Defeat in Mesopotamia

This chapter grapples with the question whether the defeat of the British Indian Army at Kut was inevitable or not? And India’s responsibility for the disaster at Kut is also considered. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first two sections show that certain innovations occurred as regards tactics and operation in Major General Charles Townshend’s force. While the first section details the initial advance from Basra, the second section shows how the lure of Baghdad gradually pulled IEFD towards its nemesis at Kut. The third section portrays the Siege of Kut. The fourth section shows that the relief column failed to relieve Townshend’s besieged force at Kut, because of logistical cum tactical failure. The failure at Kut was caused due to a mix of organizational–logistical–personal failures and also due to certain shortcomings in the field of tactics–operation.

France

This chapter details the story of the IEFA (Indian Corps), which fought in France. We tackle the question whether the IEFA faced a breakdown of morale; if not, how was it able to cope with the challenges of mass industrial trench warfare in the cold damp region of north France and the Low Countries? How the sepoys and sowars were able to make a transition from waging small wars to conducting mass industrial warfare centring round mud-filled trenches and mass infantry attacks supported by voluminous heavy gunfire is an issue discussed here. The first section deals with tactics and techniques of warfare for which the sepoys and sowars were prepared before the onset of the Great War, and the second section discusses the adaptation and adoption on part of the Indian troops in face of combat along the Western Front. The third section relates the soldiers’ experiences with issues of morale and discipline.

Introduction

Before the onset of global war in 1941, the war that engulfed the world between 1914 and 1918 was known as the World War or Great War. For example, The Real War, 1914–1918 was published by B.H. Liddell Hart in 1930 and expanded as A History of the World War 1914–1918...

Victory in Mesopotamia

This chapter focuses on the aftermath of the Kut disaster and portrays how the British Indian force in Mesopotamia was transformed. The focus remains on command, organization, and technology of the Indian Army in the battlefield and the supporting logistical backup. The interaction between technology, tactics, training, and logistics is emphasized. Under Stanley Maude’s dynamic leadership and supported by large amount of resources from both Britain and India, the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force emerged victorious over the Ottomans by early 1918. The first section shows the limited and cautious advance of the British Indian force. The second section portrays how the transformed British imperial force conducted deep penetration campaigns against the Ottomans. The last section describes the endgame in Mesopotamia.

Gallipoli and Salonika

The Indian Army was not very successful in Gallipoli and Salonika. In the Gallipoli Campaign, the Ottoman infantry made the same mistake that the British and French infantry committed in the Western Front: launching mass infantry charges against entrenched enemy positions defended by barbed wire and machine guns. This probably saved the Allied bridgeheads. The Allied infantry assault at Gallipoli faced the same problem that the Allied infantry encountered in the Western Front till 1916: the inability of the artillery to support the advancing assaulting infantry as it neared the hostile defensive positions. The Gurkhas displayed their expertise in mountain warfare, but in general Indian infantry failed to develop flexible infantry–artillery coordination in a mobile battle. At Gallipoli, Indian artillery also learnt the techniques of indirect fire, counter battery bombardment, harassing fire, and so on.

Manpower Mobilization and Indian Society

This chapter analyses the course and consequences of combatant and non-combatant manpower mobilization for the Indian Army during the First World War. The quantum of manpower mobilization by British India has been put in a proper context, by comparing it with other colonies and metropolitan powers. Recruitment of the combatants and the non-combatants is studied within the overall political, social, and military contexts. The pre-combat and in-combat motivations of the recruits have also been taken into consideration. This chapter is a fusion of both social history (which communities were recruited and why) and organizational aspects (changing mechanisms of military recruitment). At times, this chapter also takes on the colour of an exercise in the history of ideas, as the ideological roots of British recruitment policy are analysed.

Egypt and Palestine

In Egypt, the Allied troops remained on the defensive during 1914 and 1915. In 1916, there was a half-hearted advance to the Sinai Peninsula. The tempo picked up in 1917 resulting in advance across Palestine, and by 1918, the Ottomans were in headlong retreat. At this juncture, the Indian infantry and cavalry were present within the Allied force in substantial number. Indianization of the imperial force in Egypt–Palestine was speeded up due to the Ludendorff Offensive. Two issues stand out as regards this campaign: one, the contribution of Edmund Allenby in making the transition from defensive to offensive warfare, and second the decisive role played by the Indian cavalry during the Allied advance across Sinai.

Conclusion

In 1914, the Indian Army was not prepared either conceptually or materially to participate in a high-intensity conventional war. It was an occupation force geared for policing purposes and launching punitive expeditions across the frontiers of India. Before the First World War, the industrializing/industrialized nations of West Europe depended on mass armies based on short-service conscripts. The Indian Army comprised of long-service volunteers numbering to 180,000 men. Sepoys and sowars were enlisted for a service of 3 years, but with the option of continuing serving for 18 years. The recruits were trained for 10 months and then they joined the regiments. After the end of 18 years’ service, they became eligible for pension. Most Indian soldiers signed for long service. For the regiments that enlisted in north India, accommodation for families of the personnel was fixed at 5 per cent of the strength. The Indian soldiers lived in hovels made of earth, which were filthy and dilapidated, hence, unsanitary. Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions of the Indian soldiers’ lines caused diseases such as tuberculosis and so on....

East Africa

In 1914 at the Battle of Tanga, the Indian troops performed badly because of inadequate training and hardware. After Tanga, mainly dispersed small actions rather than decisive great battles characterized the campaign in East Africa. Sporadic small-unit actions resulted in mostly battalion-size engagements, rather than mass infantry armies colliding with each other within a confined space as in France. Bush fighting required skirmishing, sniping, ambush, reconnaissance patrol, and so on—tactical forms in which the Indian infantry, who were veterans of North-West Frontier fighting, were well acquainted. However, ‘raw’ sepoys required some time to adopt this specialized form of combat technique. From mid-1917 onwards, material superiority and adoption of proper techniques of bush warfare by the British and Indian troops enabled them to keep the Germans on the run.