Optimal destabilization of cartels

This paper introduces an oligopoly model that includes three actors: a cartel (comprising two or more firms that operate like one merged company), a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot competition with respect to the residual demand. The cartel is internally stable if none of its member firms finds it profitable to become a fringe firm. The antitrust authority can destabilize the cartel in the sense of making the cartel internally instable. To this end, the antitrust authority has three policy instruments at its disposal: its own effort, a fine for detected cartels, and a leniency program for cartel members that cooperate with the authority. Taking into account that the use of these instruments is not costless for society, a unique optimal antitrust policy is derived. The analysis reveals that both, the optimal force and mix of the antitrust authority’s policy depend on market characteristics such as the efficiency of the authority’s operations, the public respect for the rule of law, the ethical standards of the firms’ managers, the market volume, and the number of firms operating on the market.

On the Equilibrium Uniqueness in Cournot Competition with Demand Uncertainty

We revisit the linear Cournot model with uncertain demand that is studied in Lagerlöf (2006. “Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty.” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 6, no. 1. (Topics), Article 19: 1–6.) and provide sufficient conditions for equilibrium uniqueness that complement the existing results. We show that if the distribution of the demand intercept has the decreasing mean residual demand (DMRD) or the increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) property, then uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed. The DMRD condition implies log-concavity of the expected profits per unit of output without additional assumptions on the existence or the shape of the density of the demand intercept and, hence, answers in the affirmative the conjecture of Lagerlöf (2006. “Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty.” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 6, no. 1. (Topics), Article 19: 1–6.) that such conditions may not be necessary.

IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN CHINA'S IMPORT MARKET OF ROUNDWOOD AND LUMBER PRODUCTS

China has become the largest importer of roundwood and lumber products in recent years. In this study, the degree of competition among major supplying countries in China's import market is measured through the inverse residual demand elasticity over 1995–2015. Time-series properties of the data are considered through the autoregressive distributed lag model. The analysis reveals that market power exists in roundwood and lumber markets for a few supplying countries. The suppliers in the lumber import market have more market power than those in the roundwood market. Individual countries with substantial market power have more fluctuations in trading volumes.

Russian Market Power in International Wheat Exports: Evidence from a Residual Demand Elasticity Analysis

Russia has emerged as a major wheat exporter since the beginning of the 2000s, and today, it possesses high market shares in several wheat-importing countries in the Middle East and North African region. This has raised concerns that Russia might abuse its dominant market position by pricing above marginal cost. Using a novel dataset with weekly information on Russian wheat exports, we apply the residual demand elasticity method to analyze the pricing behavior of Russia in its two most important export markets, i. e. Egypt and Turkey. Our estimation results reveal that Russia behaves competitively in Egypt while it exerts market power in Turkey with an estimated mark-up of 13.5 %.