Conclusion: “It Sends Its Bloodhounds Everywhere”

This concluding chapter examines the legacy of the CIA's drone war on U.S. counterterrorism, wider U.S. national security policy, and the conduct of America's rivals—both nation-states and terrorist groups. It contemplates the nature of technological progress, judging that innovations always introduce potential threats and opportunities in equal measure. Furthermore, while it is almost inevitable that terrorist groups will exploit drone technology for heinous ends, the technology also offers wider commercial and civilian society opportunities, just as previous transformative technologies, first developed for the purpose of taking lives, eventually came to transform them in positive ways. The use of drones to neutralize terrorists is best understood as the embodiment of America's long-term counterterrorism goal made possible by advancements in both technology and the willingness of the U.S. government to authorize the CIA in undertaking lethal counterterrorist actions.

“We Have to Find a Better Way to Send a Message”: The CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, from the Eagle Program to the Predator Drone, 1986–2001

This chapter explores how the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC) was established to function as a war room against terrorists, under the leadership of its first director, Duane Clarridge. Though the consequences of the Iran-Contra affair initially tempered the CTC's aggression, the foundations of the agency's post-9/11 role in the War on Terror were laid during this time, and its aggressive pursuit of al-Qaeda today owes much to the approach Clarridge sought to instill in his new department. The origins of the agency's involvement with drones as tools of counterterrorism are also traced back to this period—as early as 1986. Through its classified Eagle program, the CIA first explored the concept of using unmanned aircraft for both intelligence gathering and to conduct lethal precision strikes against targets such as the Libyan dictator and state sponsor of terror, Mu'ammar Gaddafi.

Introduction: “The True Watersheds in Human Affairs Are Seldom Spotted”

This introductory chapter discusses how the CIA's use of armed drones has garnered increased attention from academia and investigative journalists, particularly those working in the foreign policy, defense, and legal fields. This is due in equal parts to the secrecy surrounding their use, the technological novelty of their unmanned operation, and concerns over the agency's suitability to undertake lethal operations. While disagreements over the putative military benefits, ethical downsides, and legal complexities of the CIA's campaign are common, a number of persistent themes in media and scholarly discussions have emerged over recent years, materializing into a dominant set of commonly held views about the agency's execution of drone warfare, many of which are challenged in the book.

“Talking about Capturing bin Laden”: The Clinton Administration and the Legal Architecture of Lethal Force in Counterterrorism, 1993–2000

This chapter addresses the notion that the CIA's drone campaign lacks appropriate congressional oversight and domestic legal authorization, instead revealing that the agency sought extensive legal cover from both the executive branch and Congress before undertaking its role as aerial executioner. Introducing the concept of the covert action pendulum, the chapter argues that a historic cycle of agency excess followed by a backlash of congressional investigation and subsequently increased oversight became established. It also examines how the hard-learned lessons from these pendulum swings prompted Langley's cautious managers to insist upon the creation of the complex legal architecture that now underwrites the United States' drone campaign.

“The Only Game in Town”: The Strategy and Effectiveness of the CIA’s Lethal Drone Campaign, 2009–2012

This chapter focuses on the notions of accuracy, collateral damage, and blowback, assessing just how accurate the CIA's program is, and the extent to which it has aided the United States in its efforts to end the ongoing War on Terror. If one is to measure the campaign by its primary goals—the decapitation of the al-Qaeda leadership; the denial of safe haven in the AfPak region; and the undermining of the Taliban's insurgency against the U.S.-backed Afghan government in Kabul—the campaign has been a success. Yet, while the drone's ability to consistently loiter over the mountains and valleys of the AfPak region may have succeeded in reducing al-Qaeda's threat, the chapter argues that the CTC's drone campaign also played a key role in creating the power vacuum into which the Islamic State was able to step.

“Ninja Guys in Black Suits”: Alternative Counterterrorism Tools, 1993–2008

This chapter talks about the issue of why the Obama administration adopted drone strikes as America's primary counterterrorism tool. By examining the methods applied by Obama's predecessors, such as the deployment of proxy agents; cruise missile strikes; rendition, imprisonment, and interrogation; and Special Forces raids, the chapter places this decision in context. It illustrates the extent to which the adoption of different counterterrorism policies from president to president has as much to do with the successes and failures of their predecessors' efforts as it does the ideological outlook of the policy makers themselves. The chapter also analyzes the impact of wider factors on influencing policy decisions; such as the American public's fatigue over foreign occupations, the financial limitations imposed by a decade of nation building, and the advent of new technological innovations.

Prologue: “Let Him Sleep”

As Mustafa Abu al-Yazid’s vehicle buffeted down the dirt track connecting the main town of Miranshah with the village of Boyya, he would have known he was taking a risk. After all, they were anticipating strikes.1 It had been just two days since the Bagram operation, and while the dozen Taliban fighters had not succeeded in penetrating the American base’s perimeter, the attack had still featured prominently in the Western media....

“Let’s Find a Way to Go after Them”: The Fadlallah Affair and the Achille Lauro Hijacking, 1985

This chapter challenges the perception that the CIA has become militarized as a result of the War on Terror. It explains that the agency's role as the United States' vanguard in its violent confrontation with terrorism began as early as 1985, when it was actively involved in a paramilitary plot against a suspected terrorist leader, Ayatollah Mohammed Hussayn Fadlallah. With pressure growing on the Reagan administration to act against increasingly aggressive terrorist elements, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger determined to keep the Pentagon away from the messy business of counterterrorism, but Director Casey opted to put his agency on the front line. Although that plot was unsuccessful in its first effort, its fallout shaped the way the CIA would conduct its future counterterrorist operations.

“The Hamlet of Nations”: The Rhetoric and Reality of the Reagan Administration’s Counterterrorism Policy, 1980–1985

This chapter reveals that the concept of waging war against terrorists did not arise from the ruins of the World Trade Center, but can in fact be traced back to a small group of counterterrorism hardliners within the Reagan administration. This group, consisting of Secretary of State George Shultz, Director of the CIA William Casey, and the National Security Council (NSC) member responsible for low-intensity warfare, Lt. Col. Oliver North, pushed for the United States to adopt a policy of preemptive force and lethal retaliation as measures of self-defense against the emerging threat posed to U.S. citizens by increasingly well organized and motivated terrorist groups. Though their calls for an aggressive American stance were never fully adopted, their philosophy prompted the establishment of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC).