Lenin’s Philosophy: A New Dialectics of Revolution?

This chapter argues against the Hegelian-Marxist narrative, in which Lenin’s reading of the Science of Logic in 1914 led him to refound Marxist dialectics. Through a close reading of Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks it is shown that although he made withering remarks about Engels’s and Plekhanov’s dialectics, this did not lead Lenin to reject the core principles of dialectical materialism. Indeed, it is demonstrated that Lenin neither intended to nor accomplished a refoundation of Marxist dialectics in 1914. The notion of quantity-quality leaps Lenin adds to his works from the time onwards show him less as an innovator in Marxist philosophy and more as a keeper of the flame of dialectical materialist orthodoxy.

Afterword: Towards a Complex Science of History

This chapter begins by taking stock of the first two parts of the book. It argues that although classical Marxism cannot think events discontinuously, its science of history can at least be subjected to empirical verification. By contrast, while post-Althusserian theory succeeds in thinking events radically it does so on the basis of a self-referential rationalism that grants authority to theorists and is resistant to empirical control. To go beyond these philosophical traditions, the afterword suggests that complexity theory and ‘weak’ notions of emergence provide a way forward. Agent-based modelling of complex social systems offers a mediation of necessity and contingency that could help orient political strategy.

Badiou’s Decision: To Give Up Leadership, Somewhat

This chapter concerns a striking paradox: on the one hand, Alain Badiou has emerged as one of the most influential public intellectuals of recent decades; on the other, he is known for insisting that philosophy is subservient to truths produced by politics, science, art and love. The chapter argues that the paradox can be unravelled by attending to how the philosophical categories and choice of mathematical models in Being and Event aim to, and fall short of, imposing limits on theoretical authority. These difficulties highlight the problematic nature of Badiou’s attempt to revive Althusser’s rationalist programme of the 1960s while avoiding that project’s theoreticist excesses. The final section reflects on how these unresolved tensions can help make sense of the charges of Stalinism levelled against Badiou after the Arab Spring.

Marx’s Idea of Communist Transformation

This chapter argues that although Engels successfully encouraged Marxism to adopt Hegelian metaphysics as its philosophy of historical change, Marx himself can be absolved of charges of teleology and political gradualism. Guided by Galvano Della Volpe’s reconstruction of Marx’s thought, it is shown that Marx’s methodology of real abstraction stands in stark contrast to Hegel’s speculative dialectic. Capital may contain isolated chapters that suggest teleological historicism, but taken as a whole the text points to the need for a conscious break from capitalism informed by economic analysis. The chapter concludes by contrasting Marx’s political statements about communist transformation with Kautsky’s and Lenin’s views on the post-revolutionary transition period.

Hegel’s Leaps and the Historicist Theory of Knowledge

This chapter locates the roots of the Marxist theory of revolutionary change in G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy. In the well-known formula, cumulative changes in quantitative properties give rise to a qualitative leap into the future. However, the chapter argues that the idea rests on shaky ontological foundations. Through a close reading of the Science of Logic, it is shown that Hegel’s idea of leaps relies on excising irrational numbers. To make his dialectical transitions work, Hegel has to dialecticise the mathematical infinite and ignore scientific epistemological breaks from the classical period onwards. This compares unfavourably to Alain Badiou, who makes Georg Cantor’s breakthrough with transfinite set theory the lynchpin for his discontinuous philosophy of events. The final section argues that Hegel’s notion of quantity to quality leaps is also complicit with the reformism and technological determinism promoted by key thinkers of Second International Marxism.

Althusser’s Science: Naming the Epistemological Break

This chapter argues that Louis Althusser’s strident anti-Hegelianism and adoption of French historical epistemology was integral in his refoundation of Marxist thought. At the same time, the roots of the Platonic rationalist trajectory found in Badiou and Meillassoux are located in Althusser’s work. The chapter shows that the vicious circularity enjoined by Althusser’s theorisation of the epistemological break grants authority to philosophers to issue judgement on the novelty of events. The concluding section argues that despite the similar vocabularies of late-Althusser’s philosophy of the encounter and Badiou’s Being and Event, it is the unresolved issues of Althusser’s mid-1960s research programme which underpins Badiou’s philosophy.

Meillassoux’s Politics: Speculative Justice

This chapter argues that although Quentin Meillassoux’s philosophy has been received as a scientistic realism, its fundamental commitments are shaped by political opposition to Hegelian historicism. By drawing on published fragments of his long-awaited book, The Divine Inexistence, the chapter shows that it is Meillassoux’s rejection of the historical symbol of modernity and its collective politics that leads him to propose replacing it with an individual, ethical orientation guided by speculative philosophy. Read in the context of this wider body of work, Meillassoux’s After Finitude realises the authoritative trajectory set in motion by Althusser and Badiou.

Introduction

This chapter argues that the science of history has been misrepresented by postmodernists as a monolithic relic of modernity. If history and event are seen not as binary opposites but as a complementary pair, then both classical Marxism and a strand of French theory after Louis Althusser offer unique sciences of history. Although there is greater stress on historical discontinuity in post-Althusserian theory, this body of contemporary thought has commitments consistent with the Marxist understanding of revolution as a quantity to quality leap. The political stakes of Marxist and post-Althusserian theories are then introduced. The Hegelian influence on Marxism is presented as supporting political gradualism and technological determinism. Althusser is shown to set in motion a self-referential rationalism that shores up the authority of theorists. Chapter abstracts follow.