Perceptual Emotions and Emotional Virtue

In this essay I focus on two areas discussed in Michael Brady’s Emotion: The Basics, namely perceptual models of emotion and the relation between emotion and virtue. Brady raises two concerns about perceptual theories: that they arguably collapse into feeling or cognitive theories of emotion; and that the analogy between emotion and perception is questionable at best, and is thus not an adequate way of characterizing emotion. I argue that a close look at perception and emotional experience reveals a structure of emotion that avoids these problems. I then explore other ways in which emotions can be operative in virtuous acts and virtue traits outside of their relation to motivation. The patterns of emotional response that we have can affect virtue because they affect the way in which we see and take-in information about the world, and the gravity that such perceptions have for us. In addition, emotions are critical to virtue because they maintain the level of importance that values have for us, and in doing so forestall axiological entropy, namely the fading of the importance that values have for us, and thus the virtues that are dependent on those values.

Précis: Emotions: The Basics

Emotion: The Basics is an introductory text about the nature and value of emotion, and highlights the very many ways in which emotions can be good for us: epistemically, deliberatively, socially, morally, and aesthetically. It proposes a pluralist account of what emotions are, and includes both an overview of current literature on emotion, and original proposals about emotion’s importance.

Emotions Under Trauma

While emotions can play positive, contributory roles in our cognition and our lives, they frequently have the opposite effect. Michael Brady’s otherwise excellent introduction to the topic of emotion is unbalanced because he does not attend to harms emotions cause. The basic problem is that emotions have a normative aspect: they can be justified or unjustified and Brady does not attend to this. An example of this is Brady’s discussion of curiosity as the emotional motivation for knowledge. More importantly, while emotions can and sometimes do reveal to us what we value, it is far less frequent that emotions reveal objective value.

Seeing Complexity To Continue to Understand Emotions

Commentary on Michael S. Brady’s book, Emotion: The Basics, indicating that it offers an overview of the field of philosophy of emotions while raising awareness about the intrinsic complexity of the issues in emotion research. This makes it possible to show how emotion research is inevitably tied to specific philosophical assumptions. Three illustrations are discussed that hopefully also testify that, as Brady states, the philosophy of emotion is inevitably tied to the question of what it means to do philosophy.

Beyond the Basics of Emotions

While emotions can play positive, contributory roles in our cognition and our lives, they frequently have the opposite effect. Michael Brady’s otherwise excellent introduction to the topic of emotion is unbalanced because he does not attend to harms emotions cause. The basic problem is that emotions have a normative aspect: they can be justified or unjustified and Brady does not attend to this. An example of this is Brady’s discussion of curiosity as the emotional motivation for knowledge. More importantly, while emotions can and sometimes do reveal to us what we value, it is far less frequent that emotions reveal objective value.

Emotions: Theories and Moral Values

This excellent book offers a clearly articulated and convincing perspective on basic disputes in the philosophy of emotions. Although it deals with complex issues, it presents them in an engaging manner. This commentary focuses on two major issues: emotional components and theories; and the role of emotions in morality. I will not discuss the many issues concerning Brady’s view which I fully embrace, but rather focus on two major issues: emotional components and theories; and the role of emotions in morality. I argue that Brady’s classification of emotional components and emotional theories are problematic. I also basically agree with Brady’s view on the role of emotions in morality; but, following Spinoza, I further develop this view.

Replies to Ben-Ze’ev, Starkey, Reyes Càrdenas, Bloomfield, LaGuardia-LoBianco, and Mendonça

In this section, I respond to all six of my commentators. I acknowledge a number of areas where the book could be improved—not least in terms of the categorisation of theories of emotion; the emphasis on the positive value of emotion as opposed to emotion’s negative aspects; and the need to consider how emotions function in a broader range of circumstances. Alongside this, I welcome the defences of the perceptual model and new perspectives on the relations between emotion and virtue that a number of commentators present.

Bringing Emotions to Reason

In his new book Emotion: The Basics, Michael S. Brady introduces the fundamentals on the philosophical approach to emotions: by fleshing out these basic tenets Brady provides insight into a core component of all our lives and covers the nature of emotions, their relationship to knowledge and understanding, and their relationship to our moral and social selves. In my comments, I value the achievements of Brady's work as well as explore a critical approach to the book in which I emphasise how the book deals with the dichotomy between emotions and reasons. I also engage with the limitations that emerge from a viewpoint of a scholar specialised on the history of philosophy and epistemology, and point towards some puzzles that ought to be further considered.

The Emotional Mind and The Moral Mind

In The Emotional Mind, Asma and Gabriel (2019) develop their grand vision of affect. Their goal is to demonstrate the foundational and pervasive nature of emotion in the mind, culture and society through the embodied, embedded, and enactive process of evolution. The book discusses how affective adaptation supports or leads diverse facets of human psychology and society. In this paper, however, I raise three critical questions about Asma and Gabriel’s approach to emotion: (1) whether emotion is a natural kind, (2) whether internalized self-critical emotions came to exist through the adaptive and interactive process of decoupling, and (3) whether the variance and integrity of the tripartite layers of the mind can be maintained.