Teaching and learning in Brussels: Sinn Féin’s strategic ‘venue shopping’ approach in the European Parliament

Sinn Féin was once staunchly Eurosceptic and has periodically campaigned against the ratification of European Union treaties in Ireland. Since the early 2000s, however, they have rejected the Eurosceptic label and self-described as ‘critically engaged’ with the European Union. This article explores how Sinn Féin have used their membership of the European Parliament and the European United Left/Nordic Green Left parliamentary group since their first Members of the European Parliament were elected in 2004, with a particular focus on the acrimonious post–Brexit referendum period. The article argues that the European Union forum is seen in terms of its utility by Sinn Féin, as a venue to teach and learn from their colleagues on their particular understanding of Irish history, nationalism and party strategy. It concludes by arguing that, in a process beginning before Brexit, the opportunities the European Union platform affords Sinn Féin have led to the adaptation of a particularly novel engagement strategy with European institutions.

Party Strength of Regionalist Parties of United Kingdom: Conceptualisation and Measuring

The article conceptualizes the concept of party strength and the measurement of its two quantitative elements (electoral and institutional) by example of four United Kingdom regionalist parties: Scottish National Party, Democratic Unionist Party, Sinn Fein and Plaid Cymru. Based on the analysis of the main theoretical approaches to party strength, the article proposes a method for its measurement, which can be used to measure and evaluate regionalism through the strength of regionalist parties in different political and institutional contexts. Comparing the levels of electoral and institutional party strength allows to highlight several tendencies: growth in electoral strength of UK regionalist parties during 2010s is noted, with stabilization of the institutional party strength; and the gap in the levels of institutional strength of the regionalist parties does not reflect the difference in the level of electoral strength. At the same time, the article mentions the challenges to assessing the strength of regionalist parties, namely, the need for detailed conceptualization of the qualitative characteristics of the party strength and the lack of analysis of the communicative and organizational elements of party strength.

Conscription, rural populations and the dynamics of war and revolution in Ireland (1914–18)

Drawing on secret witness reports from Intelligence Officers of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and diplomatic correspondence from France’s representatives to Dublin and London, this article seeks to complement recent historiography and qualify our understanding of the period 1914–18 by engaging fully with the issue of compulsory military service from the outbreak of the conflict. It contemplates how fears of conscription contributed to the radicalisation of rural communities and demonstrates that opposition to conscription formed a solid political foundation for Sinn Féin. Britain’s determination to implement conscription to Ireland frightened civilian populations, gave rise to nationwide discontent, and attracted towards Sinn Féin populations likely to be drafted into the British Army. That study seeks to be a re-examination of the dynamics between the Irish revolution and the conscription scares and maintains that fears of compulsory service in Ireland significantly contributed to the victory of Sinn Féin candidates during the four electoral contests in 1917.

Ireland faces economic uncertainty with OECD reforms

Significance This framework laid out two pillars of reform. Pillar One would see large companies liable for tax in the end-market jurisdiction where their goods or services are used or consumed. Pillar Two would set a minimum tax rate of 15%. Impacts Ireland will probably support the reforms by October, and in return it may get some concessions over implementation or sectoral coverage. Reduced corporate tax revenue may result in tighter fiscal spending, which would play into the hands of the opposition Sinn Fein. The corporate tax proposals come at a particularly bad time for the Irish economy, which is already facing the consequences of Brexit.

An bhfuil ár lá tagtha? Sinn Féin, special status and the politics of Brexit

In this article we critically examine how Sinn Féin responded to Brexit, why, and with what consequences. By destabilising the UK’s territorial constitution and intensifying debate about Ireland’s constitutional future, Brexit has represented a moment of unprecedented opportunity for Irish republicanism. However, this has been offset by the very real political and economic risks it has posed for the island of Ireland. We argue that Sinn Féin’s pursuit of ‘Special Status’ for Northern Ireland represented an attempt to mitigate Brexit’s risks, rather than to leverage its opportunities. This approach came with political costs for the party, whose recent electoral surge has arguably been in spite of rather than because of it. We demonstrate how Brexit has served to reshape Sinn Féin’s politics, and how it has functioned to further moderate its ‘Eurocriticism’.

