scholarly journals Interval-Scale Theories and Variance Voting

2020 ◽  
pp. 77-111
Author(s):  
William MacAskill ◽  
Krister Bykvist ◽  
Toby Ord
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Interval Scale ◽  
Decision Situation ◽  
Borda Rule ◽  
Moral Uncertainty ◽  
Moral Theories

This chapter discusses how to take into account moral uncertainty over interval-scale measurable but non-comparable theories. Once again, we make use of the analogy between decision-making under moral uncertainty and voting. We give examples of interval-scale theories where it’s plausible to think that these theories are incomparable with each other and discuss what to do in such cases. Arguing against the Borda Rule and Ted Lockhart’s Principle of Equity Among Moral Theories, we argue in favour of an account we call variance voting. Finally, we discuss what to do in conditions where one has positive credence in some merely ordinal theories, some interval-scale but non-comparable theories, and some theories that are both interval-scale measurable and comparable with each other. We discuss whether the normalization used by this account should be done only within the decision-situation at hand, or whether it should be done over all possible decision-situations.

scholarly journals Ordinal Theories and the Social Choice Analogy

2020 ◽  
pp. 57-76
Author(s):  
William MacAskill ◽  
Krister Bykvist ◽  
Toby Ord
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Borda Rule ◽  
Moral Uncertainty ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Right

We introduce and discuss the problems of intertheoretic incomparability and merely ordinal theories. We then introduce the analogy between decision-making under moral uncertainty and social choice, and explain how this analogy can help us to overcome these problems. The rest of the chapter is spent fleshing out how this idea can help us to develop a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty that is applicable even when all theories under consideration are merely ordinal, and even when there is neither level-nor unit- comparability between those theories. We consider whether My Favourite Theory or My Favourite Option might be the right theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty in conditions of merely ordinal theories and incomparability, but reject both of these accounts. We defend the idea that, when maximizing choice worthiness is not possible, one should use the Borda Rule instead.

scholarly journals Metanormativity: solving questions of moral and empirical uncertainty

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 790-810
Author(s):  
Nicholas Kluge Corrêa ◽  
Nythamar Fernandes de Oliveira
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Preference Aggregation ◽  
Decision Conflict ◽  
Moral Uncertainty ◽  
Theoretical Comparison ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Desire To Eat

How can someone reconcile the desire to eat meat, and a tendency toward vegetarian ideals? How should we reconcile contradictory moral values? How can we aggregate different moral theories? How individual preferences can be fairly aggregated to represent a will, norm, or social decision? Conflict resolution and preference aggregation are tasks that intrigue philosophers, economists, sociologists, decision theorists, and many other scholars, being a rich interdisciplinary area for research. When trying to solve questions about moral uncertainty a meta understanding of the concept of normativity can help us to develop strategies to deal with norms themselves. 2nd-order normativity, or norms about norms, is a hierarchical way to think about how to combine many different normative structures and preferences into a single coherent decision. That is what metanormativity is all about, a way to answer: what should we do when we don’t know what to do?  In this study, we will review a decision-making strategy dealing with moral uncertainty, Maximization of Expected Choice-Worthiness. This strategy, proposed by William MacAskill, allows for the aggregation and inter-theoretical comparison of different normative structures, cardinal theories, and ordinal theories. In this study, we will exemplify the metanormative methods proposed by MacAskill, using has an example, a series of vegetarian dilemmas. Given the similarity to this metanormative strategy to expected utility theory, we will also show that it is possible to integrate both models to address decision-making problems in situations of empirical and moral uncertainty. We believe that this kind of ethical-mathematical formalism can be useful to help develop strategies to better aggregate moral preferences and solve conflicts.

scholarly journals Intertheoretic Value Comparison: A Modest Proposal

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 324-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Tarsney
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
General Argument ◽  
Moral Uncertainty ◽  
Modest Proposal ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Error

In the growing literature on decision-making under moral uncertainty, a number of skeptics have argued that there is an insuperable barrier to rational “hedging” for the risk of moral error, namely the apparent incomparability of moral reasons given by rival theories like Kantianism and utilitarianism. Various general theories of intertheoretic value comparison have been proposed to counter this objection, but each suffers from apparently fatal flaws. In this paper, I propose a more modest approach that aims to identify classes of moral theories that share common principles strong enough to establish bases for intertheoretic comparison. I show that, contra the claims of skeptics, there are often rationally perspicuous grounds for precise, quantitative value comparisons within such classes. In light of this fact, I argue, the existence of some apparent incomparabilities between widely divergent moral theories cannot serve as a general argument against hedging for one’s moral uncertainties.

scholarly journals Moral Uncertainty

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
William MacAskill ◽  
Krister Bykvist ◽  
Toby Ord
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Know How ◽  
Moral Uncertainty ◽  
Practical Ethics ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
The Face ◽  
Moral Enquiry ◽  
Shed Light

