‘The Men of Violence’, 1976–1981

This chapter is devoted to the prison protests in Long Kesh/Maze Prison. It evaluates Church responses to the evolving protest by republican paramilitary prisoners on their quest for ‘five demands’ for political prisoner status. The chapter will culminate with the 1980 and 1981 hunger strikes which saw the deaths of ten men in the prison, including Bobby Sands, and more than sixty deaths outside caused by heightened community tensions. At this point, the English and Irish Catholic Churches faced their greatest point of division over the issue of hunger striking as suicide; a schism often reported by the British media. Fr Denis Faul, a civil rights activist, effectively ended the 1981 hunger strike by convincing the families to medically intervene. The legacy of the strikes fractured the tenuous relationship between the Church and Irish Republicans, marking a major turning point in the conflict.

Introduction

The introduction positions this book within the context of the existing historiography and provides a succinct survey of the various approaches previously employed to present and explain the behaviour of priests, women religious, and bishops during the conflict. It offers a brief overview of the relationship between Irish Catholicism and nationalism. Through an analysis of St Patrick’s College, Maynooth, the introduction traces the evolving nature of the Catholic Church in twentieth century Ireland. The introduction sets out a case for examining not just the Irish Catholic Church’s response to the conflict but that of the English and Welsh Catholic Church, arguing for an ‘entangled history’ approach. It explains the archival, oral, memoir, and newspaper sources examined for the monograph.

Conclusion

The conclusion focuses on the Church’s position in mediating the conflict and ‘dealing with the past’. It examines the Church’s much altered position in Irish society after the revelations of clerical child abuse, and scandals of the Mother and Baby Homes, and the Magdalene Laundries. The conclusion interrogates the Church’s social standing today and questions its longevity as a moral arbiter in Ireland following the successful referenda on gay marriage in 2015 and repealing the eight amendment in 2018. As the Archbishop of Dublin, Diarmuid Martin, observed: ‘The Church needs to do a reality check’. In response to some in the media who claimed the marriage equality and eight amendment votes symbolised a revolution rather than a referendum, Martin remarked: ‘It’s a social revolution that didn’t begin today, it’s a social revolution that’s been going on’. For Northern Ireland, the legacy of the conflict includes few solutions for ‘dealing with the past’.

‘Let history judge who was to blame’, 1990–1998

Individuals within the Church, rather than the institution as a whole, became the main negotiators for peace after the revelations of clerical child abuse in the early 1990s. Priests like Fathers Alec Reid, Gerry Reynolds, and Denis Faul worked privately to convince paramilitary groups to lay down their weapons. The Church hierarchy was forced into a defensive position in order to protect its reputation as a moral arbiter after the child abuse revelations. The institutional Catholic Church was no longer able to play a role in the peace process by this point. However, individual priests who fostered relationships with their Protestant counterparts continued to act as negotiators for an end to the conflict. The signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement marked one step in the peace process but after this point the Catholic Church had no influence on these policies.

‘The Demands of Justice Must be Stated before the Words of Peace Find a Receptive Ground, 1972–1976’

These years mark the bloodiest of the conflict with the highest number of deaths. Priests, women religious, and the Irish Catholic hierarchy continued to find their voice in condemning violence and, in private moments, acted as mediators between the British government and republican paramilitary groups. However, ecumenical efforts between Protestant and Catholic Church leaders at this time remained limited. The English Catholic Church hierarchy began to publicly condemn republican paramilitaries as the IRA started to bomb England. The death of IRA member James McDade, after a bomb he planted in Coventry exploded prematurely, marked the first major schism between English and Irish Catholic Church doctrine and practice. This set a course of confusion over the Church stance on issues of suicide and excommunication that continued for the rest of the conflict.

‘From Civil Rights to Armalites’

This chapter traces the Church’s involvement with peaceful civil rights protests in Northern Ireland from 1968 until the end of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire in the summer of 1972. During this period the Irish Catholic Church hierarchy condemned violence but demonstrated understanding of civil rights concerns through pastoral letters, media interviews, community visits, and homilies. Irish priests and women religious began to mediate the conflict ‘on the ground’ but found quickly that a small minority who refused to back down from violence began questioning their authority. The English Catholic Church remained silent on the growing conflict, preferring the soft power approach of private dinners with British government officials rather than public statements condemning violence. Bloody Sunday, the killing of British Army soldier William Best, and the Derry Peace Women movement marked a change in Church power relations, as priests and bishops began to openly condemn the IRA.

‘To Remind Catholics that Support for the IRA and SF was not Compatible with Membership of the Catholic Church’, 1982–1990

The Irish Catholic Church hierarchy became divided during this period marked by the installation of Bishop Cahal Daly, a conservative theologian, as the new Bishop of Down and Connor in 1982. Personality clashes between Daly and the staunchly nationalist head of the Catholic Church in Ireland, Cardinal Tomás Ó Fiaich, created tension within the Church. As Sinn Féin gained an electoral mandate, the Church struggled to condemn violence without isolating those who voted for the party. Analysis focuses on the institutional Church and grassroots clergy who were more united in the long-standing efforts to free the Birmingham Six, Maguire Seven, and Guildford Four. Bishop Edward Daly’s banning of republican paramilitary funerals in Derry constituted another challenge to republicanism from the institutional Church. By the mid-1980s, however, increased communication between Irish and English bishops resulted in greater Church-lead peace initiatives.