Some Evaluations

This chapter evaluates two aspects of Peirce's thought: his Greek insistence on the primacy of theoretical knowledge, and his almost Teilhardian synthesis of evolutionary themes. It reflects the author's own personal attitude toward both of these topics in Peirce, which is one of endorsement, though some criticisms are also offered. Concerning the first aspect, Peirce was not only an outstanding philosopher but also a man well acquainted with the history of philosophy. His knowledge of history, going back to Plato, Aristotle, and other Greeks, contributed to the formation of his own personal philosophy. One obvious Greek attitude that he made his own was the dedication to theoretical knowledge. On the second topic, the chapter argues that Peirce understood evolution as one of the chief characteristics of the world. It is not restricted to the biological sphere, but extends to the whole cosmos and to the historical development of science. In proposing this synthetic, post-Darwinian view of evolution, Peirce was decades ahead of his time.

The Moderate Fallibilism of Science

This chapter considers how valuable scientific knowledge is, and how certain and permanent is the knowledge gained through this method. Peirce repeatedly and firmly asserts that scientific knowledge is not a completely certain and adequate representation of its object. Science never achieves the final and absolute formulation of the universe. Pierce calls the acknowledgment of this necessary limitation of scientific knowledge “fallibilism.” It is an attitude of reserve toward science, a deliberate withholding of a complete and final commitment toward the achievements of the scientific method. At the same time, there is a spirit of confidence in science, and an assurance that science really does converge on the truth. Peircean fallibilism, then, is not a complete distrust of scientific knowledge. Rather it is tempered by the reasoned conviction that scientific knowledge is the best knowledge we have, and that the method of the sciences is the only reliable method of settling opinion, hence why his attitude is considered a “moderate fallibilism.” This chapter considers the moderate fallibilism of science as a consequent of the method of the sciences, and of the object which the sciences study, namely, the universe.

The Stages of the Method (ii): Deduction and Induction

This chapter discusses Peirce's process of framing and testing conjectured explanations of phenomena. Here, science progresses by means of the brilliant imaginative leaps of abduction coupled with carefully controlled evaluation in the verification phase. Systematized items of knowledge may become subject to scientific inquiry only when they are brought down from the shelves to be purified or transformed. It is then that they enter that dynamic process again. There are two main steps in the process of scientific verification of hypotheses: deduction and induction. In order to get a clearer understanding of the whole movement of verification, this chapter draws a general picture of this process before discussing each step separately. In addition, the ability of the inductive phase to converge on the truth is considered, since this is the guarantee of the whole process of inquiry. Hence, the chapter treats the following: a general picture of the verification process; the deductive phase; the inductive phase; two requirements for scientific induction; the parts of induction; the convergence on truth.

The Stages of the Method (i): Experience and Hypothesis

This chapter describes the characteristics of the method which Charles Sanders Peirce judges most adapted to the needs of scientific inquiry. In particular, the chapter deals with the experience which precedes the formation of the explanatory hypothesis, and with the formation of that hypothesis. It treats Peirce's basic teaching on the formation of the hypothesis, some of the requirements for choosing a hypothesis, and certain relevant theoretical questions. The inquirer who follows the method of the sciences advocated by Peirce will look to nature for an answer to their questions. Here, experience becomes the occasion for wonder about nature, and nature herself will ultimately supply the answer to the scientist's wonder. The genuine person of science, however, must somehow go beyond experience; they must look for explanations, even unexperienced explanations of what they have experienced. The chapter then turns to the framing of the explanatory hypothesis, or abduction. This discussion is addressed on three considerations: Peirce's basic teaching on abduction, some requirements for choosing hypotheses, and some theoretical considerations.

Charles Sanders Peirce: Philosopher, Scientist, Writer

This chapter is a brief look at the life and work of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). In his youth his style was vigorous and cryptic; but during his later years he composed with brilliance and freedom, and even looseness, with less care for accuracy than during his early days. As both a philosopher and a scientist Peirce studied the universe, using the work of previous philosophers and the method of the sciences to guide his conjectures about its constitution. For him the method of the sciences was not only a tool employed in examining nature, but was also the direct object of his careful study. A lifelong associate of scientists, Peirce says that he devoted many years to the study of the methods employed by them. He brought to this study a developed power for philosophical thought on the nature of knowledge and the methods of acquiring it. However, though he was a prolific writer, he did not succeed in publishing a book on any of the important topics which interested him, including philosophy. And although he dreamed of major composition, none of the great topics of interest to him ever received adequate treatment in a single work.

The Scientist’s Concern: Knowledge for its Own Sake

This chapter discusses Peirce's understanding of science. Peirce asserts that the lexicographer and the non-scientist may regard science as an “organized body of knowledge,” but the genuine scientist regards their pursuit as a “mode of life.” He argues that science is the pursuit of scientific men, and this pursuit must be motivated by the pure love of knowledge for its own sake. An understanding of what science is, therefore, can be achieved only by understanding what the scientist is about. For Peirce, the motive of the scientist is of primary importance: they must be in search of knowledge for its own sake. This, of course, means that the questions asked by the scientist, and the answers which they hope to find, will be theoretical. Accordingly, the method that they follow will be adapted to the scientist's theoretical questions. Hence this chapter considers scientific inquiry as the pursuit of truth for its own sake.