THE OBSTACLE FACTORS OF MUSHARAKAH AND MUDHARABAH APPLICATION IN PAKISTAN

Islamic Banking is based on the Islamic financial system. It is a banking system whose fundamental rules and regulations are established on Shariah laws i.e., Islamic jurisprudence originated from the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him. Its functions must comply with Shariah rules and must not violate any Shariah principle. The Islamic finance system is based on Profit-loss sharing financing namely, Musharakah and Mudharabah but there are numerous issues and challenges faced by Islamic bank during the implementation of Musharakah and Mudharabah financing contracts. The various paper has been revealed some of the internal and external factors in this context, but the study is still unexplored in Pakistan. This paper aims to highlight those obstacles factors that affect the application of Musharakah and Mudharabah financing by Islamic Banks in Pakistan. This paper is based on the critical analysis of the related literature on the concepts of Profit-loss sharing based financing by Islamic Banks. The finding suggests 4 (four) main factors which hinder the application of Musharakah and Mudharabah by Islamic bank in Pakistan namely high risk, lack of awareness, Regulatory constraint and Low rate of return. Finally, this paper concludes by making recommendations that may be adopted by Islamic banks and regulators to facilitate the promotion of Musharakah and Mudharabah Financing.

What influence domestic and overseas developers’ decisions?

PurposeForeign firms entering into the domestic real estate industry and foreign investment control are significant in global hot markets such as Australia. Despite their market impact and policy sensitivity, developer choice is rarely studied. The purpose of this paper is to study domestic and overseas property developers for their motive and preference in response to market growth and market barriers including regulatory constraint.Design/methodology/approachInternational trade theory suggests local and overseas firms can vary significantly for their risk profile when engaging in location-specific development opportunities. Using a comprehensive decision factor system for the residential development process, the authors conducted an experimental survey to collect the prime data to measure stated preference of domestic and overseas developers in the context of the Melbourne residential market.FindingsResults suggest high consistency between the samples of domestic and overseas developers. Possible explanations include vertical integration by innovative contracting, strict regulatory constraint dictates domestic and overseas firms’ preference or sample selection bias. This micro-analysis of developer stated preference highlights their entrepreneurial ability to combine substitution and integration for innovative contractual strategy. This ability to join asset holding and project management enables firm flexibility to mitigate business risk in rapidly globalising capital and factor markets.Practical implicationsThese insights of firm-level decision making contribute to the decision literature of real estate developers and are relevant to the broader literature of industrial economics and international trade. Government may evaluate policy strategies based on the explicit entrepreneur (e.g. developer) preference for their “comparative advantage”.Originality/valueThis paper highlights developer’s ability to jointly consider investment and project management for decision making. It found that other than political cost such as national interest and domestic interest group pressure, domestic and overseas developers in the Melbourne residential market actually think quite alike. It suggests that irrespective of property ownership conditions, market integration occurs in the Melbourne residential sector.

Bitcoin may face further regulatory constraint

Headline CHINA: Bitcoin may face further regulatory constraint

Sample Sizes for Designing Bioequivalence Studies for Highly Variable Drugs

Purpose. To provide tables of sample sizes which are required, by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for the design of bioequivalence (BE) studies involving highly variable drugs. To elucidate the complicated features of the relationship between sample size and within-subject variation. Methods. 3- and 4-period studies were simulated with various sample sizes. They were evaluated, at various variations and various true ratios of the two geometric means (GMR), by the approaches of scaled average BE and by average BE with expanding limits. The sample sizes required for yielding 80% and 90% statistical powers were determined. Results. Because of the complicated regulatory expectations, the features of the required sample sizes are also complicated. When the true GMR = 1.0 then, without additional constraints, the sample size is independent of the intrasubject variation. When the true GMR is increased or decreased from 1.0 then the required sample sizes rise at above but close to 30% variation. An additional regulatory constraint on the point estimate of GMR and a cap on the use of expanding limits further increase the required sample size at high variations. Fewer subjects are required by the FDA than by the EMA procedures. Conclusions. The methods proposed by EMA and FDA lower the required sample sizes in comparison with unscaled average BE. However, each additional regulatory requirement (applying the mixed procedure, imposing a constraint on the point estimate of GMR, and using a cap on the application of expanding limits) raises the required number of subjects. This article is open to POST-PUBLICATION REVIEW. Registered readers (see “For Readers”) may comment by clicking on ABSTRACT on the issue’s contents page.

Vertical Integration, Regulation, & The Shifting Of Economic Profits

A model which shows how a vertically integrated, multiproduct regulated monopolist can shift its monopoly profits to its upstream nonregulated affiliate is developed. The model is expanded to include a self-imposed constraint on the percentage mark-up of the transfer price which makes the regulatory constraint binding. The telecommunications industry is examined to determine what empirical evidence exists to support the shifting of profits hypothesis. Competitors are foreclosed from the market based on the desire to shift profits not on an economic efficiency criterion. How a multiproduct regulated monopolist reacts to competition in one of its product lines is analyzed.