The Role of Private Disclosures in Markets with Weak Institutions: Evidence from Market Liberalization in China

I use the announcement of a market liberalization pilot program in China as a shock to firms' disclosure environment and examine how the Chinese firms, foreign investors, and foreign brokers respond. Using a proprietary dataset, I find that affected firms respond to announcement by significantly increasing the number of selective private meetings hosted by major foreign brokers, but do not use public disclosure channels. I find this increase in private disclosure to be stronger among firms that had strong public disclosure track record and are in need of capital. Firms that increased private disclosure experience improvements in speed of price discovery and liquidity. In addition, they also experience an increase in foreign holdings and raise capital abroad through foreign brokers after the pilot program's implementation. Overall, this paper takes a yet-to-mature economy, presents evidence on dynamic shaping of disclosure, and highlights private disclosure as an important positive channel of communication.

DOES THE RECENTLY IMPLEMENTED REGULATION ON COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING DETER TAX AVOIDANCE?

To adhere with Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 13, Indonesia enacted regulations concerning Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) to address the issue of tax avoidance. Those regulations introduced the requirement of CbCR in Indonesia, where Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) operating in Indonesia are required to provide tax authorities with geographic breakdown of their profitability, tax payments, and activities wherever they operate. Using the newly implemented CbCR in Indonesia as a treatment for private disclosure requirement, this study examines the effect of CbCR on MNEs tax avoidance. Employing EUR 750 million consolidated revenue threshold for disclosure and utilizing regression discontinuity design as well as difference-in-differences analysis, we document a 4-8 percentage point increase in effective tax rates among affected MNEs, thus reflecting a decrease in tax avoidance in treatment firms. Our findings contribute (i) to the recent empirical literature on how CbCR as a private disclosure affects corporate tax avoidance behavior and (ii) to the policy evaluation whether CbCR regulation has achieved its objective.