Very often, we’re uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do. We don’t know how to weigh the interests of animals against humans, or how strong our duties are to improve the lives of distant strangers, or how to think about the ethics of bringing new people into existence. But we still need to act. So how should we make decisions in the face of such uncertainty? Though economists and philosophers have extensively studied the issue of decision-making in the face of uncertainty about matters of fact, the question of decision-making given fundamental moral uncertainty has been neglected. In this book, philosophers William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist and Toby Ord try to fill this gap. They argue that there are distinctive norms that govern how one ought to make decisions given moral uncertainty. They then defend an information-sensitive account of how to make such decisions according to which the correct way to act in the face of moral uncertainty depends on whether the moral theories in which one has credence are merely ordinal, cardinal, or both cardinal and intertheoretically comparable. They tackle the problem of how to make intertheoretic comparisons, discussing several novel potential solutions. Finally, they discuss implications of their view for metaethics and practical ethics, and show how their account can shed light on the value of moral enquiry.

scholarly journals Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 211-216
Author(s):  
William MacAskill ◽  
Krister Bykvist ◽  
Toby Ord
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Uncertainty ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Correct Rule ◽  
Moral Theories

We summarize the argument of the book: the case for taking moral uncertainty seriously, and the case for an information-sensitive account: the correct rule for making decisions under moral uncertainty depends crucially on the information provided by the moral theories in which one has credence. We then note some open questions that would require further work to address, such as how to axiomatize decision-making under moral uncertainty, how we should assign deontic statuses, such as permissible and impermissible, under moral uncertainty, and what a reasonable credence distribution across different moral theories looks like. We end by considering what implications our argument has for the value of doing moral philosophy, suggesting we should conclude that further normative research is one of the most important moral priorities of our time.

scholarly journals Maximizing Expected Choiceworthiness

2020 ◽  
pp. 39-56
Author(s):  
William MacAskill ◽  
Krister Bykvist ◽  
Toby Ord
Keyword(s):  
Interval Scale ◽  
Moral Uncertainty ◽  
Positive Argument ◽  
The Way

In this chapter we argue that, in conditions of interval-scale measurability and unit-comparability, one should maximize expected choice worthiness. Though this position has often been suggested in the literature and is often taken to be the ‘default’ view, it has so far received little in the way of positive argument in its favour. We start, in section I, by providing new arguments against two rival theories that have been proposed in the literature—the accounts which we call My Favourite Theory and My Favourite Option. Then we give a novel argument for the view that, under moral uncertainty, one should take into account both probabilities of different theories and magnitudes of choice-worthiness. Finally, we argue in favour of maximizing expected choice-worthiness (MEC).

scholarly journals Contemporary investigations of moral intuition in epistemology and cognitive science

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-89
Author(s):  
D.V. Ivanov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Ethical Decision ◽  
Ethical Decision Making ◽  
Moral Intuition ◽  
Epistemic State ◽  
Psychological Process ◽  
Moral Uncertainty

The article is devoted to the analysis and comparison of theories of moral intuition, actively discussed in epistemology and cognitive science in the first two decades of this century. At the beginning of the twentieth century intuitionism was a popular position in ethics. However, already in the middle of the last century this position was rejected by philoso­phers. At the beginning of the new century, we can see a return of interest in the study of in­tuition and its role in ethical decision-making. The main disciplines in which there is an in­crease in the number of studies of moral intuition are primarily cognitive science and epistemology. Approaches to the phenomenon of moral intuition in these disciplines are dif­ferent. Cognitive science, moral psychology, is primarily focused on understanding intu­ition as a psychological process characterized by a specific cognitive role. Epistemology is interested in moral intuition as an epistemic state, in what role it plays in justification of our knowledge of moral facts. However, despite the fact that moral intuition is understood dif­ferently in these disciplines, we can nevertheless highlight common points. The paper notes that the revival of interest in moral intuition is associated largely with the development of research in the field of decision theory, namely the development of a theory of ethical deci­sion-making. Another area of research, with which the study of moral intuition is closely re­lated, is the problem of moral uncertainty.

scholarly journals Influence of Emotions on Decision-Making

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 40
Author(s):  
Cida Sanches ◽  
Michele Franco
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Structured Interview ◽  
Decision Situation ◽  
Female Entrepreneurs ◽  
Male And Female ◽  
Empirical Base ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Intellectual Challenge

<p>The purpose of this study is to verify whether emotions and feelings influence the decisions of entrepreneurs differently in terms of gender using data collected via instruments i.e. questionnaire and a semi-structured interview. The findings suggest that out of 13 factors under study, 8 showed significant differences in the responses given by the two groups: love, unfairness, compassion, dissension, individualism, insecurity, anger and surprise. Men tend to face a decision situation as an intellectual challenge. They avoid listening to other people and decide rapidly, as they understand these actions as a sign of capacity and independence. The results showed that male and female entrepreneurs are significantly affected by feelings and emotions. Women showed a greater tendency than men did towards the following factors: love, jealousy and dissension. This study contributes to the entrepreneurship liteature and broadens the empirical base of studies related to the influence of emotions and feelings of male and female entrepreneurs, providing a possible new perspective regarding decisions, taking into account the gender of the decision maker.</p>

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