The Strengthening Liaison between Data Protection, Antitrust and Consumer Law in the German and Italian Big Data-Driven Economies

Nowadays, personal data represent a strategic asset for companies as they can significantly influence their market position. Indeed, the issues arising from the management of large amounts of data (so-called big data) are not only relevant for data protection authorities, since this practice has also induced the intervention of competition and consumer protection authorities. The digital economy has enhanced new forms of abuses of dominant position and unfair practices, which can be performed via the handling of big data. This paper starts by analysing the German antitrust authority vs Facebook decision in which the big-tech platform was sanctioned for having performed an exploitative abuse of dominant position through its data management strategy. Then, it focuses on the Italian antitrust authority vs WhatsApp decision, where WhatsApp was deemed responsible for unfair and aggressive practices aimed at extracting users’ consent for data-sharing purposes. These two remarkable cases will be compared and further discussed, outlining the need to rethink the strengthening interplay between data protection, competition and consumer law, as it will entail a closer contact of the respective authorities to ensure the sustainability of digital markets.

Optimal destabilization of cartels

This paper introduces an oligopoly model that includes three actors: a cartel (comprising two or more firms that operate like one merged company), a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot competition with respect to the residual demand. The cartel is internally stable if none of its member firms finds it profitable to become a fringe firm. The antitrust authority can destabilize the cartel in the sense of making the cartel internally instable. To this end, the antitrust authority has three policy instruments at its disposal: its own effort, a fine for detected cartels, and a leniency program for cartel members that cooperate with the authority. Taking into account that the use of these instruments is not costless for society, a unique optimal antitrust policy is derived. The analysis reveals that both, the optimal force and mix of the antitrust authority’s policy depend on market characteristics such as the efficiency of the authority’s operations, the public respect for the rule of law, the ethical standards of the firms’ managers, the market volume, and the number of firms operating on the market.

Der Anspruch auf Vorteilsabschöpfung gegen das Bundeskartellamt

With the 7th amendment to the ARC, the disgorgement of advantages pursuant to Section 34 ARC has found its way into German law. According to the German Federal Cartel Office's activity reports, not a single disgorgement procedure has been conducted to date. However, according to the legal requirements, there is a general obligation for the antitrust authority to disgorge advantages. In addition, against the background of the elimination of unlawful distortions of competition, there is a need for a consistent disgorgement of advantages by the authorities. The author deals with the question, which is important for antitrust practice, whether market participants can enforce the disgorgement of advantages pursuant to Section 34 ARC by means of a claim against the German Federal Cartel Office.

The Evolution of Antitrust Regulation in Russia in Digital Era

The article includes a comprehensive analysis of changes that have been taking place in Russian antitrust enforcement in response to the digitalization of the economy. Digitalization has led to increase of the role of information and digital platforms in day-to-day business activities of the market players. Digitalization vanished geographical boundaries of the digital markets and modified market structures in general. Innovative technologies, big data, and intellectual property have become the key drivers of economic growth. The authors analyze new violations of antimonopoly legislation in the digital era (in particular collusive tendering using auction robots), the anticompetitive effects resulting from the use of pricing algorithms, and the first approaches of the antitrust authority to regulations of the algorithmic pricing. In addition, within the framework of this article, the first legal positions of the antitrust authority regarding the use of pricing algorithms, as well as the new approaches of the regulator to the analysis of digital markets in merger control are considered, taking into account such factors as network effects, big data and technologies. Moreover, the authors analyze the first practice of using the technology transfer as a remedy in merger control by the antitrust authority to mitigate anti-competitive effects of the transactions planned in the Russian market. Finally, the authors conduct an overview of the new legal provisions governing the mandatory pre-installation of applications by Russian developers, and also describe the background for this initiative. When considering the above topics, the authors deeply analyze the relevant Russian and foreign legislation, draft laws, and the law enforcement practice of the Federal Antimonopoly Service. New approaches of the regulator to the analysis of digital markets in the framework of antitrust investigations and merger control, as well as automation of the processes of detecting antitrust violations, demand more attention from market players. Companies are encouraged to take these trends into account in their business activities, reflect them in antitrust compliance programs, as well as implement additional measures to prevent potential antitrust violations in digital markets, in particular, committed with the use of pricing algorithms.

Practice of the Appeal Board of the Federal Criminal Service of Russia (scientific review of the most significant cases considered in the first quarter of 2020)

In this review of the decisions of the Appeals Board of the Federal Criminal Service of Russia, the authors consider cases for the first quarter of 2020, containing legal positions important for maintaining uniformity of the law enforcement practice of antitrust authorities. Thus, the first of the cases considered shows the importance of observing the procedure for considering cases of violation of antitrust legislation, in particular, the procedure for forming a commission, the violation of which will lead to the annulment of acts of the territorial antitrust authority. In the second case, the Appeal Board of the Federal Civil Service of Russia addresses the question of the validity of concluding a state contract with a single supplier. The third solution considered addresses the always pressing problem of proving unfair competition.

Delineating market boundaries in the Russian mass notification market: An application of critical loss analysis

Telecom companies are a frequent target of antitrust investigations in Russia. In an industry where services tend to become more and more complex and companies actively invest in diversifying their businesses, the antitrust authority in most of its telecom cases has chosen to define markets narrowly, which increases antitrust risks for the companies. This paper uses poll data on mass SMS notifications — a market in recently investigated by the FAS Russia — to demonstrate, using critical loss analysis, that the market should be defined in broader terms. In particular, the main empirical finding is that the relevant product market boundaries should cover not only SMS, but also email, messengers and push and voice notifications.

ADVOCACY VERSUS ENFORCEMENT IN ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

We focus on the question of why firms self-regulate to avoid more severe public regulation in the area of antitrust compliance. We distinguish the effects of an antitrust authority’s outreach and enforcement on firms’ adoption of antitrust compliance programs. Furthermore, we examine the mechanism that may drive an antitrust authority’s actions on firms’ decisions to adopt compliance programs. Using a 2-year survey of 432 firms drawn from the top 300 Taiwanese enterprises and applying mediation analysis, we find that “voluntary” self-regulation actions, encouraged by the antitrust authority to promote compliance programs through advocacy, significantly increase the creation of antitrust compliance programs. Moreover, “coercive” actions of the antitrust authority in terms of enforcement are less effective than voluntary actions for firms’ compliance program creation. Within “coercive” actions, large fines are more likely to lead to the adoption of antitrust compliance programs relative to other forms of government prosecution.

Leniency Programs and Cartel Organization of Multiproduct Firms

When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, they may compartmentalize these agreements by having different individuals manage them so as to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Leniency programs can overcome this strategy but may also lead to procollusive effects for centralized firms. The introduction of US amnesty plus programs can have different competitive effects, and leniency programs may modify firms’ choice of internal structure.

Novels in the field of control over foreign investments in strategic sectors of the economy

The article explores a new legal mechanism that extends the authority of the Federal Antimonopoly Service to control the implementation of foreign investments not only to business entities of strategic importance, but also to any other Russian business entities that, according to the antitrust authority, are of key importance to the Russian economics. The problems of legal uncertainty regarding the mandatory prior coordination with the antimonopoly regulator of a transaction involving a foreign investor have been identified to differentiate legal consequences for violation of the provisions of special legislation depending on the actual presence of a threat to the defense and security of the Russian Federation. It is concluded that it is necessary and advisable to classify it as a business entity by virtue of its implementation of a type of activity that is adjacent to a strategic one (which is part of the technological process of a strategic type of activity as an integral part of it).