accountability. However, little attention is given to supporting and defending the Beneficiary Pays Principle as a guide for policymaking. This principle states that those who have benefitted from an instance of harm have an obligation to compensate those who have been harmed. Thus, this principle implies that those benefitted by industrialization and carbon emission owe compensation to those who have been harmed by climate change. Beneficiary Pays is commonly juxtaposed with Polluter Pays Principle and the Ability to Pay Principle in the relevant literature. Beneficiary Pays withstands objections that raise suspicion for the latter two.