Between Reception and Reflection

In this work, I propose some notes for a current epistemological evaluation around Whiggism and presentism in the historiographical proposal of Guillermo Boido (1941-2013). In the first place, I will locate the topic proposed in the shared framework from the “Colloquium of Historiography of Science in Latin America (Argentina – Brazil – Uruguay): Reception, Reflection and Production.” Second, I will refer to some aspects of Boido’s academic career and I will place him in what I identify as a “second stage” of the history of science in Argentina. Third, I will dwell on some of Boido’s writings, particularly on those in which he addresses the questions of Whiggism and presentism. Fourth, I will recover some elements on the treatment of these issues in recent works carried out from the perspective of historical epistemology. Finally, in conclusion, I will propose a current epistemological evaluation of Whiggism and presentism between reception and reflection; an evaluation oriented to sustain a “critical” (Loison 2016) and “pluralist” (Chang 2021) presentism, in the face of the epistemological, ethical and political challenges of our current days.

History as engagement: The Historical Epistemology of Raymond Aron

Raymond Aron was a student of Léon Brunschvicg, a representative of French historical epistemology. This article explores Aron’s relation to this tradition through three claims. First of all, it contests that Raymond Aron’s philosophy of history constituted a complete break with this tradition. Secondly, resituating Aron in this tradition is valuable, because it highlights how Aron’s own philosophy of history is to be understood as a normative project, seen as an alternative to that of Brunschvicg. Finally, Aron’s philosophy can still hold valuable lessons for present-day historical epistemology and history and philosophy of science in general.

Western spirituality: A historical epistemology

Despite the vast amount of literature on ‘spirituality’, the concept remains nebulous and unwieldy. This is only partially explained by the quality of the publications. A more convincing explanation must be sought in the history of the concept of spirituality itself. Until the eighteenth century, this history was just a subplot of the history of religion but, late during this period and encouraged by the rationalism of the Enlightenment, spirituality started to claim its independence from religion. Achieving such autonomy has not been easy and to this day there are publications still claiming that ‘real’ spirituality cannot be conceived of outside the space of religion. A method of analysis is offered in this chapter that may contribute to the shaping of a form of authentic lay or secular spirituality.

History of Mental Disorders

Writing the history of mental disorders is an unfinishable task. Each historical period is expected to write its own, and in a style designed to satisfy its own conceptual and social needs. In the 21st century such a historical account seems to be one that conceives of mental disorders as natural kinds, that is, as entities that for their meaning and ontology require to be related to a brain change. However, being aware that, after all, concepts are just instruments in the hands of humans opens up the possibility of writing a more comprehensive history of mental disorders, one based on their historical epistemology, that is, on the manner in which madness has been culturally reconfigured throughout the ages. This approach should be more fruitful in regard to finding ways of helping people with mental sufferings, a task which is about the only justification for the existence of the discipline called psychiatry.

Does the Historical Epistemology Make the Ontological Turn?

The article deals with the problems of historical epistemology as a topical direc­tion of scientific knowledge research. It focuses on the relationship between his­torical epistemology and historical ontology, on historical event, and on the differ­ence between the work of a historian of science and a historical epistemologist. The author builds a dialogue with the publication of I.T. Kasavin “Knowledge and Reality in the Historical Epistemology”. She puts forward the thesis that epistemology is justifiably called historical if it not only performs the primary epistemological grasp of a historical-scientific event, but also makes an ontologi­cal turn. When interpreting the ontological turn, she uses its understanding in contemporary anthropological research. The essential elements of the ontolog­ical turn are the historical event that sets the direction of the ontological turn and the historical epistemologist as its actor. The author interprets the event as the beginning of more than one causal historical series, an inexhaustible source of scientific knowledge for cognition. The work of the historical epistemologist is revealed as problematization of one’s own position and the local coordination of emerging causal historical series. The author gives the examples of such work of contemporary historical epistemologists from the texts of L. Daston and P. Galison. It is concluded that the relationship between epistemology and onto­logy in historical research of science, as well as interaction between the historian of science and epistemologist, depends on whether these positions are interpreted as stable and rigidly differentiated or whether the movement between them is recognized as necessary.

