The Passionate Beliefs. A Defense of the Cognitive-Evaluative Theory of Emotions

The philosophy of emotions has long been dominated by the view called «cognitivism». According to it, emotions are characterized (and definable) not by mere physical impulses but by a cognitive evaluation of their object. However, despite their success, cognitive theories have to deal with various objections and are divided on how to answer to them. In this essay I want to defend the form of cognitivism claimed by Martha Nussbaum from the most common criticisms. After a brief summary of her account, I confront some of the objections that have been raised against it. In Section 2 I deal with the classic problem of emotions in infants and animals, which lack linguistic abilities. Later, I confront the potential problem represented by cases in which one’s emotion and reasoned judgment seem to differ: in paragraph 3 I consider irrational phobias and fears, to show how they can be accounted for in terms of judgments and thoughts, and not only of perceptions; in paragraph 4 I deal with the objection that «judgementalist» theories (that is, those that describe emotions in terms of judgments and beliefs) violate the «principle of charity», for they ascribe an excessive irrationality to people. I argue that experimental evidence suggest that it is not implausible to assume that people have contradictory beliefs under conditions of uncertainty, and that perceptual theories of emotion (which compare emotional conflicts to optical illusions) fail to account for some fundamental aspects of these phenomena. Finally, in paragraph 5, I deal with the objection according to which a cognitive-evaluative theory cannot explain the sense of passivity that we commonly experience in emotions.

Seeing Complexity To Continue to Understand Emotions

Commentary on Michael S. Brady’s book, Emotion: The Basics, indicating that it offers an overview of the field of philosophy of emotions while raising awareness about the intrinsic complexity of the issues in emotion research. This makes it possible to show how emotion research is inevitably tied to specific philosophical assumptions. Three illustrations are discussed that hopefully also testify that, as Brady states, the philosophy of emotion is inevitably tied to the question of what it means to do philosophy.

Emotions: Theories and Moral Values

This excellent book offers a clearly articulated and convincing perspective on basic disputes in the philosophy of emotions. Although it deals with complex issues, it presents them in an engaging manner. This commentary focuses on two major issues: emotional components and theories; and the role of emotions in morality. I will not discuss the many issues concerning Brady’s view which I fully embrace, but rather focus on two major issues: emotional components and theories; and the role of emotions in morality. I argue that Brady’s classification of emotional components and emotional theories are problematic. I also basically agree with Brady’s view on the role of emotions in morality; but, following Spinoza, I further develop this view.

The Liberating Cacophony of Feelings: Kierkegaard on Emotions

This article argues that Kierkegaard’s account of emotions has something important to contribute to contemporary philosophy of emotions. The argument proceeds in five steps. The first section starts by outlining two influential paradigms in contemporary philosophy of emotions: the feeling theories and the cognitive theories. The second section then turns to a critique of two prominent approaches that read Kierkegaard’s conception of emotions as belonging to the cognitive theories. The third section presents Kierkegaard as a phenomenologist of emotional ambiguity, while the fourth section attempts to outline a taxonomy of Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of emotional experience. The fifth and final section argues that Kierkegaard’s primary contribution to contemporary philosophy of emotions is to be found in his concept of anxiety as the experience of human freedom particularly with respect to the ambiguity of feeling and understanding characteristic of this fundamental affective phenomenon.

Taking Situatedness Seriously. Embedding Affective Intentionality in Forms of Living

Situated approaches to affectivity overcome an outdated individualistic perspective on emotions by emphasizing the role embodiment and environment play in affective dynamics. Yet, accounts which provide the conceptual toolbox for analyses in the philosophy of emotions do not go far enough. Their focus falls (a) on the present situation, abstracting from the broader historico-cultural context, and (b) on adopting a largely functionalist approach by conceiving of emotions and the environment as resources to be regulated or scaffolds to be used. In this paper, I argue that we need to take situatedness seriously: We need (a) to acknowledge that emotions are not situated in undetermined “contexts” but in concrete socio-culturally specific practices referring to forms of living; and (b) to agree that not only are context and emotions used for the sake of something else but also that the meaning-disclosive dimension of affective intentionality is structured by situatedness as well. To do so, I offer a multidimensional approach to situatedness that integrates the biographical and cultural dimensions of contextualization within the analysis of situated affective dynamics. This approach suggests that humans affectively disclose meaning (together) which is at once product and producer of specific forms of living – and these are always already subjects of (politically relevant) critique.

Emoção versus Razão: a (ir)racionalidade das emoções em lavoura arcaica

in Lavoura Arcaica, Raduan Nassar writes a story pervaded of rebel, dense and coarse emotions that shake the structures of rationality. In several parts, it can be seen an allusion to the clash between emotion and reason. From this point, the aim of this paper is to argue that although emotions are apparently irrational, they can present their own rationality, as they are correct and justified in some situations found in the novel. For this purpose, some theories developed in the field of philosophy of emotions are the hermeneutic apparatus.

Formazione etica ed emozioni

Affectivity – especially the emotions – are proved to be a key-point of ethical formation. This book aims at clarifying which thesis the neo-aristotelian Virtue Ethics hold about emotion education, by integrating philosophy of education, philosophy of emotions and moral epistemology. Virtue Ethics, compared to deontology and utilitarianism-consequentialism, offers the more appropriate framework to conceive the relations between education, emotions and ethics. The volume discusses cognitive-evaluative theories of emotions and address the anti-rationalist challenge, based on empirical evidence about how emotions impact on moral judgments. Anti-rationalism, it is argued, is incompatible with the purpose of shaping the emotions looking at our best moral reasons. Then, two Aristotelian educational theses are put forward: all the emotional dispositions – both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ – should be cultivated, and all the emotional dispositions admit an appropriate moral form.

Bernard Williams and the concept of shame: What makes an emotion moral?

The paper proposes a way to understand moral emotions in ethics building upon Bernard Williams' claim that feelings, emotions and sentiments are an integral part of rationality. Based upon Bernard Williams' analysis of shame we argue that the richness and thickness that it is attached to some emotions is the key to understand why some emotions have a distinct ethical resonance. The first part takes up Bernard Williams' philosophical assessment of the concept of shame (Williams 1993) establishing a general framework to show how recent developments in philosophy of emotions are in line with the far-reaching consequences of Bernard Williams' insights. Then we highlight the way in which there is both an historical relativity to emotions and an intemporal understanding of their ethical role, and use the concept of meta-emotion to reinforce the idea that what makes some emotions moral requires employing Williams' distinction between thick and thin concepts.

Hate and Identity - A social philosophical attempt to understand extremism

In the analyses of extremism, the focus has mostly been on ideology and sociological – or so-called vulnerability – factors. While these factors are important the relevance and weight of emotions in the extremisation processes have not received the attention, they deserve. This article is an attempted to filling this gap. The paper explores the importance of emotions, especially strong emotions like hate and ‘ressentiment’, in establishing and reproducing the extremist identity. Methodologically this contribution emphasises a hermeneutic approach and draws on the philosophy of emotions, especially the approach of Robert C. Solomon. Empirically the article draws upon established international research and the author’s research on Islamist extremism in Norway.