THE EMPLOYER’S RISK PRINCIPLE

The article discusses the employer’s risk as a principle of labour law. The idea of employer’s risk is that the employer bears the consequences of obstacles in the performance of the employment relationship that it has not caused. The author distinguishes the obstacles: not related (the employer’s risk in a strict sense) and related to the employee (personal risk). As a rule, the employer bears the risk of circumstances not related to the employee. The nature as well as the application scope of regulations allow to formulate a normative principle of the labour law. At the same time the employer bears the risk of the obstacles related to the employee only in cases specified in the labour law, both: statutory standards as well as autonomous provisions. As a result, the personal risk of the employer cannot be considered to be a normative principle of the labour law.

Woman philosopher of the Pythagorean school about human nature and upbringing

The article offers academic translation into Ukrainian of a number of works by Pythagorean woman philosophers, which reveal the problems of human nature and personality education. The focus is on such pseudo-epigraphs of ancient woman thinkers as two letters by Theano of Crotone, letters of Miya of Crotone and Melissa, as well as treatises by Fintys of Sparta "On a woman prudence", Aesara of Lucania "On human nature" and excerpts from Porphyry’s "Pythagorean music" which contain fragments of the works of Ptolemais of Cyrene. The main themes of the above works and letters are the education of the individual in general, and women in particular. Accordingly, the basis of education should be an element of restraint and prudence in everything. If the child is brought up on this basis, he will be able to be strong and resilient during certain life situations. In the treatises of the Pythagorean women-philosophers it is noted that through the study of our own human nature (namely, the human soul) we can understand the philosophical foundations of natural law and morality. Therefore, a woman should use in her life not fleeting emotions and reactions to a particular event, situation, but also be moderate and prudent. These texts are significant in the context of understanding gender issues in the Hellenistic era. Based on the translated works, we can say that, according to thinkers, a number of virtues are common to both sexes (courage, justice and wisdom), moderation or abstinence are more common in women. At the same time, the limitation of the social role of women reflects an understanding of the nature of the female soul. Accordingly, the normative principle of harmony must be implemented in the context of the specific social roles allowed to women. At the same time, the availability of these texts indicates that philosophy is possible for both men and women, thus emphasizing the importance of involving the latter in knowledge and scientific knowledge.

Too Important for the Bureaucrats: Rethinking Risk and Regulatory Presumptions in Times of Crisis

The posture of American regulation of medicine is negative—we assume that a new drug is unsafe and ineffective until it is proven safe and effective.1 This regulatory posture is a heuristic normative principle, a specific instance of the so-called precautionary principle in public health law.2 It is defensible, if debatable, in many ordinary circumstances.3 But like many normative heuristics, this negative posture may compel suboptimal decision-making in emergencies, where context-specific decisions must be made and a range of unique values may apply.

Meritocracy

Meritocracy is a normative principle directing the distribution of opportunities and benefits based on ability, talent, or effort. It is a central issue in education, which seems centrally concerned with identifying, developing, and rewarding merit. But many have come to doubt the reality of meritocracy, apart from its worth as an ideal; and in a society in which opportunities and benefits (including educational opportunities and benefits) are in fact not distributed based on merit, the belief in meritocracy functions as a kind of legitimating myth. The essay concludes that meritocracy is an ambivalent principle, producing some things that we want and many things that we do not want.

Introduction

This chapter introduces this book’s investigation into the question of which normative principle governs the scope of consent. The scope of someone’s consent is the range of actions that they permit by giving consent. The ultimate conclusion of this book is that the scope of consent is determined by certain evidence that bears on the appropriate interpretation of the consent. To reach this conclusion, this book’s investigation involves taking a stance on what constitutes consent. By appealing to the idea that someone can justify their behaviour by appealing to another person’s consent, this book defends the view that consent consists in behaviour that expresses a consent-giver’s will for how a consent-receiver behaves. Discovering the principle for consent scope’s is important for a variety of practical applications, including sexual deception: by engaging in deception, a perpetrator can unwittingly manipulate their victim into taking part in a sexual encounter that lies outside the scope of their consent.

The Scope of Consent

The scope of someone’s consent is the range of actions that they permit by giving consent. This book investigates the underexplored question of which normative principle governs the scope of consent. To answer this question, this investigation involves taking a stance on what constitutes consent. By appealing to the idea that someone can justify their behaviour by appealing to another person’s consent, this book defends the view that consent consists in behaviour that expresses a consent-giver’s will for how a consent-receiver behaves. The ultimate conclusion of this book is that the scope of consent is determined by certain evidence that bears on the appropriate interpretation of the consent.