Towards the Reform of the System of Epistemological Goals and Values

Cultural and historical epistemology is not only a special branch of philosophical researches of science, but also the base of reform of a system of the epistemological categories expressing the purposes and values of scientific knowledge. Its need follows from the nature of development of modern science. Preservation of the traditional epistemological categories applied to the analysis of this development results in rough relativism. This danger can be eliminated, having developed the holistic system of epistemological values proceeding from the principle of historicism and “collective” understanding of the subject of scientific knowledge. Both of these bases allow to disclose historical and cultural conditionality of processes of scientific research and broadcast of their results. Such purposes and values of science as the truth and the objectivity of knowledge have historical measurement: they exist only in the course of continuous emergence and destruction, being affected by cultural factors. The collectivity of the subject of scientific knowledge is defined together with concepts of a “transcendental” and “individual and empirical” subject according to the principle of complementarity (N. Bohr) finding an epistemological transcription. The possibilities of political subjectivity of science in connection with the epistemological investigations from participation of scientific communities in political structures and movements are considered.

Cultural-Historical Epistemology and Individual Methodological Attitudes of a Scientist

In this article, the author proceeds from the conceptual reversal of cultural-historical epistemology to the personal, historical, and social experience of a representative of an intellectual culture (scientist, philosopher) and his understanding and rethinking of his methodological attitudes. The idea of the article is that cultural-historical epistemology makes it possible to present natural-scientific and philosophical individual reflection as a specific component of the development of special tools, which are capable of recording and assessing the methodological effectiveness of research activities taking into account individual cognitive experience. For this purpose, the author turns to the issue of an autobiographical narrative – a narrative containing the personal experience of working scientists rethinking their own methodological attitudes. The specific character of ego-documents, and moreover, ego-texts of a natural scientific kind in this case is corroborated by the ideas of cultural-histori - cal epistemology. A scientist is turned to Other, whether in himself or in the narrative. Here scientific methodology and autobiographical narrative are conceptually mixed. As the main material reveals the meaning of the above idea, ego-texts by A.A. Ukhtomsky (his notes in notebooks, correspondence, and memoirs) were selected. While comprehending the fate of domestic and foreign science and also perfectly imagining the further development of multiple “systems of knowledge”, Ukhtomsky still saw a living person – the Interlocutor – behind this process. The need to preserve this image in front of oneself, to preserve the Dominant on the face of Other, this internal orientation, are brought by Ukhtomsky to a conceptually higher level. In this case, the narrative is viewed as a type of reflection that allows one to explicate and give a personal assessment of the effectiveness of the methodological guidelines, based on which the scientist chooses certain areas of research.

Cultural-Historical Epistemology and Perspectives of the Philosophy of Science

The purpose of the article is to demonstrate the methodological effectiveness of one of the directions in developing the philosophy of science – cultural and historical epistemology. Cultural-historical epistemology does not pretend at all to be any radical epistemological originality but offers a general view of science as a part of intellectual culture, where both individual historical cases and broad sociological generalizations find their methodologically significant place. The authors believe that it is the development of methodological norms capable of determining the fundamental parameters and strategies of scientific research that is now the central task of the philosophy of science. One of the characteristic forms of organization of modern advanced science is interdisciplinary research programs that involve the joint activities of large research teams. This fact raises a critical question about the mutual understanding of specialists from different disciplines and, accordingly, about the development of methodological norms that can determine the generally accepted parameters of the reproducibility of cognition results. Thus, in the center of attention of the philosophy of science, epistemological plots are put forward, one way or another connected with a specific understanding of the phenomenon of communication in science. Moreover, according to the authors, in these philosophical and methodological searches, it is essential to overcome, on the one hand, the inclination to conceptual design that leads away from the real methodological needs of science and, on the other hand, straightforward sociologization and equally direct historicization of science. These approaches are fraught with relativization of the very idea of scientific knowledge as a rational phenomenon of culture. The authors of the article believe that in modern conceptual trends in the philosophy of science, it is necessary to accentuate quite traditional epistemological principles, which in their updated edition make it possible to activate, or, as it were, to revive the methodological functions of the philosophy of science that are partially lost today. Justifying this approach, the authors turn to the epistemological trend, which for two decades has been developed based on the traditions of Russian philosophy of the first half of the 20th century.