Talking to the Dead in the Classroom: How a Supposedly Psychic Event Impacts Beliefs and Feelings

Paranormal beliefs (PBs) are common in adults. There are numerous psychological correlates of PBs and associated theories, yet, we do not know whether such correlates reinforce or result from PBs. To understand causality, we developed an experimental design in which participants experience supposedly paranormal events. Thus, we can test an event’s impact on PBs and PB-associated correlates. Here, 419 naïve students saw a performer making contact with a confederate’s deceased kin. We tested participants’ opinions and feelings about this performance, and whether these predicted how participants explain the performance. We assessed participants’ PBs and repetition avoidance (PB related cognitive correlate) before and after the performance. Afterwards, participants rated explanations of the event and described their opinions and feelings (open-ended question). Overall, 65% of participants reported having witnessed a genuine paranormal event. The open-ended question revealed distinct opinion and affect groups, with reactions commonly characterized by doubt and mixed feelings. Importantly, paranormal explanations were more likely when participants reported their feelings than when not reported. Beyond these results, we replicated that 1) higher pre-existing PBs were associated with more psychic explanations (confirmation bias), and 2) PBs and repetition avoidance did not change from before to after the performance. Yet, PBs reminiscent of the actual performance (spiritualism) increased. Results showed that young adults easily endorse PBs and paranormal explanations for events, and that their affective reactions matter. Future studies should use participants’ subjective experiences to target PBs in causal designs (e.g., adding control conditions).

Closing-in Behavior in Mild Cognitive Impairment: An Executive Deficit

This study explored Closing-in behavior (CIB), the tendency in figure copying to draw very close to or on top of the model, in mild cognitive impairment (MCI). The files of 154 people diagnosed with MCI were reviewed and CIB was identified in 21% of cases. Two approaches were used to explore CIB. First, we capitalized on the diverse cognitive profiles within MCI, subdividing the overall sample into people with and without memory deficits. The frequency of CIB was significantly higher in multidomain non-amnestic MCI than in multidomain amnestic MCI, suggesting that CIB is not associated with specific memory impairment. Second, we assessed the cognitive correlates of CIB, by selecting patients with MCI who completed a battery of executive, visuo-constructional and memory tasks. Sub-groups of patients with and without CIB showed a similar overall severity of cognitive decline and comparable performance in visuo-constructional and memory tasks, but those with CIB were slightly but significantly more impaired on executive function tasks. The study provides evidence against memory-based accounts of CIB, and supports recent suggestions that executive impairments are the dominant cognitive correlate of this clinical sign. (JINS, 2012, 18, 269–276)

Dream Bizarreness as the Cognitive Correlate of Altered Neuronal Behavior in REM Sleep

Bizarreness is a cognitive feature common to REM sleep dreams, which can be easily measured. Because bizarreness is highly specific to dreaming, we propose that it is most likely brought about by changes in neuronal activity that are specific to REM sleep. At the level of the dream plot, bizarreness can be defined as either discontinuity or incongruity. In addition, the dreamer's thoughts about the plot may be logically deficient. We propose that dream bizarreness is the cognitive concomitant of two kinds of changes in neuronal dynamics during REM sleep. One is the disinhibition of forebrain networks caused by the withdrawal of the modulatory influences of norepinephrine (NE) and serotonin (5HT) in REM sleep, secondary to cessation of firing of locus coeruleus and dorsal raphe neurons. This aminergic demodulation can be mathematically modeled as a shift toward increased error at the outputs from neural networks, and these errors might be represented cognitively as incongruities and/or discontinuities. We also consider the possibility that discontinuities are the cognitive concomitant of sudden bifurcations or “jumps” in the responses of forebrain neuronal networks. These bifurcations are caused by phasic discharge of pontogeniculooccipital (PGO) neurons during REM sleep, providing a source of cholinergic modulation to the forebrain which could evoke unpredictable network responses. When phasic PGO activity stops, the resultant activity in the brain may be wholly unrelated to patterns of activity dominant before such phasic stimulation began. Mathematically such sudden shifts from one pattern of activity to a second, unrelated one is called a bifurcation. We propose that the neuronal bifurcations brought about by PGO activity might be represented cognitively as bizarre discontinuities of dream plot. We regard these proposals as preliminary attempts to model the relationship between dream cognition and REM sleep neurophysiology. This neurophysiological model of dream bizarreness may also prove useful in understanding the contributions of REM sleep to the developmental and experiential plasticity of the cerebral cortex.

Language and Thought: Developmental Perspectives on Counterfactual Conditionals

Work by Alfred Bloom, suggesting that the lack of a distinct counterfactual marker in Chinese has as a cognitive correlate the inability or unwillingness of Chinese speakers to think counterfactually, elicited a would-be replication and refutation from Terry Kit-Fong Au. Capitalizing on Au's radical modifications of the original experimental design, Bloom was able to turn Au's refutation into a strengthening of his own position. In the present study developmental data from English, Afrikaans and Northern Sotho children, supplemented by data from English and Afrikaans adults, were used to question certain aspects of the Bloom-Au methodology, and of the interpretation of their results. In the absence of control data Bloom's claim that differences between the performance of his English and Chinese subjects are due to the variable ‘counterfactuality’ seems unjustified. The Bloom-Au response-elicitation procedure seems to contain a systematic bias towards responses suggesting counterfactual thinking, which would tend to inflate the end-state of the development under discussion. The assumption that any counterfactual stimulus would per se elicit an appropriate response from speakers of a ‘counterfactual’ language seems suspect.