Why appeals to the moral significance of birth are saddled with a dilemma

In ‘Dilemma for Appeals to the Moral Significance of Birth’, we argued that a dilemma is faced by those who believe that birth is the event at which infanticide is ruled out. Those who reject the moral permissibility of infanticide by appeal to the moral significance of birth must either accept the moral permissibility of a late-term abortion for a non-therapeutic reason or not. If they accept it, they need to account for the strong intuition that her decision is wrong as well as deny the underlying normative principle that killing a viable fetus requires good reason, and not wanting to care for the child when the child could be easily placed for adoption is not a good enough reason to abort. If they reject the moral permissibility of the late-term abortion, they need to explain why her decision is wrong. Doing so, however, will undermine their own project of denying infanticide by appeal to birth. Walter Veit argues that the dilemma relies too much on intuition and does not live up to biological continuity. We explain why his criticisms are unconvincing.

Bayesian Epistemology

Everyone agrees that it is good to know. We however believe many more things than we know, which has made the notion of belief a target of recent work in epistemology. Not only do we believe propositions, we also believe them to different degrees. That beliefs come in degrees is often taken as a psychological fact and as a normative principle of rationality. The most prominent normative approach to beliefs which come in degrees is Bayesian epistemology. Bayesian degrees of belief are postulated to be represented by numbers in the unit interval [0, 1] obeying the axioms of probability. The convention is that a greater number expresses a stronger belief. The second postulate of Bayesian epistemology governs the change of beliefs whenever new evidence becomes available via updating procedures, Bayesian updating for categorical evidence and the more general Jeffrey updating for uncertain evidence.

Schismata and ʾAgudot: The Prohibition against Creating Factions in Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians and Rabbinic Literature

Paul opens his First Epistle to the Corinthians with the exhortation “Now I appeal to you, brothers [and sisters], … that there be no divisions among you, but that you be united in the same mind and the same purpose” (1:10). This plea is strikingly similar to a passage in Sifre Deuteronomy 96, where the words lo titgodedu are interpreted as “Do not be made into gatherings/factions [ʾagudot]; rather, be all of you one gathering [ʾagudah].” Analyzing these sources in depth, this article argues that Paul was familiar with this early rabbinic midrash in an oral form. It also explores the possibility that Paul used another early rabbinic tradition on unity, which is found in the Mekhilta de-miluʾim section of the Sifra. If Paul indeed knew certain rabbinic oral traditions, then he was an independent interpreter of Scripture, who read Scripture in the original Hebrew. Further, even if Paul's audience consisted primarily of gentiles, the legal norms he sought to institute among them were based on Jewish traditions. Finally, Paul follows his exhortation against schismata with the names of specific groups in Corinth, which demonstrates that he understood the tannaitic tradition as a normative principle, meant to be applied to specific disagreements. If so, other first-century Jews also likely understood lo titgodedu as a concrete halakhic prohibition.

Reconhecimento social e seu contrário no Brasil / Social recognition and its opposed in Brazil

O artigo discute o uso que Roberto Schwarz e Maria Sylvia de Carvalho Franco fazem do conceito de reconhecimento. Desse modo, busca mostrar que reconhecimento é, ao mesmo tempo, um princípio normativo e revelador de uma subordinação a práticas arbitrárias nos textos de ambos sobre a sociedade brasileira. Assim, a ordem do favor e a rede de relações de dominação pessoal que Schwarz e Franco, respectivamente, descrevem podem ser vistas como formas derivadas da subordinação do reconhecimento às necessidades práticas das camadas dominantes. Com isso, ao identificar uma “dissonância vexatória” entre o que intenciona uma norma de reconhecimento recíproco e o que intencionam as práticas concretas de reconhecimento, Schwarz e Franco mostram ser possível denunciar criticamente a transformação de um princípio legítimo de organização da vida social em um mecanismo de reprodução de hierarquias.Palavras-chave: reconhecimento, favor, dominação pessoal.***This paper presents the concept of recognition, as used by Roberto Schwarz and Maria Sylvia de Carvalho Franco. It tries to show that recognition is, at once, both a normative principle and a concept that reveals how everyday practices were subordinated by arbitrariness in Brazil. Accordingly, the relations of favor and personal domination, which Schwarz and Franco respectively describe, could be taken as consequences of practical necessities of the dominant classes. So, in identifying a “shaming dissonance” between what the norm of recognition implies and what it becomes within Brazilian society, both authors are able to show that is possible to critically denounce the inversion of a legitimate principle of social life’s organization into a mechanism of reproduction of social hierarchies.Keywords: recognition, favor, personal domination.