scholarly journals Optimal destabilization of cartels

2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-192
Author(s):  
Ludwig von Auer ◽  
Tu Anh Pham

AbstractThis paper introduces an oligopoly model that includes three actors: a cartel (comprising two or more firms that operate like one merged company), a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot competition with respect to the residual demand. The cartel is internally stable if none of its member firms finds it profitable to become a fringe firm. The antitrust authority can destabilize the cartel in the sense of making the cartel internally instable. To this end, the antitrust authority has three policy instruments at its disposal: its own effort, a fine for detected cartels, and a leniency program for cartel members that cooperate with the authority. Taking into account that the use of these instruments is not costless for society, a unique optimal antitrust policy is derived. The analysis reveals that both, the optimal force and mix of the antitrust authority’s policy depend on market characteristics such as the efficiency of the authority’s operations, the public respect for the rule of law, the ethical standards of the firms’ managers, the market volume, and the number of firms operating on the market.

Economies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 80
Author(s):  
Ewa Cichowicz ◽  
Ewa Rollnik-Sadowska ◽  
Monika Dędys ◽  
Maria Ekes

Public Employment Services (PES) are identified as important institutions in the process of improving the match between supply and demand in the labor market, which, despite their importance, still do not achieve the desired efficiency. The indicated problem is partly due to the lack of appropriate evaluation methods for the applied labor market policy instruments. This paper aims to verify the possibility of using the two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method in measuring the efficiency of public sector entities. The authors focused on 39 PES operating in Mazovia province, Poland in 2019. In the first stage, the model of technical efficiency of local PES included six variables (four inputs and two outputs). Only seven PES obtained full efficiency. The inefficiency of analyzed PES varied from about 1% to 80%. In the second stage, the attention focuses on the relationship between true unknown efficiency and its determinants (five environmental variables, both demand and supply oriented). Then, the regression coefficients and confidence intervals showed that three out of five variables influence the efficiency results, the share of the long-term unemployed, the share of the unemployed under 30, and the share of the unemployed over 50 in the total number of unemployed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanchayan Banerjee ◽  
Manu Savani ◽  
Ganga Shreedhar

This article reviews the literature on public support for ‘soft’ versus ‘hard’ policy instruments for behaviour change, and the factors that drive such preferences. Soft policies typically include ‘moral suasion’ and educational campaigns, and more recently behavioural public policy approaches like nudges. Hard policy instruments, such as laws and taxes, restrict choices and alter financial incentives. In contrast to the public support evidenced for hard policy instruments during COVID-19, prior academic literature pointed to support for softer policy instruments. We investigate and synthesise the evidence on when people prefer one type of policy instrument over another. Drawing on multi-disciplinary evidence, we identify perceived effectiveness, trust, personal experience and self-interest as important determinants of policy instrument preferences, along with broader factors including the choice and country context. We further identify various gaps in our understanding that informs and organise a future research agenda around three themes. Specifically, we propose new directions for research on what drives public support for hard versus soft behavioural public policies, highlighting the value of investigating the role of individual versus contextual factors (especially the role of behavioural biases); how preferences evolve over time; and whether and how preferences spillovers across different policy domains.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike King ◽  
Angela Ballantyne

Donor-funded research is research funded by private donors in exchange for research-related benefits, such as trial participation or access to the trial intervention. This has been pejoratively referred to as ‘pay to play’ research, and criticised as unethical. We outline three models of donor-funded research, and argue for their permissibility on the grounds of personal liberty, their capacity to facilitate otherwise unfunded health research and their consistency with current ethical standards for research. We defend this argument against objections that donor-funded research is wrongly exploitative, unfair and undermines the public good of medical research. Our conclusion is that, like all human subjects research, donor-funded research should be regulated via standard health research legislation/guidelines and undergo Research Ethics Committee/Institutional Review Board and scientific peer-review. We expect that, measured against these standards, some donor-funded research would be acceptable.


Author(s):  
S.R. Subramanian

India is the 12th nation in the world to have a special system of laws addressed to the information technology sector. Besides the general criminal law of the country, the Information Technology Act, 2000 incorporates a special legal framework relating to cyber-crimes. Looking differently, India is also a global hub of information technology and its allied services. Accordingly, the growth and development of the information technology sector and its contribution to national economy is phenomenal. It is in this context, the chapter examines and analyses the Indian ICT laws and policies in the backdrop of cyber-crime prevention and regulation, with the aim of offering a comprehensive model of ICT policy. It will discuss the extent of legal framework in the light of classification and criminalization of various cyber-crimes. Also, while examining the policy instruments, it will bring out the public and private initiatives on protection of information infrastructures, incident and emergency response and the innovative institutions and schemes involved.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (6) ◽  
pp. 985-1003
Author(s):  
Tracey L Adams

Given their positions of public trust, regulated professions are legally required to uphold ethical standards, and ensure that professional practice protects the public. Nonetheless, there is ample evidence that professionals do not always behave ethically. One proposed solution is greater organizational surveillance; however, research from a neo-Weberian perspective encourages scepticism about such arguments. Organizations may not only fail to stop professionals from violating ethical codes, but rationalizing organizations might actively encourage such violations in the name of efficiency. This article explores the impact of organizations and rationalization on professional misconduct through a mixed-methods study of professional engineers in Ontario, Canada. Findings suggest engineers are impacted by rationalization, and that those with less decision-making authority experience pressures discouraging practice in the public interest.


Author(s):  
Erick Lachapelle

In debates surrounding policy options for mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, economists of various political stripes are near unanimous in their advocacy of putting a price on carbon, whether through a tax or emissions trading program. Due to the visible costs imposed on industry and consumers, however, these policies have been resisted by carbon-intensive industries and by an ideologically divided public, producing incentives for vote-seeking politicians to avoid implementing comprehensive and stringent carbon prices within their own borders. In this highly politicized environment, and considering the more recent diffusion of market-based instruments across political jurisdictions around the world, researchers have sought to identify the conditions most favorable to implementing carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs, the correlates of public support for these policies, and the extent to which different communication strategies may help build public support. How do experts, political leaders, and members of the public understand these policy instruments, and what specific approaches have been most successful in persuading policy makers and the public to support a price on carbon? In places that have yet to implement a carbon price, what can communication strategists learn from existing research and the experience of other jurisdictions where such policies have been successfully implemented? In places where carbon taxes or carbon cap-and-trade programs exist, how are the benefits of these policies best communicated to ensure the durability of carbon pricing policies over time?


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiroaki Ino ◽  
Toshihiro Matsumura

AbstractWe investigate a Stackelberg oligopoly model in which m leaders and $N - m$ followers compete. We find an important welfare effect that relates to anti-monopoly policies when we move from the Cournot model ($m = N$) to the Stackelberg model: Exchanging a small number of Cournot firms for Stackelberg followers always improves welfare under moderate conditions. This contrasts with the welfare effect that can reduce welfare when a small number of Cournot firms are exchanged for Stackelberg leaders. The key result behind this asymmetry is the contrasting limit results in the cases where m converges to N and m converges to 0. We also discuss the optimal number of leaders and the integer constraint for the number of firms.


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