Exploring Responses to the Collapse of Devolution in Northern Ireland 2017–2020 through the Lens of Multi-Level Governance

The system of devolution set up in Northern Ireland in 1999 has proved volatile and unstable. In 2017, the Northern Ireland Executive collapsed, following the resignation of the Sinn Féin, deputy First Minister. For a three-year period, Executive and legislative devolution ceased to operate. The UK Government opted not to impose Direct Rule from Westminster, as happened previously. This article examines the consequences of the absence of a devolved government in the context of the existing system of multi-level governance (MLG). It is contended that mitigating action taken or considered to address the gap in governance can be best understood using an analytical framework drawn from the lens of MLG. A range of interventions, adjustments and interactions occurred involving the remaining levels of MLG. Despite the fall of the Executive and Assembly an amended form of governance continued to function in Northern Ireland.

Conflict over Northern Ireland protocol will persist

Significance Through a joint EU-UK committee, the NIP's purpose is to implement a regulatory and customs border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. Amid trade disruptions and the EU's aborted decision to suspend aspects of the NIP's operation on January 29, hard-line unionists are now calling for the protocol to be scrapped. Impacts David Frost's replacement of Michael Gove as co-chair of the joint EU-UK committee could see London harden its approach to the NIP. Victory for the nationalist Sinn Fein in elections in 2022, as polls suggest, could prompt unionists to collapse the governing institutions. Further civil unrest by loyalists opposed to the NIP could trigger counter-responses by nationalist groups.

The significance of the political dimension of armed rebellion on the example of Northern Ireland

At the beginning of the last century, after several unsuccessful armed uprisings against the central government, insurgents in Ireland realized that the fight with weapons was not enough and united in the political organization Sinn Fein (Irish: Sinn Fein - "We ourselves"), respecting the security grammar (Ejdus, 2017: 30), they managed to determine what was the danger they are fighting against, what was the reference object of security (what was endangered), who was the one who protected security (subject of security) and most importantly what were the means or measures to protect security. The subsequent mobilization of forces at the political level, the expansion and deepening of the conflict led to success, especially for the population in Northern Ireland who bore the brunt during the second thirty-year escalation of the conflict (armed insurgency) in the 20th century. The activities of Catholic rebels and Protestant loyalists in the second half of the twentieth century (from 1968 to 1998) confirmed the liberal view that political and economic order reduces tensions between social groups, but also the realistic view that the entire field of security is political, as well as Galula's statement that opposing an insurgency is eighty percent a political and only twenty percent a military struggle (Galula, 1966: 63). Rebel approach, motives, interests and goals, as well as the conditions (environment) were such that the repression and engagement of the army for the implementation of police tasks such are arrest, internment, maintenance of public order and peace (Alderson, 2009: 29), instead of contributing to solving conflict, in fact contributed to decades of instability. After this, the political segment of internal conflict gained importance because the military (hard) power, as a way of achieving goals (political results), did not have a decisive influence any more. The weapons that led to success at the strategic (state) level were the processes of political reconciliation, improvement of socio-economic conditions and diplomatic relations with the Republic of Ireland. At the tactical (local) level, these were investments in education, employment, housing and local government reform. So it can be concluded that the political dimension used to have and still has the biggest significance in this and similar conflicts.

Loyalists in a Garrison County: Kildare, 1912–1923

This chapter explores the experiences of loyalists in County Kildare during the Irish Revolution. Up to 1922, loyalists and Unionists in Kildare until 1922 enjoyed a level of security experienced in no other county outside Ulster due to the presence of British army barracks, which included the Curragh camp. Persistently anti-Home Rule, the loyalist and Unionist population – ably led by Lord Mayo and William Goulding – initially resisted concessions to nationalist aspirations. Developments such as the threat of partition resulted in a more compromising viewpoint regarding self-determination. However, fears expressed in 1920 by Lord Mayo that the community would be left to the ‘mercies of a Sinn Féin parliament’ came to fruition. While loyalists and Unionists in Kildare did not experience the same level of violence as loyalists in neighbouring counties, some high-profile incidents occurred during the Civil War. In post-independence Kildare, despite a decline in population, former unionists in the county continued to play a disproportionate role in large scale farming and the professions.